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Just as pronouns like she and he make anaphoric reference to individuals, English
words like that and so can be used to refer anaphorically to a proposition introduced in a
discourse: That’s true; She told me so. Much has been written about individual anaphora,
but less attention has been paid to propositional anaphora. This dissertation is a com-
prehensive examination of propositional anaphora, which I argue behaves like anaphora
in other domains, is conditioned by semantic factors, and is not conditioned by purely
syntactic factors nor by the at-issue status of a proposition.
I begin by introducing the concepts of anaphora and propositions, and then I discuss
the various words of English which can have this function: this, that, it, which, so, as, and
the null complement anaphor. I then compare anaphora to propositions with anaphora
in other domains, including individual, temporal, and modal anaphora. I show that the
same features which are characteristic of these other domains are exhibited by proposi-
tional anaphora as well.
I then present data on a wide variety of syntactic constructions—including sub-
clausal, monoclausal, multiclausal, and multisentential constructions—noting which li-
cense anaphoric reference to propositions. On the basis of this expanded empirical do-
main, I argue that anaphoric reference to a proposition is licensed not by any syntactic
category or movement but rather by the operators which take propositions as arguments.
With this generalization in hand, I turn to how such facts can be formally modeled: I
review existing systems which track anaphora and/or which make use of propositional
variables, and then introduce a new formalism which incorporates insights from these
existing systems.
Finally, I turn to the interaction between a proposition’s availability for anaphoric ref-
erence and its discourse status (in particular, its at-issue status). Contrary to the prevail-
ing assumption in the literature, I argue that there is no tight linking between these two
properties, and that one of the tests frequently used to diagnose at-issueness in fact di-
agnoses only anaphoric availability. I argue that propositional anaphora and at-issueness
are distinct, showing that at-issueness is neither necessary nor sufficient to determine a
proposition’s anaphoric potential.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation investigates the nature of propositional anaphora, wherein a word
refers back to the sort of entity denoted by a declarative sentence, among other things.
Consider the exchange in (1), in which comedian and talk show host Stephen Colbert
prepares to cajole his guest (and friend) Steve Carrell into performing alongside him.
(1) COLBERT: People still don’t know that you’re a great singer.
CARRELL: Mm, well, that’s not really true. But, thank you.
COLBERT: That you’re a great singer-
CARRELL: Yes
COLBERT: or that people don’t know?
CARRELL: That I’m a great singer. But that’s nice of you to say.
COLBERT: Do people- do you guys- Are aware that he’s a great singer?
[audience cheers]
COLBERT: No one knows that, Steve Carrell. . . . Let’s do a song.
(The Late Show with Stephen Colbert, December 7, 2015)
In this exchange, what Colbert and Carrell are negotiating—explicitly—is what Carrell
meant by that when he said that’s not really true. This is a case where the existence of
propositional anaphora becomes apparent, as it (like other anaphoric processes) is sub-
ject to ambiguity, and so sometimes requires extra work for conversational participants
to successfully coordinate on a meaning. That in this case is a propositional anaphor, and
refers to one of the two salient propositions floating around: (a) Carrell is a great singer;
or (b) People don’t know (a). Colbert mentions both possible interpretations, and Carrell
clarifies that he was denying (a). In fact, both speakers then go on to use the same propo-
sitional anaphor that, to again refer to the same proposition: Carrell in that’s nice of you to
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say and Colbert in No one knows that.
Of course, both Colbert and Carrell are comedians, and playing around with language
is par for the course. But propositional anaphora is not limited to the comedic, nor is it
always so explicitly negotiated. For a more serious, and perhaps more antagonistic exam-
ple of propositional anaphora in action—or more accurately, a careful use of propositional
anaphora—, consider the exchange in (2), which took place during the confirmation hear-
ing for Tom Price, then the nominee for the United States Secretary of Health and Human
Services.
(2) SENATOR
BROWN:
President Trump said that he’s working with you on a replace-
ment plan for the ACA which is nearly finished and will be re-
vealed after your confirmation, is that true?
PRICE: It’s true that he said that, yes.
(Senate Finance Committee hearing, January 24, 2017)
In this exchange, it is clear that what Senator Sherrod Brown really wants to know is
whether such a replacement plan exists. But this isn’t what Price addresses, and yet he
seems to somehow be following the rules of the conversational game. One might consider
him sneaky, or clever, but he avoids answering the Senator’s question without ignoring it.
He does this by responding to one way to construe the Senator’s question, where the that
in Senator Brown’s is that true? question tag refers not to the proposition ‘President Trump
is working with Price on a replacement plan. . . ’, but instead to the proposition ‘President
Trump said. . . ’ This question, so construed, is not the sort of thing a Senator is likely
to ask at a confirmation hearing, and it’s highly unlikely that Price actually interpreted
the question that way. Nevertheless, he pretended to, and his response, while perhaps
elusive, ‘followed the rules of the game’.
These sorts of examples indicate how often we make and resolve anaphoric reference
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to propositions, as well as the range of contexts in which we do so. This phenomenon is
the focus of this dissertation. I will investigate the anaphors themselves, the constructions
which introduce propositions into a discourse such that they can be referred to, and the
relationship between them. I will discuss when such anaphoric reference to propositions
is available, what mediates its availability, and discuss how to model it formally.
The sort of reference to propositions I am interested in has also been called discourse
deixis (Webber 1988), sentential anaphora (Gast & Ko¨nig 2008), and abstract object anaphora
(Asher 1993). Like Needham (2012), I will prefer the label propositional anaphora over these
other terms. The term deixis carries a meaning relating to focus-shifting (Ehlich 1982;
Cornish 1992), where some of the anaphors which take part in this process have been
argued not to switch focus but to maintain it (Gundel, Hegarty & Borthen 2003; Ehlich
1982 on it, Needham 2012 on so). The term sentential anaphora, meanwhile, is a syntactic
characterization, and one which is in fact too narrow. Part of my goal here is to investigate
precisely which constructions make such anaphoric reference possible, and I show that in
fact many subsentential constructions do (in Chapter 3), so the term sentential anaphora
isn’t sufficiently precise. And finally, Asher 1993 uses the term abstract object anaphora as
an umbrella term which includes proposition anaphora as distinct from anaphora to events,
facts, possibilities, and concepts. I carve up ontological space differently from Asher 1993,
however, and will consider a range of phenomena under the umbrella of “propositional
anaphora” that Asher 1993 would subdivide, in part, on the basis of head nouns which
can take that-clause complements, like fact, myth, and belief. For me, these complements
are all propositional, regardless of the head noun involved, and so I will call these all
“propositional anaphora”. I discuss the typologies of Asher 1993 and others further when
I discuss the notion of a proposition in Chapter 2.
In Chapter 2, I address the question What is propositional anaphora? I introduce the phe-
nomenon of anaphora broadly, and give examples of anaphora to individuals, to events,
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and to propositions, the lattermost of which is the focus of the dissertation. I then intro-
duce the notion of a proposition and its role in contemporary natural language semantics,
before turning to the various anaphors of English which can pick up on propositional con-
tents. Finally, I explore a variety of features which have been discussed as characteristic
of anaphora across domains: individual anaphora, tense anaphora, and modal anaphora
(Partee 1973, 1984; Stone 1997). I show that propositional anaphora, like anaphora in
these other domains, exhibits these same features, including both referential and bound
readings, linguistic and non-linguistic antecedents, ‘donkey’ examples, and strict/sloppy
ambiguities. I argue, thus, that propositional anaphora is just that: anaphora.
Having looked at the anaphors themselves, I then turn to the things they refer to. I’m
interested in the structures that do and don’t allow for subsequent anaphoric reference.
In other words, in Chapter 3, I address the question What licenses propositional anaphora?
Karttunen (1969) introduced the term discourse referent to mean those things which are
discussed in a text and which can be picked out by anaphors, and Karttunen 1969 was a
detailed exploration of which nominal constructions introduced individual discourse ref-
erents. Chapter 3 does the same in the propositional domain, examining a wide range of
constructions—subclausal, monoclausal, multiclausal, and multisentential—to determine
which of them make a proposition available for anaphoric reference, that is, introduce a
propositional discourse referent. In doing so, I compare the observed facts to the proposal
put forward in Krifka 2013, which makes predictions about when propositional discourse
referents are introduced on the basis of the presence or absence of a particular syntactic
category, namely the Tense Phrase (TP). Ultimately, I argue that this type of syntactic
generalization of the observed facts is untenable, and that neither syntactic category nor
syntactic movement type are sufficient to capture the data. Instead, I argue that a gen-
eralization must be sensitive to the semantic type of the objects involved in a sentence’s
composition. And, where Krifka 2013 associates the introduction of propositional dis-
course referents with a clause, I argue that the introduction of discourse referents should
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be attributed not to a proposition-denoting object but to the operator which takes that
proposition as its argument.
Having developed a clearer picture of the empirical landscape in Chapter 3, I turn
to the theoretical in Chapter 4, addressing the question How can we model propositional
anaphora? I begin by providing background on a number of existing formal systems,
including Dynamic Predicate Logic (Groenendijk & Stokhof 1991), Discourse Representa-
tion Theory (in particular that of Asher 1993), Update with Centering (Bittner 2009, 2011),
and others. Some of these formalism are built to account for anaphora, in particular in-
dividual anaphora; others are built with mechanisms for the explicit representations of
propositions, even if not considering the anaphoric potential thereof. For each system,
I discuss what would need to be changed (if anything) in order to account for the data
observed in Chapter 3. I then present a novel formal approach, taking insights from sev-
eral of these existing systems, to account for the data presented here. I introduce the
system with a few illustrative examples, using declarative sentences, sentential negation,
embedding verbs, and relative clauses, and then discuss some issues around the com-
positionality of the system and describe what would be desirable in a successor to this
system. Finally, I discuss the way this proposed system models the status of a proposi-
tions, which raises questions about the differing statuses that a proposition can have in a
discourse model.
These questions about the status of a proposition, as it relates to its anaphoric poten-
tial, are the motivation for the final chapter. There is a growing body of literature inves-
tigating the effects of the discourse status of a proposition—in particular, its at-issue sta-
tus. At-issueness has been associated with a proposition’s truth-conditional contribution,
with presupposition projection, and more (see Potts 2005; Tonhauser, Beaver, Roberts &
Simons 2013, a.o.). Chapter 5 addresses the question How does a proposition’s availability for
anaphoric reference interact with its at-issue status? There is a presumption in the literature
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that these two phenomena, though a priori distinct, are tightly linked; this is reflected both
in the way at-issueness is diagnosed (Tonhauser 2012) and how it is modeled (Murray
2010, 2014; AnderBois, Brasoveanu & Henderson 2013), even as researchers debate how
at-issueness should be defined. Focusing on the Simons, Tonhauser, Beaver & Roberts
2010 definition of at-issueness, I argue that these two phenomena are in fact distinct, and
that one of the tests frequently used to diagnose at-issue status is in fact not diagnostic of
at-issueness, but of anaphoric potential. If one instead uses the other two classes of diag-
nostics from Tonhauser 2012, which I argue are more reliable diagnostics for Simons et al.
2010 at-issueness, then the anaphoric availability of a proposition becomes differentiable
from its at-issue status. As I demonstrate, at-issueness is neither necessary nor sufficient
for a proposition to be available for anaphoric reference: I present examples of felicitous
anaphora to not-at-issue propositions, as well as at-issue propositions which systemati-
cally fail to be available for propositional anaphora. I then discuss what this means for
our theories of at-issueness and and how we model it.
Ultimately, this dissertation aims to provide (the beginnings of) a comprehensive
and systematic examination of propositional anaphora. Up to this point, linguists and
philosophers of language have been aware of the phenomenon, but there has not been an
in-depth examination of how it works, and when. This dissertation aims to fill this gap.
In doing so, I show that a careful examination of propositional anaphora also provides in-
sights into the behavior of a wide range of linguistic phenomena, including: small clause
embedding verbs; epistemic and root modals; sentential adverbs; the underlying struc-
tures of raising and control constructions; matrix and embedded interrogatives; and the
nature of at-issueness.
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CHAPTER 2
PROPOSITIONAL ANAPHORA IS ANAPHORA
2.1 Introduction
We use natural language (at least) to talk about topics. We introduce topics and com-
ment on them. Sometimes, it is useful or desirable to continue discussing an already
introduced topic, to comment on a topic that has already had been commented on. We
might do this to further elaborate on a topic, adding new information, or to negotiate
about comments that have already been made, perhaps seeking further information or
even disagreeing with prior comments. In order to do this, we need a way to refer back
to topics that have already been introduced. We can do this with anaphora, as in (3).
(3) Joan napped. She had been very tired.
We understand the meaning of the pronoun she, which is an anaphor, as referring back to
the same individual as the one picked out by the name Joan.1 Joan is the antecedent of the
anaphor she. For ease of identification, the anaphors we’ll be paying attention to will be
italicized, with their respective antecedents underlined.
The phenomenon as a whole is called anaphora, from Ancient Greek ana´- ‘up, back’ +
phe´ro¯ ‘to carry’. In most cases, as in (4a), the anaphor follows its antecedent, forcing a
hearer to recall back to a previously-mentioned entity (or, on a written page, to look up,
higher on the page). When the anaphor precedes its antecedent, we call it cataphoric (from
Ancient Greek kata´- ‘down’), as in (4b).2
1Chomsky 1981 uses the term anaphor so as to exclude pronouns, referring instead only to reflexives
(e.g., herself ) and reciprocals (e.g., each other). I will be using the term to refer to any word that gets its
meaning from some other expression, including but not limited to pronouns.
2This ana´- is cognate with English on, and is the same ‘up’ as in English anatomy (lit. ‘cut up’). Mean-
while, kata´- gives us English catacomb.
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(4) a. Because Joan had been very tired, she napped.
b. Because she had been very tired, Joan napped.
Regardless of the ordering, both of the examples in (4) are considered to have an
anaphoric relation between anaphor and antecedent.
These examples can be called nominal anaphora, in that the antecedent is introduced
by a noun phrase (or a determiner phrase): this is a syntactic characterization. But (3)
is perhaps better considered individual anaphora, in that the antecedent refers to an indi-
vidual: this is a semantic characterization. We can use individual anaphora to refer to
both singular and plural individuals (Link 1983), whether introduced by names (5a–5b),
indefinite descriptions (5c), or quantifiers (5d–5e), as well as to fictional individuals (5f).
And, lest we think of “individual” as referring just to humans, individual anaphora can
able be used to refer to places (5g), objects (5h), kinds (5i), and abstract concepts (5j).
(5) a. Agatha Christie went to library. She started looking at biographies.
b. Kim and Jessie went to library. They started looking at biographies.
c. A woman went to library. She started looking at biographies.
d. Some women went to library. They started looking at biographies.
e. Every girl in the class went to library, and went straight for her favorite book.
f. Nancy Drew went to the library. She started looking at biographies.
g. Joan went to the library. That was her favorite place in town.
h. Joan’s book was on the floor. She picked it up and put it back on the shelf.
i. The horse is indigenous to eastern Chile. It is a magnificent creature.
(cf. Carlson 1977)
j. At the academy, Fran learned love for her country. It shaped the course of her
career.
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We can also use anaphors to refer to events, the types of things denoted by verb
phrases, as in (6), and to refer to propositions, which are denoted by (at least) declarative
sentences, as in (7).
(6) Joan went to the library. She had been meaning to do that all week.
(7) Joan went to the library. She told me that.
Other processes in natural language have been argued to rely on similarly anaphoric rela-
tions, including the interpretation of tense (Partee 1973, 1984), modality (Stone 1997), re-
sponse particles (Krifka 2013; Roelofsen & Farkas 2015), and discourse relations (Webber,
Stone, Joshi & Knott 2003). Verb phrase ellipsis has also been argued to be an anaphoric
process (Ginzburg & Sag 2000).
This dissertation focuses on propositional anaphora, as exemplified in (7).
In this first chapter, I introduce some background on anaphora (§2.2), and on propo-
sitions (§2.3), before turning to expressions of English which can refer anaphorically to
propositions (§2.4). In §2.5, I demonstrate that propositional anaphora behaves in parallel
to other domains, including individual, tense, and modal anaphora.
2.2 Anaphora
Anaphora is the phenomenon wherein the meaning of a linguistic expression, in par-
ticular in referring to an entity of some type, depends on the interpretation of some other
linguistic expression. In a prototypical case like (3), repeated here, the anaphor she is
understood as coreferential with the name Joan, its antecedent.
(3) Joan napped. She had been very tired.
The interpretation of her depends on our interpretation of Joan: the entity that Joan picks
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out is the same one that her refers to.
This characterization of anaphora is imperfect, however (King & Lewis 2017). There
are examples of anaphora which don’t properly refer, such at the anaphor her in (5e). In
this bound use, the anaphor doesn’t pick out any individual, but instead covaries with
the quantifier. In this sense, the interpretation of her depends on the interpretation of
every girl, but the anaphor still doesn’t refer. It’s also not sufficiently precise to say that
anaphora describes simply when the interpretation of one expression depends on the
interpretation of another: such a definition would include disambiguation of lexically
ambiguous words like bank, as in (8).
(8) John is down by the bank of the river. (King & Lewis 2017: (1))
The interpretation of the word bank here depends on the interpretation of the word river—
so as to disambiguate it from the ‘financial institution’ meaning—but we wouldn’t want
to say that bank is anaphoric on river. Finally, the characterization above presumes that the
antecedent, on which the interpretation of the anaphor depends, is a linguistic expression;
as we will see in §2.5, this is too strict a definition.
Because of these issues, and because of the variety of types of objects which can be
involved, anaphora can be difficult to define. In characterizing it, Webber et al. 2003 dis-
tinguishes three classes of anaphora: coreference, indirect anaphora, and lexically speci-
fied anaphora. Coreference includes the examples shown above, where an anaphor refers
to the same entity as its antecedent.3 This category includes “split reference”, where a
plural-marked anaphor picks up entities mentioned separately in the discourse, as in (9).
(9) Joan went to the library, and saw Marcia there. They hugged.
3On the Webber et al. 2003 classification, this presumably includes examples of bound anaphora like
(5e), even though they don’t properly refer.
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Indirect anaphora describes cases where an anaphor picks up not a discourse referent,
but rather an associate of a discourse referent, as in (10).
(10) Myra darted to a phone and picked up the receiver. (Webber et al. 2003: (25))4
The noun phrase a phone doesn’t specifically introduce a discourse referent for the its
receiver, but nonetheless the definite noun phrase the receiver is understood in (10) as
referring to the phone’s receiver. The term “indirect anaphora” comes from Hellman &
Fraurud 1996, but this class has also been called bridging anaphora (Clark 1975; Clark &
Marshall 1981; Not, Tovena & Zancanaro 1999), partial anaphora (Luperfoy 1992), textual
ellipsis (Hahn, Markert & Strube 1996), associative anaphora (Cosse 1996), and inferrables
(Prince 1992).
In the third class, lexically specified anaphora, an anaphor denotes a function which
takes the antecedent (or an associate of the antecedent) as its argument, and returns a
referent. Webber et al. 2003 provides (11) and (12) as examples (among others).
(11) I dont like sitting in this room. Can we move elsewhere? (Webber et al. 2003: (31))
(12) Sue lifted the receiver as Tom darted to the other phone. (Webber et al. 2003: (27))
In (11), elsewhere takes the place denoted by this room as its argument, referring to a (con-
textually restricted) complement set. In (12), the other phone refers to a phone distinct from
the phone which is associated with the receiver. In addition to noun phrases with other,
and the pronoun elsewhere, Webber et al. 2003 lists “NPs with such but no postmodifying
as phrase” and “comparative NPs with no postmodifying than phrase” as other examples
of lexically specified anaphora, following Bierner 2001. Webber et al. 2003 goes on to ar-
gue that discourse adverbials like then, also, otherwise, nevertheless, and instead also fall into
this class of anaphora.
4Emphasis as in the original.
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For the purposes of this dissertation, we’ll be focusing on the first class of anaphora,
coreference, wherein an anaphor simply refers to the entity picked out by the antecedent.
Whether propositions have associates, or can be associates of other entities, in the way re-
quired for indirect anaphora remains an open question for future work.5,6 It is also unclear
whether there are lexically specified anaphoric expressions, parallel to other, which mod-
ify proposition-denoting expressions, such that this class generalizes across propositional
anaphora as well.7 For the meantime, we will focus on the simplest cases of propositional
anaphora—the coreference class—to establish the groundwork for future exploration of
these questions.
2.3 Propositions
This topic of this dissertation is anaphoric reference to propositions, but what is a
proposition? Up to this point, I have merely asserted that propositions are things denoted
by declarative sentences. In this section, I’ll present some background on the role that
propositions have in modern conceptions of natural language semantics, in particular as
relates to the questions of anaphora that I will be pursuing here.
We have the intuition that speakers can use different words to convey the same mean-
ing, that they can ‘say the same thing’. For example, we have the sense that (13) and (14)
mean the same thing (at least in the United States), despite the fact that they use different
words.
5Webber et al. 2003 does not specify the limits of the assoc function, which takes an entity and returns
the set of its associates, so it’s not clear how it might interact with propositional discourse referents.
6We may need a type-shifting function between propositions and individuals, along the lines of Partee
1987; Ter Meulen 1995, to account for sentences like (i).
(i) Joan napped. That fact pleased Ernest.
The definite NP that fact denotes an individual, and is anaphoric on the first sentence, Joan napped, which
denotes a proposition. While these phrases denote objects of different types, they still pick out the same
entity (the proposition ‘Joan napped’), so this is likely distinct from the assoc function needed to resolve
Webber et al.’s (2003) indirect anaphora. This is coreference, albeit across types.
7These types of modifiers can certainly combine with individual-denoting expressions which can then
be type-shifted to propositions, such as the other belief, but this is still individual-denoting.
12
(13) [Claire’s mother:] My daughter is an attorney.
(14) [Claire’s daughter:] My mom is a lawyer.
What’s more, we have the sense that (15) means the same thing as (13) and (14), even
though it is in a different language entirely (namely Spanish).
(15) [Claire’s mother:] Mi hija es abogada.
We can capture these intuitions by making use of the notion of a proposition: these
sentences mean the same thing, even though they use different words (in different lan-
guages), because they express the same proposition. Propositions are simply the truth-
conditions of declarative sentences, or as Perry 1993 quotes Frege, “that for which truth
arises”: we understand a sentence (no matter which words are used) when we identify
the proposition associated with it.
And just as we use propositions to capture sameness across sentences and languages,
we can also use propositions to capture sameness of belief and other attitudes: if two
people share the same belief, it is not in virtue of any linguistic object (e.g., a sentence)
that they do so, but rather because they stand in the same relation to the same propo-
sition.8 As a result, we say that that-clauses, the sorts of things embedded under atti-
tude verbs in English, denote propositions. Propositions are also useful for representing
modal statements: it is not a linguistic object which is described by necessary or possible,
but a proposition. Linguists and philosophers of language continue to debate the role of
propositions in interrogative and imperative sentences, but at least for Stalnaker 1976: 79,
the role of propositions is not restricted to declarative sentences: “Propositions are things
people express when they make predictions or promises, give orders or advice. They are
8In defending a possible world semantics as a way to capture propositions, Stalnaker 1976: 82 says: “If
desires and beliefs are to be understood in terms of their role in the rational determination of action, then
their objects have nothing essential to do with language. It is conceivable (whether or not it is true) that
there are rational creatures who have beliefs and desires, but who do not use language, and who have no
internal representations of their attitudes which have a linguistic form.”
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also things people doubt, assume, believe to be very likely, and hope are true.”
While sharing this central idea of the function of propositions, people have disagreed
about how best to understand them. In a possible worlds semantics, a proposition de-
noted by a sentence is a set of worlds: the worlds which make the sentence true (see
Lewis 1970; Montague 1970; Stalnaker 1976, among others). If worlds are fully-settled
maximally-determined states of affairs, then this notion of a proposition can run aground
of issues related to identity9 and logical omniscience.10 To avoid these issues, some re-
searchers adopt accounts of propositions which allow for more fine-grained distinctions
than just reference to possible worlds. This has been handled in different ways, including
Russellian structured propositions, which have internal structure that includes individ-
uals and the relations that hold among them (see Barwise & Perry 1981; Soames 1987,
among others). For more detailed reviews of the different views on propositions, see
Hanks 2009; King 2017. Ultimately, presuming that we adopt some system that can dif-
ferentiate between propositions that are true at the same worlds (whether along the lines
of Barwise & Perry 1981 or Cresswell 1985), the differences between these different con-
ceptions of propositions will not bear on the questions about anaphora I will address
here.
There are researchers who make finer distinctions among the types of things I will be
considering propositions here. For example, Peterson 1982 and Parsons 1993 distinguish
facts as a distinct category from propositions, on the basis of predicates which seem to
take one but not the other. Peterson’s (1982) typology is in (16–17), and Parsons’s (1993)
examples in (18).
9Because sets are defined by their members, the proposition ‘Superman can fly’ is indistinguishable
from the proposition ‘Clark Kent can fly’, even though it’s easy to imagine someone who might recognize
one proposition as true while disbelieving the other.
10If mathematical truths like ‘2 + 2 = 4’ and ‘8675309 is prime’ are true at all possible worlds, then how
is it that rational agents can fail to know the truth value of certain statements of mathematics?
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(16) Predicates of facts
-matters, -amuses, -explains, -surprises, realizes-, remembers-, discovers-, knows-,
hears-, -tragic, -important, -significant, -crazy, -odd, -mysterious, -result, -fact,
-explanation, -consequence, -reason, -upshot, etc. (Peterson 1982: (7))
(17) Predicates of propositions
believes-, fears-, hopes-, wants-, thinks-, affirms-, denies-, -(un)likely,
-(im)possible, -(in)consistent, -seems strange, -appears important, -sure, -true,
-certain, -proposal, -hypothesis, etc. (Peterson 1982: (9))
(18) a. * She believes everything her mother regrets.
b. * She says everything that is tragic.
c. * Whatever amuses him is likely. (Parsons 1993: 455)
Some of these classifications simply seem erroneous, like amuse or tragic, which can take
both individual and event arguments, as in (19) and (20) respectively.
(19) a. Magnus’s sideburns are bushy.
b. Magnus’s sideburns amuse me.
c. Magnus’s sideburns are tragic.
(20) a. The destruction of the city lasted three days.
b. The destruction of the city amused Nero.
c. The destruction of the city was tragic.
Moreover, that Peterson 1982 classifies true as a predicate of propositions—and not of
facts—should raise concerns. After all, the central distinction between propositions and
fact, on this line of reasoning, is the truth of the latter.
“‘Facts, facts, facts’ cries the scientist if he wants to bring home the necessity of
a firm foundation for science. What is a fact? A fact is a thought that is true.”
(Frege 1918: 307)
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In other words, facts are just propositions which are (thought to be) true in a world. But
that is not a reason to consider them distinct entities; rather facts are a subset of proposi-
tions, namely the true ones. We can distinguish between individuals which are dogs and
individuals which are not dogs, and the predicate Border Collie will apply only to individ-
uals of the former type. But that alone is not reason to distinguish dogs type-theoretically
from individuals; dogs are merely a subset of individuals.
Similarly, Asher 1993 distinguishes both facts and possibilities as distinct types of en-
tities from propositions. For Asher 1993, the distinction is on the basis of the “extended
Vendlerian argument” (31), which considers which predicates are compatible with differ-
ent noun phrases which take that-clause complements (in the spirit of Vendler 1957). For
example, Asher 1993 argues on the basis of (21) that announce “may be satisfied by facts
but not by thoughts or propositions”, and thus that facts and propositions are distinct.
(21) a. John announced the fact that he was married.
b. # John announced the thought (claim) that he was married.
(Asher 1993: 31: (45))
Similarly, Asher 1993 argues on the basis of fear in (22) that possibilities are distinct from
both facts and propositions.
(22) a. John feared the possibility that Mary had left without him.
b. ? John feared the claim that Mary had left without him.
c. John believed the claim that Mary had left without him.
d. ? John believed the possibility that Mary had left without him.
e. ? John feared the fact that Mary had left without him.
(Asher 1993: 31: (46–47))
But this style of argument is about head nouns, not about the types of their arguments.
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On this approach, one would further have to distinguish, say, suspicions as a privileged
type of entity: suspicion is incompatible with announce, as in (23a), and so doesn’t denote
a fact; it is incompatible with believe, as in (23b), and so doesn’t denote a proposition; and
it is incompatible with fear, as in (23c), and so doesn’t denote a possibility.
(23) a. # John announced the suspicion that he was married.
b. # John believed the suspicion that Mary had left without him.
c. # John feared the suspicion that Mary had left without him.
For the purposes of this dissertation, I will treat all of these things as one type of entity:
propositions. As Hanks 2009 points out, sentences like those in (24), which make use of
believe, know, and fear, suggest that these predicates all relate to entities of the same type.11
(24) a. Everything Andy believes, Jon knows.
b. Andy fears something that Jon knows.
I will call that type a proposition, and examine its anaphoric properties.
This is not to say that we can’t use predicates to diagnose the type of an argument.
On the contrary, I’ll be using that method extensively, to distinguish propositions from
events and individuals (though not from facts or possibilities, which I’ve argued above
are subtypes of propositions). For the purposes of this work, I take it as given that having
a truth value is a property of propositions (and not events), as is being known, believed,
and many properties introduced by attitude verbs. Events, unlike individuals and propo-
sitions, occur at a particular time and place, and therefore can be arguments of certain
predicates of time and space. Individuals similarly have their own predicates. For exam-
ple, consider the triplets in (25–27):
11See also King 2002 on how these different predicates can interact and how to explain substitution
failures without resorting to additional types.
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(25) a. John is tall.
b. # John’s skateboarding is tall.
c. # That John went skateboarding is tall.
(26) a. # John took place this morning.
b. John’s skateboarding took place this morning.
c. # That John went skateboarding took place this morning.
(27) a. # John is true.
b. # John’s skateboarding is true.
c. That John went skateboarding is true.
The predicate tall exemplifies a class of predicates which take individuals—but not events
or propositions—as arguments, as in (25). Take place, meanwhile, describes events, but
not individuals or propositions, as they don’t have ‘runtimes’, as in (26).12 And, finally,
as desired, true is compatible with propositional arguments, but not with individuals or
events, as in (27). These sorts of predicates will be useful diagnostics for determining
what type of argument a construction denotes. Some such predicates can be tricky, as
they appear to take other types as argument as well, either by lexical ambiguity13 or by
coercion,14 but we’ll avoiding such confounds whenever possible.
Before concluding, it’s worth discussing the type-logical type of a proposition. On a
12Individuals might have lifespans, but these times seem to be distinct from event runtimes, as a sentence
like (ii) is ungrammatical.
(ii) * Catherine the Great took place from 1729 to 1796.
13For example, know can take an individual as an argument if it is used in the sense of ‘be familiar with’.
These two meanings are distinct, and are lexicalized as different words in many other languages: it’s merely
a quirk of English that they’re homophonous.
14For example, was yesterday can take an individual as an argument if we understand some additional
predicate to have been elided. In certain contexts, one might take (iii) to mean that Carmen’s scheduled
time, e.g. for giving a presentation, was yesterday.
(iii) Carmen was yesterday.
This isn’t about Carmen having occurred at a particular time, but about understanding the name Carmen to
pick out some salient event (as only events, not individuals or propositions, occur at times).
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simple possible worlds model, a proposition is a set of worlds, and so is type 〈s, t〉. This
is the type usually assigned to propositions, despite sets of worlds not being sufficient for
proposition individuation: it acts as a sort of shorthand for ‘sets of worlds, or whatever
appropriately fine-grained alternative replaces them’. For the most part, I will adopt this
convention as well.
Throughout, I will use the term “proposition” to mean not just maximally-specified
situations, but to include open propositions as well. An open proposition is a proposition
with one or more arguments filled by an unbound variable, and we’ll need them in order
to account for examples like (28) and (29).
(28) Jasmine is a scholar, and that is true of Kendra as well.
(29) Daniel is an honest person today, and that was true yesterday as well.
In (28), the proposition which is true of Kendra must be ‘x is a scholar’—an open
proposition—rather than ‘Jasmine is a scholar’, which cannot be true of Kendra. The
subject position is left ‘open’ from the proposition described by the first clause. A parallel
thing happens in (29), except with a temporal variable. The proposition which is asserted
to be true of the time picked out by yesterday is ‘Daniel is an honest person at time t’. In
both of these cases, the anaphor that seems to pick out not a fully-specified proposition
but an open proposition.15 I leave aside for now the question of whether these are always
open, or whether they are created by an abstraction procedure.
There is one point worth mentioning here regarding the way propositions compose
with attitude verbs. Propositions are the sorts of things which attitudes (like belief) are
about, so the straightforward assumption would be that verbs like believe take arguments
of type 〈s, t〉 for the target of the attitude (in addition to a type e argument for the attitude-
15At least for (28), this open proposition appears suspiciously similar to a property. However, the objects
we are interested in here can be described by true and false, and are things that can be known or doubted or
believed; these sorts of descriptions appear suitable in talk of propositions, but not talk of properties.
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holder). On a Kratzer 2006 account, though, attitude verbs like believe take two arguments
of type e: the attitude-holder, and an individual which conveys propositional content.
Moulton 2015: 310 argues that both that-clauses and content nouns like myth, story, and
rumor “denote properties of individuals that carry propositional content (type 〈e, st〉)”,
and so can combine together via Predicate Modification, and can be taken (together or
individually) by verbs like believe. To achieve this, Moulton 2015 has the complementizer
that take a proposition and return the set of individuals which carry that proposition’s
content. For the purposes of this dissertation, I’ll be talking about that-clauses (including
as complements of attitude verbs or content nouns) as denoting propositions, because
these type differences won’t be directly relevant for the anaphora facts I’m interested in.
Whether that-clauses directly denote propositions—type 〈s, t〉—, or whether they denote
properties (of entities that carry propositional content)—type 〈e, 〈s, t〉〉 (Moulton 2015)
or type 〈e, t〉 (Elliott forthcoming)16—with the proposition itself as the argument of the
complementizer, either way a proposition is encoded in the derivation of the clause. And
it is the anaphoric properties of that proposition which I will be examining here.
2.4 Anaphors
In this section, I’ll review the English words which can function as propositional
anaphors. In particular, these are the demonstratives this and that, the proform that, the
relative pronoun which, and the coordinators as and so. I’ll also look at null compelement
anaphora, where there is no explicit anaphor but where reference is nevertheless made to
an antecedent proposition. There are interesting questions about the inventory of propo-
sitional anaphors across languages, and it is by no means a given that the English set is
paradigmatic; those questions will remain for future work, however.
16See Elliott forthcoming for more on the semantics of that-clauses, and for a syntactic distinction to be
made between classes of DPs, those which (can) host propositional content and those which cannot.
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2.4.1 The demonstratives this and that
We normally think of demonstratives (like this and that) as picking out an individual
or some other entity which is made salient in the context, usually by nonlinguistic means.
(30) [After unlocking the door, Xander leads a friend into his apartment.]
Well, this is my place.
(31) [Kay finds her favorite guitar pick in her jacket pocket.]
I was wondering where this went.
(32) [At a school soccer game, Christina points at a child who’s just scored.]
That’s my son!
(33) [Cedric sees Kelly reading a rare first edition Austen novel.]
I can’t imagine where she found that.
In (30), the anaphor this refers to the place that has been raised to salience by being newly
available to the interlocutors. In (31), this refers to Kay’s guitar pick, raised to salience by
having just been found. In (32), the anaphor that refers to the child who had just made
himself relatively salient by scoring a goal. In (33), that refers to the rare Austen novel
which Cedric sees Kelly reading, salient (at least to Cedric) due to its rarity.
In addition to picking out salient individuals in the context, English uses its singular
demonstratives to anaphorically refer to propositional discourse referents.
(34) A: Did you hear? Kyle won the race!
B: a. This I know.
b. I know this.
c. That I know.
d. I know that.
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The plural demonstratives these and those, however, cannot be used as propositional
anaphors; contrast (34) with (35).
(35) A: Did you hear? Kyle won the race!
B: a. # These I know.
b. # I know these.
c. # Those I know.
d. # I know those.
Even when there are multiple propositions being discussed, as in (36), the plural demon-
stratives are infelicitous.
(36) [Farah challenges Jeremy and Stu to tell her something about whales that she
doesn’t already know.]
Jeremy: Blue whales are pregnant for 10–12 months.
Stu: You can tell how old a whale is by counting the rings in its earwax.
Farah: a. # These I know.
b. # I know these.
c. # Those I know.
d. # I know those.
These plural demonstratives can be felicitous in this context with some help, as in (2.4.1),
but the addition of are things indicate that we’re no longer dealing with propositional
anaphora; instead, this is individual anaphora, with things (or, equally, facts) performing
an ‘individuating’ function, that is, giving us individual-type arguments.17
17These are individuals with propositional content; see Moulton 2015 and discussion in the previous
section.
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(36′) Farah: a. These are things I know.
b. I know these things.
c. Those are things I know.
d. I know those things.
The singular this and that, though, remain felicitous even when referring to (plural
complexes of) multiple propositions, as in (37).
(37) [Farah challenges Jeremy and Stu to tell her something about whales that she
doesn’t already know.]
Jeremy: Blue whales are pregnant for 10–12 months.
Stu: You can tell how old a whale is by counting the rings in its earwax.
Farah: a. This I know.
b. I know this.
c. That I know.
d. I know that.
Up to this point, I have discussed the demonstratives this and that as though they
were monolithic; and, indeed, they have been described as such: Webber 1988 argues that
the two are interchangeable, differing only in a speaker’s “psychological distance” to the
referent. However, the two demonstratives do differ in use. In particular, the proximal
this allows for cataphoric uses—that is, forward-looking reference to antecedents not yet
introduced—where the distal that does not. Consider the utterances in the context of (38).
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(38) [Discussing who was at the party last week; Erik hasn’t yet been mentioned.]
a. i. This is what I was told: Erik was there.
ii. # That is what I was told: Erik was there.
b. i. I was told this: Erik was there.
ii. # I was told that: Erik was there.
c. i. Erik was there. This is what I was told (by Joanna).
ii. Erik was there. That is what I was told (by Joanna).
d. i. Erik was there. I was told this (by Joanna).
ii. Erik was there. I was told that (by Joanna).
The examples in (38a)–(38b) are cataphoric, in that the antecedent—Erik was there—is not
yet introduced at the time the anaphor is uttered. In these cases, this is acceptable, but that
leads the sentences to be judged as infelicitous. The sentences in (38c)–(38d), on the other
hand, are anaphoric (in the strict arrangement sense) in that the antecedent occurs before
the anaphor (here, a demonstrative) doing the referring. In these cases, both this and that
are acceptable. So where this can be used for both anaphoric and cataphoric uses, that is
strictly for anaphoric—that is, backwards-looking—use.
One way that we can understand this distinction is by looking at how people tend to
use this and that, even in contexts where both would perhaps be licit. Lord & Dahlgren
1997 found that the proximal this is more often used to refer to discourse referents18 which
are considered topical to a discourse, where that is more often used with discourse ref-
erents which are considered peripheral. If this generalizes, then we might explain the
behavior in (38) as a consequence of the more peripheral nature of that, which as a result
cannot be used to introduce new topics into the discourse. That said, Lord & Dahlgren
18Lord & Dahlgren 1997 looks at anaphora to all types of discourse referents, including individuals,
events (both eventive and stative), and propositions.
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1997 suggests that those results may be genre-dependent, so there may be more work
needed in order to explain the incompatibility of that with cataphoric uses.
It seems, then, that the proximal demonstrative, this, is in some sense the more general
‘all-purpose’ anaphor of the two demonstratives, where the distal that is reserved for truly
anaphoric anaphoric uses. Given this all-purpose/specific dichotomy, we might expect
that for some speakers the anaphoric (in the spatial sense) use of this would be somewhat
marked (although still acceptable), considering that the word that is equally available
and more specific to the task as a possible competitor; and this is precisely the case. Some
speakers prefer (38cii) over (38ci), and (38dii) over (38di), for example. This is in line with
a ‘competition of forms’ story for words which are otherwise interchangeable, as they are
in a backward-looking anaphoric use.
2.4.2 The proform it
The proform it is typically used as a pronoun, to refer to a non-human individual, as
in (39).
(39) a. Have you seen my wallet? I can’t find it anywhere.
b. Felicia loves Central Park. It’s her favorite place in the world.
It is also frequently used in expletive constructions, as in (40).
(40) a. It’s my birthday today.
b. It seems likely to rain.
But it is not limited to referring to individuals: It can also be used to refer to events
(Bresnan 1971; Postal 1972; Hankamer & Sag 1976), as in (41–42), and to propositions
(Webber 1991; Asher 1993; Gundel et al. 2003; Needham 2012), as in (43–44).
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(41) Jack didn’t cut Betty with a knife—Bill did it. (cf. Hankamer & Sag 1976: (30))
(42) Jack didn’t get picked off by a throw to first, but it happened to Bill.
(cf. Hankamer & Sag 1976: (31))
(43) John believes that [Mary is a genius]i. Fred is certain of iti. (Asher 1993: 241: (23))
(44) Felicia says Central Park is her favorite place in the world, but I doubt it.
On a Moulton 2015 style account, (43–44) might also be considered to be reference to
individuals: individuals that bear propositional content. Nevertheless, the predicates
certain and doubt indicate that it is the propositional content which the anaphor makes
available, so this is a different sort of anaphoric use from that of (39).
There are differences between where it and the demonstratives this and that appear.
In particular, researchers have noted that the demonstratives are used more often than
it (Webber 1988, 1991), and that substituting it in place of this or that frequently leads to
infelicity, or otherwise changes the interpretation of the sentence (Gundel et al. 2003). For
example, consider the examples in (45) and (46).19
(45) a. Erik was at the party. Joanna told me that.
b. ?? Erik was at the party. Joanna told me it.
(46) A: You have a dental appointment at 2.
B: That’s true.
B′: ?? It’s true.
B′′: It’s true, then. (Gundel et al. 2003: (18))
One can explain at least some of this behavior by noting that it is a weak pronoun—in the
sense of Cardinaletti & Starke 1999—and thus is syntactically restricted from occurring
19Judgment marks in (46) as in the original; see discussion of these judgments, and the role of then, in
Gundel et al. 2003.
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in certain positions: θ-positions, coordination structures, “peripheral” positions, etc. In
contrast, this and that are strong pronouns, and are subject to different restrictions.
Gundel et al. 2003 argues that the differences between it and the demonstratives are
a consequence of a requirement that the referent of it “be in focus whereas demonstra-
tive pronouns this/that only require activation” (using the Givenness Hierarchy; Gundel,
Hedberg & Zacharski 1993). Needham 2012 analyzes this use of it as a propositional
pro-form which presupposes that the antecedent is a commitment of the speaker, which
is presumably not also a requirement of the demonstratives this and that in their use as
propositional anaphors. This presupposition, then, might also account for some of the
cases where it is disallowed; this alone is not sufficient to explain the behavior in (46),
though, as the dental appointment is clearly a commitment of the speaker.
It also cannot be used cataphorically, like that but unlike this.
(47) a. # It is what I was told: Erik was there.
b. # I was told it: Erik was there.
(48) a. # It is what I believe: Erik was there.
b. # I believe it: Erik was there.
I include (48) in addition to (47), in case part of the restriction on (47) is due to it’s incom-
patability with tell in general (despite constructions like Tell it to the jury!). The cataphoric
behavior of it might also be explained as a function of a givenness requirement, but there
may be other explanations of this behavior as well; I leave this question to future work.
2.4.3 The relative pronoun which
The relative pronoun which can also be used to refer anaphorically to a propositional
referent. Even though relative clauses are frequently discussed in their uses modifying
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noun phrases—describing individuals—, as in (49), they can also modify clauses—and
thus describe propositions—, as in (50)–(51) (see Jackendoff 1977; Fabb 1990; Arnold 2004;
Arnold & Borsley 2008).
(49) Tracy saw the book, which Derek had bought the day before, lying on the table.
(50) Tracy wanted the book, which Derek knew.
(51) Tracy thought it was left there accidentally, which wasn’t the case.
Relative constructions are usually characterized by their syntactic nature (classified as
internally-headed, externally-headed, or correlative) and by their semantic effect (classi-
fied as restrictive or non-restrictive), though many of these divisions presume a nominal
antecedent rather than a propositional one. For example, classifying a relative clause as
restrictive or non-restrictive presumes that we’re dealing with a set of individuals (de-
scribed by a noun phrase) which can be restricted (as in (52)) or not (as in (53)). (For
comparison, prepositional phrases are normally restrictive; (53) has the same interpreta-
tion as (54).)
(52) The dog, which has floppy ears, is Greta’s. NON-RESTRICTIVE RELATIVE CLAUSE
(53) The dog which has floppy ears is Greta’s. RESTRICTIVE RELATIVE CLAUSE
(54) The dog with floppy ears is Greta’s. RESTRICTIVE PREPOSITIONAL PHRASE
The relative clause in (52) doesn’t help to pick out a particular dog—it doesn’t restrict the
set of dogs we’re considering—, it instead provides some additional information about
that dog (which we’ve already identified). The relative clause in (53), in contrast, does
help us to identify which dog is being discussed; (53) can be uttered in a context in which
there are multiple salient dogs, as long as only one has floppy ears. In contrast, (52) is only
felicitous in a context in which there’s only a single salient dog, floppy eared or otherwise.
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The restrictive/non-restrictive distinction doesn’t properly apply to relative clauses
which modify non-nominals, as all such relative clauses are non-restrictive: “while RRCs
[(restrictive relative clauses)] are always nominal modifiers, NRCs [(non-restrictive rela-
tive clauses)] take a much wider range of antecedents:” (Arnold 2004: 29). Descriptively
speaking, we don’t see sentences like (50) that have the syntax and prosodic character of
the RRC in (53). It’s not entirely clear, however, whether this is a fact about the syntax (or
prosody) of clause-modifying relatives, or due to a difference between the way we refer to
propositions as opposed to individuals. Functionally speaking, it seems as though know-
ing about the properties that hold of a proposition (e.g., that Derek knows it) don’t help
to identify it, i.e., to narrow down the set of potentially intended referents; this stands in
sharp contrast to the individual domain, where knowing about a property (e.g., having
floppy ears) is precisely what allows us to identify it. Continuing the thought, this might
indicate that while speakers consider and negotiate ambiguities about which individu-
als are denoted by a nominal expression, they don’t do the same for which proposition
is denoted by a clause. Why precisely this should be the case remains to be explained.
Nevertheless, it seems that clausal relatives are all non-restrictive, to the extent that this
classification is applicable in the propositional domain.
The syntactic classifications are even harder to fit propositional relative clauses into.
Where the semantic classification has an ‘elsewhere’ case in the non-restrictive class, the
definitions of the various syntactic classes assume a noun. The World Atlas of Lan-
guage Structures definition of relative clauses is general enough to allow for non-nominal
cases—“A construction is considered a relative clause for the purposes of this map if it is
a clause which, either alone or in combination with a noun, denotes something and if the
thing denoted has a semantic role within the relative clause.” (Dryer 2013: Ch. 90)—but
none of the examples given have a clause “alone” (not “in combination with a noun”),
and all of the later more specific definitions presume a nominal relative: “The two basic
types shown on Map 90A are languages in which the relative clause follows the noun,
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and languages in which the relative clause precedes the noun” (emphasis mine). WALS
is not alone in this: Keenan 1985 defines relative clauses as “a clause which describes the
referent of a head noun or pronoun”, and in doing so restricts the definitions of externally-
headed and internally-headed relative clauses to only nominal ones. The third major class
of relative clauses, correlatives, are also only discussed as relating to nominals: Dryer 2013
describes them as “a subtype of internally-headed relative clauses in that the head noun
occurs inside the clause” and whose “relative clause is outside the main clause and is con-
nected anaphorically to a noun phrase in the main clause that corresponds to the head
noun in the English translations” (again, my emphasis). Lipta´k 2009 defines correlatives
as “a left-peripheral relative clause [which] is linked to a (possibly phonetically unreal-
ized) nominal correlate in the clause that follows the relative clause” (my emphasis).20
If we did want to categorize the propositional relative clauses in (50)–(51) as belonging
to one of these syntactic subtypes, we’d have to say that they’re externally-headed relative
clauses, if only because the anaphoric antecedent—the proposition—isn’t encoded by any
content within the relative clause. That said, the typology falls apart somewhat, as it’s not
entirely clear what the head of a propositional relative clause would be in the first place.
Is the entire matrix TP the head? The CP?
Like that, and like other relative pronouns broadly, the relative pronoun which does
not function cataphorically, as in (56); it can only refer to discourse referents introduced
previously in the discourse, and indeed, immediately beforehand (whether by the same
speaker, as in (55), or a different speaker, as in (57)).
(55) Erik was there, which is what I was told.
(56) * Which was what I was told, Erik was there.
20With the exception of accounts that analyze conditionals as a special kind of correlative clauses (Bhatt
& Pancheva 2006; Arsenijevic´ 2009), there’s not much discussion of sentences like (50) with propositional
antecedents are correlatives. Correlatives seem to explicitly and exclusively deal with nominal antecedents,
so they won’t be of use to us in the analysis of propositional relatives.
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(57) A: Erik was there.
B: Which is what I’ve been trying to tell you!
The relative pronoun which is also involved in structures which have been called “gap-
less relative clauses”, as discussed in Collins & Radford 2015 (and references therein).
These are reported as marginal by many speakers, but can be found in corpora, and ap-
pear to modify both individuals (as in (58)) and propositions (as in (59)).
(58) Theres also the stunning crash on the Tour de France, which I watched the high-
lights last night and I was amazed at what happened.
(Adrian Durham, Talk Sport Radio, cited in Collins & Radford 2015: (4g))
(59) And she decided to move out, which I think she’s crazy.
(Loock 2007, cited in Collins & Radford 2015: (3c))
On some accounts, this which is simply a connective, and is not anaphoric in any sense
(Loock 2007), but Collins & Radford 2015 argues that this is still a normal (anaphoric)
relative pronoun, albeit with content which has been deleted. See Collins & Radford 2015
for discussion.
2.4.4 The coordinators so & as
Both so and as have many different uses in English, though their ranges of meaning
overlap a great deal, which is why I’ll address them both together, highlighting their
similarities and differences along the way. Some uses of so and as are best analyzed as
coordinators, as in (60)–(62).21 In these cases, both so and as coordinate two clauses and
say something about their temporal ordering. In a sentence like φ so ψ, the coordinator
21I use the term coordinator loosely here: I don’t mean to assert that these are in the head of &P. English-
teaching texts frequently describe so as a coordinating conjunction and as as a subordinating conjunction,
even though both can be taken to introduce temporal information (as in (60)–(62)). At least for the so’s
and as’s which introduce adjunct CPs—like purpose clause so or temporal clause as—these are likely not
coordinators in the &P sense.
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so conveys a causal relationship of ψ on φ. Given what we know about the universe, this
also means that the event described by φ temporally precedes the event described by ψ.
as, on the other hand, can be interpreted as coordinating events which are overlapping,
or as conveying a causal relation opposite that of so, with φ as ψ meaning that φ is a
consequence of (and thus temporally follows) ψ.
(60) Owen went to the mall(,) so Betty went home.
≡ Owen went to the mall, therefore Betty went home.
τ(go.mall(o)) < τ(go.home(b))22,23
(61) Owen went to the mall as Betty went home.
≡ Owen went to the mall while Betty went home.
τ(go.mall(o)) ∩ τ(go.home(b)) 6= ∅
(62) Owen went to the mall, as Betty went home.
≡ Owen went to the mall because Betty went home.
τ(go.mall(o)) > τ(go.home(b))
In (60), we understand Betty’s behavior as following Owen’s, likely as a consequence (be
it direct or indirect), where in (61) and (62)—differentiated only by an intonational break,
noted here with a comma—we understand Betty’s going home as occurring at the same
time or prior to Owen’s going to the mall (respectively). The as- and so-clauses which are
coordinated in this way can also be sentence-initial, as in (63–65), though some of these
readings are easier to get when combining events which are stative or otherwise explicitly
occur over longer periods of time.
In the non-fronted cases (60)–(62), these might occur in the head of C, as they do not allow the inclusion
of the complementizer that. The same can’t be said (at least) for the purpose clause so in (63), however,
which is perfectly grammatical with that.
(iv) So that Owen would remember to go to the mall, Betty left a note.
This suggests that there is indeed a syntactic distinction between coordinating so and subordinating as.
22Take τ to be a function from events to times, locating the time (interval) of the event, which can then
be compared with other times.
23Whether the relationship asserted by so should be taken as purely the temporal ordering of events (with
the casual inference as an implicature thereof) or as the casual relationship (with the temporal ordering an
entailment thereof) is an interesting question, but one which is beyond the scope of the current project.
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(63) So Owen would remember to go to the mall, Betty left a note.
(64) As Owen was arriving at the mall, Betty was heading home.
(65) As Owen had arrived at the mall, Betty decided to go home.
The clause introduced by so in (63) is a purpose clause, so it is only felicitous with an irre-
alis reading (expressed in subjunctive mood); contrast with (63′), which is ungrammatical
on the same purposive reading.
(63′) * So Owen went to the mall, Betty left a note.
Other uses of so and as deal with degrees, as in (66–71). In some of these contexts, so
and as are interchangeable, as in (66–67). In some other cases, though, so acts as something
like an excessive, as in (68), or an emphatic, as in (69), where as does not. In other cases,
as acts as an equative, as in (70–71), where so cannot. (Because the demonstratives can
also make reference to contextual standards of comparison—and because the similarities
and difference between the demonstratives and as and so are of interest in this context—I
provide the demonstratives alongside them as well.)
(66) a. Owen was never so happy when he was at home.
b. Oven was never as happy when he was at home.
c. Oven was never {this/that} happy when he was at home.
(67) a. Owen was never so happy as he was when he was at the mall.
b. Oven was never as happy as he was when he was at the mall.
c. * Oven was never {this/that} happy as he was when he was at the mall.
(68) a. * Owen went to the mall as much that Betty couldn’t stand it.
b. Owen went to the mall so much that Betty couldn’t stand it.
c. * Owen went to the mall {this/that}much that Betty couldn’t stand it.
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(69) a. * Owen went to the mall as much!
b. Owen went to the mall so much!
c. Owen went to the mall {this/that}much!
(70) a. Owen was as happy as a clam.
b. # Owen was so happy as a clam.24
c. # Owen was {this/that} happy as a clam.25
(71) a. Owen went to the mall as much as Betty could stand.
b. * Owen went to the mall so much as Betty could stand.
c. * Owen went to the mall {this/that}much as Betty could stand.
One could argue that there is a semantic core common to these uses, connecting the
degree-relating and event time-relating uses of so and as, but such a project is beyond
the scope of the current enterprise.
so and as can also act anaphorically, referring to events, as in (72) (see also Cornish
1992; Gast & Ko¨nig 2008).
(72) a. Owen went to the mall, and Betty did so, too.
b. Owen went to the mall, as did Betty.
In comparing the anaphoric uses of so and it, Cornish 1992 argues that the did so construc-
tion, as in (72a), is an anaphoric use, in contrast to the so did construction, as in (73).
(73) Owen went to the mall, and so did Betty.
The latter, (Cornish 1992: 165) argues is a “variant form of also”.
24This is felicitous with an emphatic so, but not as an equative.
25This is felicitous with a contextual standard of happiness c, on a reading where Owen was as happy
as c at the time that he was a clam. This reading is also available for (70a). This sentence is infelicitous on a
purely equative reading, however, where Owen was never himself a clam.
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Finally, we turn to the examples that are most relevant to the current project, where so
and as are used to refer anaphorically to a proposition, as in (74).
(74) a. Owen went to the mall. I know so, because I saw him there.
b. Owen went to the mall, as is known.
There has been some work on so as a propositional anaphor going back to Ross 1972; Han-
kamer & Sag 1976, and more recently, in particular in responses to polar questions (Gast
& Ko¨nig 2008; Sailor 2012; Needham 2012; Meijer in press). (I am not aware of any equiva-
lent work on as.) Needham 2012 argues that so is a propositional anaphor which picks out
the propositional content of the current Question Under Discussion (Roberts 1996), pre-
supposing uncertainty with respect to that proposition on the part of the speaker. Meijer
in press argues that so isn’t a simple propositional anaphor of type 〈s, t〉, but instead is
an anaphoric adverb. If so were of type 〈s, t〉, then it would have to be the argument of
a covert complementizer in order to combine with predicates like believe (on the Kratzer-
Moulton approach). But so, unlike that-clauses with a covert complementizer, can be top-
icalized, as in (75) in contrast to (76a), and cannot be the complement of content nouns, as
in (77c).
(75) A: My father gave his life so that we may have a chance to defeat this.
B: So you’ve told us. (Star Wars Rogue One, quoted in Meijer in press)
(76) a. * [CP C [IP John likes Mary ] ] Jane didn’t believe.
(Bosˇkovic´ & Lasnik 2003: (3e))
b. [CP That [IP John likes Mary ] ] Jane didn’t believe.
(Bosˇkovic´ & Lasnik 2003: (4e))
(77) a. I believe/claim/am afraid so.
b. my belief/claim/fear that pigs fly
c. * my belief/claim/fear so (Moulton 2015: (6))35
Instead, Meijer in press argues that so is an anaphoric adverb, of type 〈〈e, 〈s, t〉〉, 〈e, 〈s, t〉〉〉.
It modifies a predicate like believe (of type 〈e, 〈s, t〉〉), 26 and provides the propositional-
content-bearing-individual argument of that predicate via (presupposed) propositional
anaphora. (It is adverbial in that so also carries other information on the Meijer in press
account, such as the antecedent proposition’s not being settled on the discourse Table.)
This accounts for the movement properties of so (in contrast to that-clauses), and may
also account for why so cannot be used as a response particle (see discussion in Meijer in
press).
The behavior described above for so can also be seen with as. Consider (75′) and (77′):
(75′) A: My father gave his life so that we may have a chance to defeat this.
B: As you’ve told us.
(77′) a. I believe/claim/am afraid as much.
b. my belief/claim/fear that pigs fly
c. * my belief/claim/fear as much
Despite their many similarities, so and as do differ in their behavior, even in this propo-
sitional anaphoric use. One obvious difference is that, where so functions on its own, as in
some cases also needs the word much, especially when in complement position; see (78).
(78) a. I believe so.
b. I believe as *(much).
c. I believe not.
Because of the way so can stand alone in this way, it has sometimes been considered
to act as a response particle, with not as its negative counterpart (Sailor 2012; Needham
26Meijer in press: fn. 18 assumes that “an additional layer, e.g. Kratzers (1996) VoiceP, adds an attitude
holder.”
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2012). Another difference between so and as, perhaps related to this last point, is that so
can be combined with sentential adverbs (Meijer in press: fn. 2), where as and the other
(non-null) propositional adverbs discussed here cannot; not, like so, is felicitous in such
constructions.27
(79) Is John coming tonight?
a. Possibly so.
b. * Possibly as (much).
c. Possibly not.
d. * Possibly this.
e. * Possibly that.
f. * Possibly it.
g. * Possibly which.
h. Possibly.
The null complement is felicitous in this construction, as in (79h); we turn to this next.
2.4.5 Null complement anaphora
Though they don’t contain an explicit anaphor of any sort, sentences with null com-
plements can also be understood as anaphoric, referring to events, as in (80), or to propo-
sitions, as in (81).
(80) a. I asked Bill to leave, but he refused.
b. Sue was attempting to kiss a gorilla, and Harry didn’t approve.
c. We needed somebody to carry the oats down to the bin, but nobody volun-
teered. (Hankamer & Sag 1976: (56))
27Some speakers find even (79a) to be marked, but the pattern in (79) is fairly robust. Explaining such
speakers’ objections to (79a) will remain a topic for future work.
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(81) a. Paul cheated on the test, and his teacher knows.
b. Paul cheated on the test, and his teacher found out.
In both of the examples in (81), we interpret the null complement of know/find out as
referring to the proposition introduced by the first clause: ‘Paul cheated on the test’.
Null complement anaphora (NCA) can be interpreted as having an event or proposi-
tional referent, but never an individual referent, as noted in Shopen 1972, 1973; Grimshaw
1979; Saeboe 1996; Depiante 2000; Haynie 2009. Depiante 2000 gives the following illus-
tration:
(82) a. The children know [NP the song ]
b. The children know [CP that it is time to leave ] (Depiante 2000: 60: (7))
(83) a. The teacher told the children that it was time to leave even though they
already knew
b. * The children learned the song on Monday but by Friday they know longer
knew (Depiante 2000: 60: (8))
Even though know can take either a nominal or clausal complement, as shown in (82),
only the clausal—propositional—version is compatible with NCA, while the nominal—
individual—version is not, as in (83).
Combined with a Kratzer-Moulton view of attitude verbs, this non-individual restric-
tion might explain why NCA seems to be incompatible with many verbs which otherwise
are thought to take propositional complements. For example, compare (81b) to (81c).
(81) b. Paul cheated on the test, and his teacher found out.
c. * Paul cheated on the dest, and his teacher discovered.
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If a verb like discover can only take (propositional-content-bearing-)individuals as argu-
ments, and NCA disallows individual-denoting antecedents, then we can explain the un-
grammaticality of (81c). If find out, on the other hand, takes propositions—propositions,
and not individuals bearing propositional content—as arguments, then the grammati-
cality of (81b) is not problematic. This might also be an answer to the puzzle posed by
Williams 2012 regarding the behavior of predicates like notice—which like find out can
take truly propositional arguments, and thus participate in NCA28 —in contrast to predi-
cates like win and ready, which take individual-type arguments—like discover—, and thus
don’t participate in NCA.29 If correct, this raises a question about what else might dis-
tinguish notice/find out verbs from discover/believe verbs, which might explain, or at least
confirm, this argument-type distinction. One possible answer might lie along the lines of
the semantic characteristics discussed in White, Hacquard & Lidz in press: both types of
verbs are representational and factive, but only the latter are assertive.
Hankamer & Sag 1976 discusses NCA in distinguishing two types of anaphora, sur-
face anaphora and deep anaphora. On this account, surface anaphors are derived trans-
formationally, and so have internal syntactic structure—and with it, certain syntactic
requirements—, while deep anaphors show “no sign of having been syntactically com-
plex at any stage” (i.e., have no internal syntax) (Hankamer & Sag 1976: 406). As a result,
surface anaphors require a linguistic antecedent, while deep anaphors can be controlled
pragmatically. Hankamer & Sag 1976 argues that NCA is an example of deep anaphora,
as (following Bresnan 1971) is “sentential it”, i.e., the propositional anaphor it discussed
above. In contrast, Hankamer & Sag 1976 argues that so is a surface anaphor.
Because NCA involves an ‘invisible’ component, I want to be careful to distinguish it
28Williams 2012 (knowingly) “stretch[es] the term somewhat”, using NCA more broadly than Hankamer
& Sag 1976 use it, or than I am using it here. For Williams 2012, NCA includes implicit arguments of verbs,
as in Ron won. I will not argue that such a “stretch” is problematic, nor the opposite. That said, the difference
is worth being aware of. Future comparison of these perhaps-distinct classes, e.g., with the extraction facts
noted in Depiante 2000, would be worthwhile.
29They don’t fit under the Hankamer & Sag 1976 definition of NCA, that is; see previous footnote.
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from other constructions which might appear similar. As Hankamer & Sag 1976 show,
NCA is distinct from intransitive uses of verbs (where there is no object, null or other-
wise, and thus no anaphora). The intransitive use of eat in (84), for example, tends be
interpreted as having “general (unspecified))” object: i.e., it’s not that he just won’t eat
soup and potatoes, but rather, he won’t eat anything.30
(84) I bring him soup and potatoes, but he won’t eat.
(Hankamer & Sag 1976: fn. 21: (i))
In contrast, the null complement of (85) is interpreted such that the speaker’s wife doesn’t
approve specifically of the speaker’s gambling, not that she doesn’t approve of anything
in general.
(85) I play cards and shoot dice, but my wife doesn’t approve.
(Hankamer & Sag 1976: fn.21: (ii))
NCA is also distinct from the null objects—which, unlike NCA, can be individual-typed—
in a language like Spanish (which allows for implicit objects much more widely than
English), as in (86).
(86) A: Quere´s cafe´?
Do you want coffee?
B: Sı´, sı´ quiero
Yes, yes I want (Depiante 2000: 61: (10))
Depiante 2000 demonstrates that Spanish null objects are subject to island restrictions in
a way that NCA is not. Finally, NCA is distinct from Verb Phrase Ellipsis (VPE), which
30Though see Glass 2014 questioning how robust this assumption is.
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Hankamer & Sag 1976 classifies as surface anaphora on the basis of arguments by Ross
1969 and Grinder & Postal 1971.
2.5 Parallels across domains
In arguing that the interpretation of tense should be considered an anaphoric process,
Partee 1973, 1984 lays out some foundational properties of anaphora (exemplified in the
individual domain, then paralleled in the temporal domain). These same properties are
used by Stone 1997 to argue for the same parallels in the modal domain. In this section,
I’ll demonstrate that these same properties hold in the propositional domain.
2.5.1 Non-linguistic antecedents
The examples given thus far rely upon linguistic material (spoken or written; for man-
ual linguistic material, i.e., anaphora in signed languages, see Sandler & Lillo-Martin
2006; Schlenker 2011) to serve as antecedents; that is to say, the anaphors refer back to
entities introduced via language. But we can also use anaphors to refer back to content
which has no linguistic antecedent, if there is some entity which is salient enough in the
discourse to be available.
(87) [We’re sitting in a high school classroom, when suddenly the door is pushed open,
and in walks a goat.]
What is that doing here?!?
In (87), we understand the anaphor that to refer to the goat which has just walked into the
room. The context does not presume that a goat had been mentioned earlier in discourse,
and in fact does not even require that there have been any conversation taking place at
the time of the goat’s entry. There is no linguistic material which introduces or refers to
a goat, either before or after the use of the anaphor, but the goat’s salience in the context
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makes it available for anaphoric reference. This is, in a sense, simply a more extreme
version of the examples in (30) and (32).
Propositions can also be made salient enough in a context to be available for anaphoric
reference, as noted in Hankamer & Sag 1976; Asher 1993: 229–230.
(88) Hankamer [observing Sag successfully ripping a phone book in half]:
I don’t believe it. (Hankamer & Sag 1976: (32))
(89) [Mom walks into the living room, and sees her three children standing around the
broken remains of a lamp.]
Mom: Who broke the lamp?
[Two of the children look at Dewey.]
Dewey: That’s not true!
In (89), the anaphor that refers to the proposition ‘Dewey broke the lamp’. The mom’s
question is linguistic, but the question alone doesn’t make this proposition salient enough
to be referred to; contrast with (89′):
(89′) [Mom walks into the living room, and sees her three children standing around the
broken remains of a lamp.]
Mom: Who broke the lamp?
Dewey: # That’s not true!
Following Hamblin 1973, we might take the question Who broke the lamp? to denote the set
of propositions which answer it: {Huey broke the lamp, Louie broke the lamp, . . . }. But,
as we’ll see in Chapter 3, wh-questions don’t in fact make these propositions available
for anaphoric reference. And, even if they were introduced by the question, none of
them are more salient than one another, and so (89′) is bizarre. The other children’s gaze
towards Dewey, though, is enough to make ‘Dewey broke the lamp’ salient enough to
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be felicitously referred to (and denied) anaphorically, in (89). This non-linguistic event
makes a proposition available for anaphoric reference.
If (89) isn’t convincing, due to the presence of the question,31 we can also consider (90):
(90) [Jeremy is trying to impress his new roommate, Sam. Hearing Sam’s footsteps ap-
proaching the door, Jeremy hurries off the couch and assumes a push-up position.
As Sam enters the room, Jeremy is doing push-ups, ‘counting’: “Seventy-three,
seventy-four...” ]
Sam: I don’t believe that for a second.
In (90), Sam doesn’t believe that Jeremy has done the number of push-ups that he is
(perhaps indirectly) indicating. The anaphor that refers to the proposition ‘Jeremy has
done 73 push-ups’. Unless we take the utterance of the number seventy-three alone to
denote the proposition ‘Jeremy has done 73 push-ups’, then we must admit that non-
linguistic material (i.e., doing push-ups in time with the utterance, such that the uttering
might be perceived as counting) makes a proposition available for anaphoric reference.
Anaphors which refer to propositions, then, can pick up on non-linguistic antecedents,
just like those which refer to individuals.
2.5.2 Definite anaphors with definite antecedents
In what Partee 1984: 245 calls the “paradigm case” for anaphora, an antecedent noun
phrase refers to a specific individual and a subsequent pronoun refers to that same indi-
vidual, as in (91):
(91) Sam is married. He has three children. (Partee 1984: (2a))32
31Though, again, see Chapter 3, §3.3.2 on the introduction of propositional discourse referents by wh-
questions.
32Here, and beyond, formatting for anaphors and antecedents had been added.
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Just as in (3), we have a singular individual introduced by a proper name, and that same
individual referred to by a pronoun.
The propositional parallel is just as straightforward:
(92) Sam is married. He told me that.
In (92), the anaphor that refers to the singular proposition ‘Sam is married’, which is
denoted unambiguously by the first sentence.
2.5.3 Indefinite antecedents
As nominal expressions in English can be classified as definite or indefinite, we can
differentiate indefinite antecedents for individual anaphora from definite ones.
(93) Agnes brought a book to school. It is in her locker.
The indefinite a book is the antecedent for the anaphor it. Even though we might not know
quite which book we’re discussing, we can still make reference to it and comment on it.
Sentences can’t be classified as definite or indefinite, so the parallel for propositional
anaphora isn’t entirely straightforward. The closest parallel is perhaps as in (94), where a
proposition is referred to by an indefinite nominal.
(94) Victoria told me a rumor, but it’s not true.
In (94), the anaphor it refers to the rumor that Victoria told the speaker. Here I have
omitted the underlining, because it’s not clear whether the antecedent is really a rumor, or
if the proposition is simply the one associated with, and named by—but not introduced
by—the nominal.
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2.5.4 Bound variables
As Partee 1973, 1984 notes, pronouns can behave as bound variables when under the
scope of a quantifier. Partee 1984 gives an individual example, as in (95), as well as a
temporal one, as in (96).
(95) Every woman believes that she is happy. (Partee 1984: (4a))
(96) Whenever Mary telephoned, Sam was asleep. (Partee 1984: (5a))
In (95), the anaphor she is bound by every woman, so we understand she to refer to each
woman included in that set. There are multiple women, and each is happy. In (96), as
Partee 1984 argues, the past tense of was is bound by whenever, so we understand it to refer
to a number of different past times, each simultaneous with a time that Mary telephoned.
We can construct a similar example for propositional anaphora. For reasons that will
become clearer in the next subsection, it’s easier if we model our example off of (96):
(97) Whatever Rosie believes, Peter believes ∅.
In (97), the (null) anaphor refers to a proposition of the form ‘Rosie believes p’, which is
denoted by the antecedent. But because it is under whatever, we understand there to be
multiple such things, multiple beliefs p. And for each belief, the anaphor refers to that
respective proposition: the anaphor is bound.
Propositional anaphors, then, can be bound, just like individual anaphors.
2.5.5 ‘Donkey-sentences’
Partee 1973, 1984 highlights as characteristic of anaphora cases where a pronoun acts
as if bound, even though it is not c-commanded by its binder; that is, it behaves seman-
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tically as if bound even though it is not in the right syntactic structural configuration to
be bound. These are the famous “donkey-sentences” from Geach 1962; Kamp 1981, and
many others.
(98) If Pedro owns a donkey, he beats it. (Partee 1984: (6a))
(99) Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it. (Partee 1984: (6b))
In both of these cases, the anaphor it refers to the donkey (or donkeys) owned. If Pedro,
or any single farmer, owns multiple donkeys, we understand each of those donkeys to be
beaten. In other words, the anaphor acts just as if bound.
The same can be shown for propositional anaphora:
(100) If anyone looks at the test before time starts, I will tell the principal
{
that
so
as much
}
.
(101) Every student who cheated on the test told her mother
{
that
so
as much
}
.
In (100), the speaker will tell the principal propositions of the form ‘x looked at the test
before time started’ for anyone x who does so. If there are multiple such students, we
understand the speaker to be committed to conveying multiple propositions to the prin-
cipal. In (101), each student told her mother something like ‘I cheated on the test’: one
proposition per student. In both cases, the anaphors behave as if bound.
Because of the syntax of the structures which make propositions available for
anaphoric reference, most of the bound readings of propositional anaphors are donkey-
like, the anaphor not being syntactically bound by its antecedent. Nevertheless, we have
examples of both types of bound uses discussed by Partee 1984 within the propositional
domain.
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Partee 1984 Feature Propositional equivalent
Non-linguistic antecedents X
Definite antecedents X
Indefinite antecedents ?/X
Bound variables X
Donkey sentences X
Figure 1: Propositional equivalents of Partee 1984 features of anaphora
2.5.6 Other properties from Stone 1997
After showing that modals share the five properties from Partee 1984 listed above
with tense, Stone 1997 notes three further parallels between modal anaphora and tempo-
ral anaphora. I briefly discuss these parallels, and why propositional anaphora doesn’t
display them.
Parallels in presuppositions about referents
Stone 1997 notes that for individual/tense/modal anaphora, the anaphor can carry
certain presuppositions about its referent. This information can be used to disambiguate,
but it can also lead to clashes:
(102) a. # Pedro owns a donkey. She beats it.
b. # When John saw Mary, she crosses the street.
c. # If the railroads merged, the line will face bankruptcy. (Stone 1997: (27))
The pronoun she presupposes that its referent is feminine, but there is no such antecedent
in (102a), so the discourse is infelicitous. In (102b), the PRESENT morphology -es conveys
a non-PAST time, but the only antecedent time available is PAST, indicated by was. And,
using the Stone 1997 terminology, will conveys a VIVID modality, which is incompatible
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with the conditional in (102c)’s REMOTE modality.
There doesn’t seem to be a parallel in the propositional domain, however. Propositions
don’t have features associated with gender, number, tense, etc. Propositions can be true
or false at a world, but there don’t seem to be English anaphors which presuppose either
of those features. This might be a characteristic of propositions, that they don’t have the
sorts of properties which can be encoded by an anaphor, or it might just be a fact about
the English anaphors.
Parallels in adverbials and clauses
Following Hinrichs 1986, Stone 1997 notes that modal adverbs (otherwise) and modal
conjunctions (If -antecedents), just like temporal adverbs and temporal conjunctions, in-
troduce antecedents which license one another as well as other modal morphemes like
would and should. Tellingly, this parallel is strictly between modality and tense; there
is no equivalent parallel in the individual domain. For tense and modals, the particles
which introduce times/situations are the same particles which pick up on them. With in-
dividual anaphora, these are distinct: names, indefinite nominals, and (some) quantifiers
introduce individuals which can be referred to anaphorically by pronouns and definite
descriptions. The same is true for propositional anaphora, in that the set of things that
introduce propositions and the set of things that refer back to them are disjoint.
Parallels in modification
Following Hornstein 1993, Stone 1997 distinguishes between OPERATORS, which are
functions from sentences to sentences, and so are iterable, from MODIFIERS, which impose
constraints on specific entities, and so are not necessarily iterable. Hornstein 1993 shows
that English tense is a MODIFIER, not an OPERATOR, and Stone 1997 shows the same for
English modals.
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Here, too, it’s not at all clear what a propositional anaphoric parallel would look like
(or even an individual anaphoric parallel). Tense and modality can be thought of as mod-
ifying a sentence which might otherwise omit information about the time or worlds in
which is takes place. Individuals, however, don’t modify sentences, but are described
by them. Similarly, propositions don’t modify sentences, but are named by them, and
perhaps also are described by them (in the case of an embedded sentence).
2.5.7 Sloppy identity
According to Stone & Hardt 1999, it is a general feature of anaphora resolution that it
can give rise to both strict and sloppy identity readings. Sloppy identity readings arise
when an embedded anaphor in an elided (or otherwise reconstructed) phrase is inter-
preted differently from an anaphor in the antecedent phrase. The most common examples
of sloppy identity make use of verb phrase ellipsis (VPE), as in (103).
(103) Susan loves her cat. Jane does too. (cf. Stone & Hardt 1999: (3b))
The verb phrase which is elided is loves her cat, and we understand does too to mean ‘Jane
loves her cat too’. Where we get a strict vs. sloppy identity ambiguity is who is picked
out by her in this elided phrase. On a strict reading, the elided her refers to the same entity
as the first her, namely Susan: Jane loves Susan’s cat. On a sloppy reading, the elided her
refers not to Susan, but to Jane, the pronoun’s now-closest antecedent: Jane loves Jane’s
cat.
Stone & Hardt 1999 follows Hardt 1993, 1999 in characterizing sloppy identity as in
(104):
(104) C1 . . . [XP . . . [Y P ] . . .] . . . C2 . . . [XP ′ ]
(C1, C2: “controllers” of sloppy variable YP) (Stone & Hardt 1999: (2))
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“We have an antecedent of category XP containing a sloppy variable YP. The interpreta-
tion of YP switches from controller C1 to C2” (302). Stone & Hardt 1999 presents (105) as
“familiar examples of sloppy identity, with the antecedent in italics:”
(105) a. [ NP [ NP ] ]
Smith spent [ [ his ] paycheck ]. Jones saved it. (Stone & Hardt 1999: (3a))
b. [ VP [ NP ] ]
Susan [ loves [ her ] cat ]. Jane does too. (Stone & Hardt 1999: (3b))
“In [(105a)], the NP his paycheck is the antecedent for the pronoun it. The embedded NP his
is sloppy, switching from Smith to Jones. In [(105b)], the VP loves her cat is the antecedent
for the VPE. The embedded NP her is sloppy, switching from Susan to Jane.” (Stone &
Hardt 1999: 302)
I find illustrations a bit easier than bracketed structures, so I represent the same con-
trast in a diagram. The example in (105b), for example, can be represented as in (106).
(106)
Susan
her
Jane
does (= loves her cat)
(her)sloppystrict
The anaphor her in the first sentence is interpreted as coreferential with Susan (indicated
by an arrow), and the elided verb phrase, indicated by does, is interpreted as including
another copy of that anaphor—this implicit content in parentheses. This second anaphor
can be interpreted as coreferential with Susan—the strict identity reading—, or as coref-
erential with Jane—sloppy identity.
It is quite easy to construct examples of sloppy identity which involve proposition
anaphora, as in (107).
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(107) [Judy’s son Jacob and Meredith’s son Malcolm are in the same 5th grade class.]
Judy thought her son cheated on the test. Meredith believed that, too.
The second sentence of (107) allows for either a sloppy or strict reading: we can interpret
the anaphor that as referring to either the proposition ‘Judy’s son cheated on the test’ (the
strict reading) or ‘Meredith’s son cheated on the test’ (the sloppy reading). Some speakers
report the strict reading of (107) being the unmarked reading, but a follow-up can sway
a hearer’s interpretation either further towards a strict reading, as in (107b), or towards a
sloppy reading, as in (107a).
(107) a. Judy thought her son cheated on the test. Meredith believed that, too: she
thought Jacob copied off of her Malcolm’s work.
b. Judy thought her son cheated on the test. Meredith believed that, too: she
didn’t think Malcolm studied enough to get that A.
In this sort of example, though, the propositional anaphora is serving the same purpose
as VPE, above: it is what allows for the ‘repeated’ instance of the sloppy variable (here,
the pronoun her). This is sloppy identity involving a propositional anaphor, but not a
sloppy interpretation of a propositional anaphor. We can make this clear if, just as above,
we diagram the two readings available for the second sentence of this discourse; see (108).
(108)
Judy
her
Meredith
that (= her son cheated on the test)
(her)sloppystrict
We understand the propositional anaphor that as potentially referring to two different
propositions only by virtue of the strict/sloppy readings of the pronoun her, which is
‘repeated’ through the anaphora resolution process.
More interesting are examples where the sloppy variable is a propositional anaphor,
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but these can be tricky to construct. Consider the example in (109):
(109) Ryu cheated on the test, but he didn’t tell the teacher that. Paul didn’t either.
The second sentence in this discourse is ambiguous, although speakers report a prefer-
ence for the reading where Paul didn’t tell the teacher that Ryu cheated. This is the strict
identity reading, as the propositional anaphor that within the elided VP refers to the same
proposition as the overt that: ‘Ryu cheated on the test’. There is a second reading to this
sentence, however, on which what Paul didn’t tell the teacher is that he, Paul, cheated on
the test. We can consider this a sloppy reading, as it’s clear that the anaphor that refers to
a different proposition: ‘Paul cheated on the test’. What is particularly interesting about
this reading of (109), though, is that this proposition isn’t introduced by the mention of
the name Paul, or by any explicit content; consider the diagram in (110).
(110)
Ryu cheated
that
(Paul cheated)
didn’t ∅ (= didn’t tell the teacher that)
(that)sloppystrict
On this (attempted) representation, both the repeated anaphor that and its propositional
antecedent in the second sentence are implicit.
Alternatively, this might not be a sloppy propositional variable, but a sloppy indi-
vidual variable: the elided VP is [ tell the teacher that ], but that anaphor is in turn under-
stood as ‘(that) he cheated (on it)’, so we understand the elided structure to mean ‘tell the
teacher that he cheated (on it)’. And it’s this ‘he’, under two layers of substitution, which
seems to be behaving as the sloppy variable. It’s only because this ‘he’ is interpreted as
referring to Paul (as opposed to the strict reference to Ryu) that we reconstruct ‘he cheated
(on it)’ as ‘Paul cheated (on it)’, to derive this sloppy reading. Compare the diagram in
(110) to the one in (111).
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(111)
Ryu
that (= he cheated)
(he)
Paul
didn’t ∅ (= didn’t tell the teacher that)
(that (= he cheated))
(he)sloppystrict
Note, however, that the ‘(that) he cheated (on it)’ meaning isn’t represented explicitly in
the first sentence of (109); it’s only after we resolve the anaphor that in the first sentence—
and only if we resolve it using a pronoun—that we understand the first sentence of (109),
repeated in (112a), as (112b).
(112) a. Ryu cheated on the test, but he didn’t tell the teacher that.
b. Ryu cheated on the test, but he didn’t tell the teacher that he cheated (on it).
The example in (109), then, might better be considered an example of sloppy identity of
an individual variable, even though it happens by means of a propositional anaphor.
It is difficult to construct an example where a propositional anaphor can be an
ambiguously strict/sloppy variable, where the proposition to be picked up under the
sloppy reading is introduced explicitly. Such a discourse would require a proposition-
introducing clause to intercede between the first and (implicit) second occurrences of the
propositional anaphor, making the first proposition (the strict antecedent) quite remote.33
To complicate matters further, some speakers have different behavior for the differ-
ent propositional anaphors in cases like (109). Asher 1993 gives the examples in (113)
33For such an example to work, we would need four clauses, A–D, such that: A denoted a proposition;
B included an explicit propositional anaphor, referring to A; C denoted a different proposition; and D
included an implicit (elided or reconstructed) propositional anaphor. On a strict reading, the anaphor in D
would refer to the proposition denoted by A, and on a sloppy reading, to that of C.
For D to be understood as including the same anaphor as in B, D would have to include a construc-
tion like VPE: did too or didn’t either. And, to ensure that this VPE didn’t pick up the verb phrase of C—
instead picking out the proposition denoted by C, via the implicit anaphor—, there would have to be a
valence/tense/aspectual mismatch between the verb phrase of C and the anaphor-containing D. And, on
an SDRT account like Hunter & Asher 2016, both B and C would have to be discourse subordinate to A (in
the sense of Asher & Vieu 2005). I’ve been unable to create such an example here, but one is theoretically
possible.
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as evidence that the “ambiguities of sloppy and struct readings appear to be a general
trademark of abstract entity anaphora” (including propositional anaphora), but notes that
“this and that and descriptions like the same thing support sloppy identity anaphora easily,
while it has more difficulty in doing so.”
(113) a. Mary has been going around saying that Al proposed to her, but Jo has been
saying this (that) too. (Asher 1993: 228:(4.a))
b. Mary has been going around saying that Al proposed to her, but Jo has been
claiming the same thing. (Asher 1993: 228:(4.b))
c. Mary has been going around saying that Al proposed to her, but Jo has been
saying it too. (Asher 1993: 228:(4.f))
“Most speakers easily get the sloppy reading for [(113a)], in which what Jo has been say-
ing is that Al proposed to Jo, with both that and that as anaphors. Many speakers do
not get the sloppy reading of [(113c)]; the highly preferred reading is the (non-sloppy)
reading on which Jo has been saying that Al proposed to Mary” (Asher 1993: 228). These
examples, like (109), derive the strict/sloppy readings on the resolution of the pronoun
her, not on the propositional anaphors themselves.
And we can extend this comparison to the other propositional anaphors discussed
here, as in (114)–(121). In these examples, a strict reading of the second clause means
that Mac said John would be late—which the (a) follow-ups attempt to bias. On a sloppy
reading, Mac said that he (Mac) would (also) be late; the (b) follow-ups attempt to bias
this reading.
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(114) a. John said he would be late, and Mac said this, too. Apparently John has a
conflict until 3, and he told Mac about it.
b. John said he would be late, and Mac said this, too. Apparently Mac has a
conflict until 3. John didn’t tell me his reason, though.
(115) a. John said he would be late, and Mac said that, too. Apparently John has a
conflict until 3, and he told Mac about it.
b. John said he would be late, and Mac said that, too. Apparently Mac has a
conflict until 3. John didn’t tell me his reason, though.
(116) a. John said he would be late, and Mac said it, too. Apparently John has a conflict
until 3, and he told Mac about it.
b. John said he would be late, and Mac said it, too. Apparently Mac has a conflict
until 3. John didn’t tell me his reason, though.
(117) a. John said he would be late, which Mac said, too. Apparently John has a conflict
until 3, and he told Mac about it.
b. John said he would be late, which Mac said, too. Apparently Mac has a conflict
until 3. John didn’t tell me his reason, though.
(118) a. John said he would be late, as did Mac. Apparently John has a conflict until 3,
and he told Mac about it.
b. John said he would be late, as did Mac. Apparently Mac has a conflict until 3.
John didn’t tell me his reason, though.
(119) a. John said he would be late, and so did Mac. Apparently John has a conflict
until 3, and he told Mac about it.
b. John said he would be late, and so did Mac. Apparently Mac has a conflict
until 3. John didn’t tell me his reason, though.
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(120) a. John said he would be late, and Mac did so, too. Apparently John has a conflict
until 3, and he told Mac about it.
b. John said he would be late, and Mac did so, too. Apparently Mac has a conflict
until 3. John didn’t tell me his reason, though.
(121) a. John said he would be late, and Mac did, too. Apparently John has a conflict
until 3, and he told Mac about it.
b. John said he would be late, and Mac did, too. Apparently Mac has a conflict
until 3. John didn’t tell me his reason, though.
Unfortunately, the data on these cases are not clear. Some speakers report that all of the (a)
and (b) discourses are fine, indicating that all of these propositional anaphors (including
the null complement in (121)) display a strict-sloppy ambiguity. Other speakers report
that all of the (a) discourses are degraded and unacceptable, where the (b) discourses
are fine, indicating a strong preference only for the sloppy reading. And some speakers
fall in between, indicating that this and that freely allow for the strict/sloppy ambiguity,
but strongly preferring the sloppy reading for the other propositional anaphors. What
underlies this interspeaker variation regarding strict readings for propositional anaphors
I leave as a question for future research.
Ultimately, the data provided here demonstrate that propositional anaphora is
anaphora, showing many (if not all) of the same behaviors as anaphora in other domains.
Propositional anaphors can be referential or bound, can have linguistic or non-linguistics
antecedents, can appear in ‘donkey’ contexts, and appear to participate in strict/sloppy
ambiguities.
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2.6 Conclusion
Anaphoric reference to propositions is fairly widespread in natural language. In this
chapter, I’ve laid the groundwork for a detailed investigation into this type of anaphora.
In §2.2, I introduced the notion of anaphora broadly, giving examples of anaphora to
individuals, events, and propositions, and located our discussion within the classes of
anaphora discussed in Webber et al. 2003. I then introduced the notion of a proposi-
tion in §2.3 and explained its function in discussions of natural language semantics. In
§2.4, I introduced the anaphors of English which can refer to a proposition, and dis-
cussed a few differences among these various anaphors. I leave it to future work—of
the sort done by Needham (2012); Meijer (in press)—to determine the precise denotations
of these anaphors such that these differences could be captured formally. This enumera-
tion of the English propositional anaphors also begs for a comparison of such inventories
crosslinguistically, to determine the range of variation that different language exhibit in
this function; such an investigation is left to future work.
In §2.5, I used the features of individual anaphora identified by Partee 1973, 1984 and
Stone 1997 to argue for the anaphoric nature of tense and modality (respectively), in or-
der to argue that propositional anaphora, too, is anaphoric. I showed that propositional
anaphora displays many of the same behaviors as other types of anaphora: allowing non-
linguistic antecedents, bound variable readings, ‘donkey’ sentences, and strict/sloppy
identity ambiguities. In this sense, propositional anaphora deserves that label: it is truly
an anaphoric process, in parallel to individual, tense, and modal anaphora.
In the next chapter, we will examine the bounds of this parallelism between proposi-
tional anaphora and other kinds of anaphora, in particular individual anaphora. Chapter
3 investigates which structures introduce propositions into a discourse such that they
are available for anaphoric reference, and in doing so surveys the empirical landscape
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of when propositional anaphora is licensed. In the process of investigating that land-
scape and generalizing over the observed behavior, we will discover some similarities,
and some differences, between propositional and individual anaphora.
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CHAPTER 3
INTRODUCING PROPOSITIONAL DISCOURSE REFERENTS
3.1 Introduction
Karttunen 1969 is a systematic examination of which constructions license anaphoric
reference to an individual, that is to say, which constructions introduce a discourse refer-
ent for an individual. Not all indefinite noun phrases, for example, make an individual
available for anaphoric reference: consider (122) & (123).
(122) a. Bill has a car. (Karttunen 1969: (3a))
b. It is black. (Karttunen 1969: (3b))
(123) a. Bill doesn’t have a car. (Karttunen 1969: (4a))
b. # It is black. (Karttunen 1969: (4b))
The words a car introduce a discourse referent which can be referred back to by the pro-
noun it in (122), but not in (123). Determining precisely when discourse referents are
introduced for individuals was the goal of Karttunen 1969. This chapter addresses the
same question in the propositional domain: Which constructions introduce a propositional
discourse referent?
3.1.1 The goal
Karttunen 1969 introduces the notion of a discourse referent—something established by
a certain construction which “justifies the occurrence of a coreferential pronoun or a defi-
nite noun phrase later in the text” (p. 5)—and then examines “under what circumstances
discourse referents are established” (p. 5). The discourse referents Karttunen 1969 was in-
terested in were individual ones, but here we will examine the question for propositional
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discourse referents. The examination in Karttunen 1969 is comprehensive: Karttunen
1969 discusses indefinite noun phrases in the scope of modals, negation, and quantifiers,
under factive, non-factive, and implicative verbs, in the antecedent of conditionals, and
in imperatives and polar interrogatives. The current chapter aims to be at least this com-
prehensive, if not more so; the nature of this investigation will require examining a wide
variety of constructions, including any phrase or clause which might be taken to convey
a proposition, to see if that proposition is available for future anaphoric reference.
Karttunen’s (1969) generalization was that “[a] non-specific indefinite NP in an
affirmative sentence (single sentence or a complement) establishes a[n individual] dis-
course referent just in case the proposition represented by the sentence is asserted,
implied or presupposed by the speaker to be true” (p. 13; underlining mine). By the end
of this chapter, we will have a parallel generalization for which things establish propo-
sitional discourse referents, something of the form: ‘A establishes a propositional
discourse referent just in case ’. The generalization we seek here is parallel in terms
of phrasing and aims, though the similarity of the generalizations will remain to be seen.
3.1.2 Background
There is currently one theory on the market for what introduces propositional dis-
course referents. Krifka 2013 argues that propositional discourse referents are introduced
by the syntactic phrase projections for Tense (TP) and anything higher than it, includ-
ing but not limited to Negation (NegP). For example, Krifka 2013 presents (124b) as a
schematic for the sentence in (124a), where each ↪→ indicates a discourse referent being
introduced.
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(124) a. Ede didn’t steal the cookie. (Krifka 2013: (4a))
b.
(Krifka 2013: (22))
The TP in (124b) introduces a discourse referent for the proposition ‘Ede stole the cookie’,
and NegP introduces a discourse referent for ‘Ede didn’t steal the cookie’. (124b) also
schematizes the introduction of discourse referents for events and speech acts; we won’t
focus on those here, except to contrast with the propositions we’re interested in.
We will evaluate Krifka’s (2013) proposal as we proceed with our investigation, exam-
ining how the data comports with this theory. I will argue that the Krifka 2013 proposal
is on the right track, but is ultimately untenable, as we will see both (i) phrases of TP or
higher which don’t introduce propositional discourse referents, and (ii) phrases below TP
which do introduce propositional discourse referents.
3.1.3 Methodology
In order to ensure that the observations made here are sound, I will be careful about
which examples I use. Like in any good experiment, the more variables we can control
for, the better. In this subsection, I’ll discuss the choices that underlie the examples that
we’ll consider for the remainder of the chapter.
First, we’ll identify an anaphor as being propositional by pairing it with a predicate
which takes propositional arguments. The clearest such predicates are true and false, but
other predicates which take sentential complements (e.g., tell, doubt) also fit the bill. Pe-
terson 1982 lists the predicates in (17), repeated below, as those which take propositional
arguments.
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(125) Predicates of propositions
believes-, fears-, hopes-, wants-, thinks-, affirms-, denies-, -(un)likely,
-(im)possible, -(in)consistent, -seems strange, -appears important, -sure, -true,
-certain, -proposal, -hypothesis, etc. (Peterson 1982: (9))
I won’t comment here on the validity of all of these, but the idea that certain predicates
select for propositional arguments is sound. Some predicates that take propositional ar-
guments also take individuals as arguments, as in (126), but some do not, as in (127).
And, some that can take individuals do so with a different meaning, as in (128), often
corresponding to different lexical items crosslinguistically.34
(126) a. I believe (that) Nancy is at the party.
b. I believe Joyce.
(127) a. I think (that) Nancy is at the party.
b. * I think Joyce.
(128) a. I know (that) Nancy is at the party.
b. I know Joyce.
The fact that many of these predicates also take individual-type arguments is not espe-
cially worrisome, as there is rarely ambiguity between propositions and individuals of
the kind described thus far (e.g., persons). More relevant are nominalizations like the fact
that Nancy is at the party, which are syntactically nominal (DPs), and thus of the same
type as individuals. But it is not the case that we can interpret all sentences with that-
clause complements as having covert nominalizations, as multiple substitution failures
34The know that takes a propositional argument, as in (128a), means something like ‘to have a high
credence in’. That same meaning applied to an individual argument like Joyce would mean something like
‘to have a high credence in Joyce’, which would then mean the same thing as I believe Joyce, as in (126b).
But that isn’t what (128b) means. Rather, the know which takes an individual argument, as in (128b), means
something like ‘be acquainted with’, a meaning which does not extend to cover (128a). These two senses of
English know are distinct verbs in, e.g., French, German, Greek, Hebrew, Mandarin, Spanish...
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have been noted between propositions and their respective nominalizations (Prior 1971;
Pietroski 2000; King 2002; Pryor 2007).
Many of the examples that will be presented as infelicitous can be made felicitous by
picking a different predicate; indeed, in many cases, there are very natural follow-ups
the speaker could felicitously utter that involve anaphors. Many of these ‘fixed’ variants,
though, no longer make use of propositional anaphors, instead making anaphoric refer-
ence to an event. For this reason, we’ll be especially careful to only use predicates which
take propositions, but not events, as arguments. When demonstrative, felicitous event
anaphora examples may be presented as a foil to infelicitous attempts at propositional
anaphora.
Second, I’ll be using single-speaker discourses. These can be construed as indepen-
dent segments of a larger multi-participant discourse (as opposed to a speaker talking to
herself), but importantly only a single speaker will be considered. Doing so will allow
us to largely sidestep thorny issues of speakers possibly differing internal models of the
discourse, their assumptions about which referents are available or salient in a discourse
context. These sorts of misalignments might occur in discourses where there is later nego-
tiation about these differences via explicit disagreement, but they can also occur entirely
unbeknownst to the interlocutors; either way, focusing on a single speaker (who is not
retracting a prior assertion or correcting themselves) allows us to avoid these problems
entirely. Similarly, keeping to single-speaker discourses means we don’t have to attempt
to identify hearers’ accommodation of new information: single speakers needn’t accom-
modate themselves.
Because we’ll be using single-speaker discourses, we won’t be using response parti-
cles (like yes and no) as our anaphors, even though they have been analyzed as being
anaphoric (Krifka 2013; Roelofsen & Farkas 2015). Instead, we’ll use other propositional
anaphors, and in particular the demonstrative that. The different anaphors have different
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selectional restrictions, so some can be more or less marked in different contexts:
(129) a. ? Dustin proved the theorem. Lucas told me this.
b. Dustin proved the theorem. Lucas told me that.
c. # Dustin proved the theorem. Lucas told me it.
d. Dustin proved the theorem. Lucas told me as much.
e. Dustin proved the theorem. Lucas told me so.
f. ? Dustin proved the theorem. Lucas told me.
In general, we’ll be using that, simply because it seems to be relatively unmarked. That
said, if using another anaphor (like it) makes a sentence more natural, we can do so with
confidence, without sacrificing the strength of our evidence. If any anaphor can felici-
tously refer back to a discourse referent (that we can be confident is propositional, given
the predicates discussed above), then something must have introduced that discourse
referent. That said, we’ll stick with that as our preferred anaphor.
Whenever possible, we’ll also try to keep the anaphor in complement position. This
will help to avoid complications which might arise due to topicalization, which may have
effects on anaphora resolution.
(130) Steve said (that) Nancy was at the party,
a. but Joyce doesn’t know that.
b. but that’s something Joyce doesn’t know.
Judgments may differ, but many speakers have the intuition that the more preferred an-
tecedent of the propositional anaphor that differs in these two follow-ups. In (130a), the
complement position anaphor preferentially refers to the proposition introduced by the
matrix clause of the first conjunct, ‘Steve said . . . ’. The clefted anaphor in (130b), how-
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ever, preferentially refers to the proposition introduced by the embedded clause, ‘Nancy
was at the party’. Because the same first conjunct in (130) has follow-ups which can refer
to either of these propositions, we should say that it introduces propositional discourse
referents for both of them, in both cases; the distinction between (130a) and (130b) is not
which discourse referents are available, but which is preferred (perhaps due to salience).
Nevertheless, (130) demonstrates that topicalization, here via clefting (Fichtner 1993), has
consequences for anaphora resolution. The exact nature of these consequences is beyond
the scope of the current chapter, however. For now, we’ll simply stick with anaphors in
complement position, the one common exception being in composition with the predicate
true.
Finally, clauses in a discourse can be related to one another by means of discourse re-
lations (Hobbs 1985; Lascarides & Asher 1991, 1993). In particular, one can distinguish
between discourse relations which are coordinating (such as Narration, Parallel, and Con-
trast) and those which are subordinating (such as Elaboration, Explanation, and Back-
ground) (Asher & Vieu 2005).35 The structure described by these discourse relations has
been argued to have consequences for the resolution of anaphora (Asher 1993; Asher &
Vieu 2005), as only discourse referents in the “right frontier” (Polanyi 1988; see also Web-
ber 1991) are accessible for anaphoric reference. As such, the examples here will be those
which have a subordinating discourse relation between the clause hosting the anaphor
and the antecedent, such that no content is ‘removed’ from the right frontier (i.e., such
that the right frontier isn’t advanced). For the same reason, we’ll avoid discourses with
intervening material between the potential antecedent clause and the anaphor-containing
clause, lest some intervening material advance the right frontier and change the anaphoric
availability of the earlier clause.
35It is worth noting that discourse structure is distinct from syntactic structure: a clause may be syn-
tactically subordinate without implying that the content is conveys has a subordinate discourse relation
(Blu¨hdorn 2008).
(v) The penguins were yellow-brown, while the giraffes were black and white. (Blu¨hdorn 2008: (3))
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With those details squared away, we can turn to the various constructions and see
which introduce propositional discourse referents. For each example, I’ll provide a dis-
course containing both the construction under investigation and a follow-up containing
an anaphor; the anaphor will be italicized. I’ll then list out candidate antecedents for
the anaphor, each of which will be accompanied by judgment marks of the type associ-
ated with these sorts of examples: X indicates felicity; # indicates infelicity, and (one or
more) question marks indicate (varying degrees of) uncertainty, usually with accompa-
nying discussion in prose. I’ll also provide right-aligned labels alongside each candidate
antecedent, indicating the (part of the) construction associated with it.
3.2 Subclausal constructions
In this section, we’ll examine constructions below the level of TP which might be
taken to introduce a propositional discourse referent. In particular, we’ll look at con-
structions which are associated with propositions, for instance, constructions that trigger
the presupposition of a proposition, to see whether that proposition is then available for
anaphoric reference.
3.2.1 Names
Proper names presuppose both the existence and the discourse salience of a referent.
Proper names are Determiner Phrases (DPs), which are below TP.
(131) Nancy napped. Dustin told me that.
Xthat: Nancy napped. MATRIX CLAUSE
#that: Nancy exists. NAME, EXISTENCE PRESUPPOSITION
#that: Addressee knows which Nancy is intended.
NAME, SALIENCE PRESUPPOSITION
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Neither the existence presupposition nor the salience presupposition are available an-
tecedents for anaphoric reference. There are no other propositions which names are
straightforwardly associated with, so we can conclude that names don’t introduce propo-
sitional discourse referents.
3.2.2 Definites
Definite noun phrases, also DPs, presuppose the existence and salience of a referent.
(132) The cat napped. Dustin told me that.
Xthat: The cat napped. MATRIX CLAUSE
#that: The cat exists. DP, EXISTENCE PRESUPPOSITION
#that: Addressee knows which cat is intended.
DP, SALIENCE PRESUPPOSITION
Just like with names, neither the existence presupposition nor the salience presupposition
are available antecedents. So, just as with names, definites do no introduce propositional
discourse referents. This is perhaps not surprising, considering the ways in which names
and definite descriptions behave similarly (Strawson 1950; Searle 1958).
3.2.3 Possessives
Possessive phrases (PossP) of the form x’s y presuppose some relation that obtains
between x and y. This relationship is prototypically one of possession (Fran’s property),
but can also range over a number of other relations, including inherent possession (Fran’s
nephew, Fran’s knee), parthood (the desk’s bottom drawer), location (Fran’s neighborhood), and
many others (Langacker 1995a; Alexiadou 2003). (These phrases also presuppose the ex-
istence of x and y, but those presuppositions are associated with the DPs within PossP.)
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(133) Mike carried Dustin’s backpack. Elle told me that.
Xthat: Mike carried Dustin’s backpack. MATRIX CLAUSE
#that: Dustin has a backpack. POSSESSIVE PHRASE
(134) Nancy hugged her brother. Lucas told me that.
Xthat: Nancy hugged her brother. MATRIX CLAUSE
#that: Nancy has a brother. POSSESSIVE PHRASE
(135) Steve’s rudeness angered me. I heard that on the radio.
??that: Steve’s rudeness angered me. MATRIX CLAUSE
#that: Steve is rude. POSSESSIVE PHRASE
The anaphors in (133)–(135) cannot felicitously refer to the relation propositions presup-
posed by the various PossPs, regardless of the type of relation described by the PossP. In
addition, the context of (135) makes the matrix clause unsuitable as an antecedent for the
anaphor, because presumably a speaker is the highest authority on their own personal
taste, which makes listing a radio report as a source for learning about one’s own anger
bizarre.
None of the possessive phrases given in (133)–(135) make their presupposed propo-
sition available for anaphoric reference, so possessive phrases don’t introduce proposi-
tional discourse referents.
3.2.4 Intersective Adjectives
Intersective adjectives introduce predications of their arguments. 36 For prenominal
adjectives these predications are distinct from the matrix predication of a clause. For
example, the adjective red in (136) is what conveys the information (in this context) that
36This is a semantic characterization, not a syntactic one. The intention here is to discuss adjectives in
general, but without overgeneralizing to include predicates like fake watch, whose propositional content is
less transparent than is necessary for our present investigation.
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the entity picked out by the ball is red. This information is represented as a proposition
‘the ball is red’ distinct from the proposition denoted by the matrix clause ‘the ball rolled
down the stairs’.
(136) The red ball rolled down the stairs. Nancy told me that.
Xthat: The red ball rolled down the stairs MATRIX CLAUSE
#that: The ball is red. ADJ PREDICATION
In (136), the ball’s being red is entailed by the whole first sentence, but the report in the
second sentence cannot felicitously describe Nancy as having only described the color.
The proposition associated with the adjective is not available for anaphoric reference.
The first sentence in (137) has an intersective adjective not prenominally but as a mod-
ifier of the main predication of the clause, is a[n] attorney.
(137) Barb is a wealthy attorney. Mike told me that.
Xthat: Barb is wealthy and an attorney. MATRIX CLAUSE
#that: Barb is wealthy. ADJ PREDICATION
#that: Barb is an attorney. NP PREDICATION
The anaphor that cannot be taken to refer to either the adjectival predication or the main
NP (attorney) predication. This attempt might be hampered by the context, which pro-
vides no motivation for wanting to refer to just one of these predications, as opposed to
the total (wealthy attorney) predication. Even more specific contexts, however, don’t allow
anaphoric reference to just one of these predications:
(138) a. A: Who should we invite to our political fundraiser?
B: Barb is a wealthy attorney. # Mike told me that, even though he doesn’t
know she’s an attorney.
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b. A: Who can we find to represent our corporation in this case?
B: Barb is a wealthy attorney. # Mike told me that, even though he doesn’t
know she’s wealthy.
The context of (138a) gives the speaker B a reason to want to talk about just Barb’s
wealth—any wealthy person makes a good donor, regardless of their occupation—but
B’s follow-up in (138a) which explicitly denies Mike’s knowledge of Barb’s job is self-
contradictory. Similarly, the context of (138b) gives B a reason to want to talk about just
Barb’s job—any attorney can serve, regardless of their personal wealth—but B’s follow-
up which explicitly denies Mike’s knowledge of Barb’s wealth is incompatible with B’s
prior utterance. Neither of these predications are individually available for anaphoric
reference; reference is only felicitous to their conjunctive whole.
Intersective adjectives, then, don’t make propositions available for anaphoric refer-
ence, either prenominally or as a modifier of a main predication.
3.2.5 Verbs with lexical presuppositions
Some verbs carry presuppositional information in addition to their asserted main con-
tent. For instance, the verb stop presupposes that some state or process existed prior to the
event time being described: in other words, stop presupposes that there was something
to be stopped. This isn’t a purely syntactic designation, but it does describe a group of
English verbs which might behave differently, and so we’ll examine them as a group.
(139) Steve stopped smoking. Nancy told me that.
Xthat: Steve stopped smoking. MATRIX CLAUSE
#that: Steve used to smoke. VP, EXISTENCE PRESUPPOSITION
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(140) Steve continued smoking. Nancy told me that.
Xthat: Steve continued smoking. MATRIX CLAUSE
#that: Steve used to smoke. VP, EXISTENCE PRESUPPOSITION
The first sentence of (139) conveys the proposition ‘Steve stopped smoking’, but it also
conveys the proposition ‘Steve used to smoke’ via presupposition. This presupposed
proposition, however, is not available for anaphoric reference. Similarly for (140), which
does not make the proposition ‘Steve had been smoking’ (cued by the presupposition
trigger continue) available for anaphoric reference. These sorts of verbs with lexical pre-
suppositions, then, don’t introduce propositional discourse referents.
Up to this point, all of the constructions we have examined have supported Krifka’s
(2013) proposal. DP, PossP, AdjP, and VP are all below TP, and so according to Krifka
2013 should not introduce propositional discourse referents. And this is precisely what
we have observed thus far.
3.2.6 Small clauses (PrP, Bowers 1993, Balasz 2012)
English small clause constructions are those in which a nominal and adjective appear
(in that order) after a verb. These constructions have a number of different functions: they
can introduce a predication, a cause, a result, or an epistemic state, among other things
(Wilder 1991). There is some disagreement about the syntax of small clause constructions,
including whether the nominal and adjective make up a constituent (Wilder 1991). Some
authors calling them VPs, and others use a specific Predication Phrase (PrP) to model
them (Bowers 1993; Balazs 2012). In all of these analyses, though, syntacticians agree that
small clauses are below TP.
We can investigate the different types of small clauses individually. First, secondary
predications, which Wilder 1991 compares to Kratzer’s (1995) “stage-level predicates”.
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(141) Hopper ordered his steak rare. Joyce told me that.
Xthat: Hopper ordered his steak rare. MATRIX CLAUSE
#that: The steak was rare. SMALL CLAUSE
(142) Steve left Nancy angry with herself. Barb couldn’t believe that.
Xthat: Steve left Nancy angry with herself. MATRIX CLAUSE
#that: Nancy was angry with herself. SMALL CLAUSE
In (141), the small clause [his steak] [rare] describes how Hopper ordered his steak (to be
cooked). There is no associated proposition which is available for anaphoric reference,
though; this makes some sense, as (141) doesn’t entail that the steak was in fact cooked
rare. (Hopper could have ordered it that way, only to be told that no steak was available
at all.) In contrast, (142) does entail that Nancy was in fact angry with herself. Neverthe-
less, that proposition ‘Nancy was angry with herself’ fails to be available for anaphoric
reference, at least from a subsequent clause. This proposition does seem to be available if
the anaphor is in coordinate structure, a second predicate which is thus part of the same
small clause, as in (143).
(143) Steve left Nancy angry with herself, and unhappy that that was true.
??that: Steve left Nancy angry with herself. MATRIX CLAUSE
Xthat: Nancy was angry with herself. SMALL CLAUSE
The proposition ‘Nancy was angry with herself’ associated with the left predication of
the coordinated small clause seems to be available for anaphoric reference, but only from
within this shared coordinate structure. It is not available from beyond this structure, as
in (142).37
37These coordinate examples are harder to construct with inanimate objects, though not impossible.
(vi) Hopper ordered his steak rare, and thrown out if that wasn’t true.
To the extent that this example is grammatical and felicitous, this may be true in general of small clauses.
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Small clause constructions also describe causative events, with a causative verb em-
bedding the small clause. In (144), Steve caused Barb to be nervous, and in (145), Hopper
caused Callaghan to be promoted.
(144) Steve made Barb nervous. She told Nancy that.
Xthat: Steve made Barb nervous. MATRIX CLAUSE
#that: Barb was nervous. SMALL CLAUSE
(145) Chief Hopper had Officer Callaghan promoted, but Joyce doesn’t believe that.
Xthat: Chief Hopper had Officer Callaghan promoted. MATRIX CLAUSE
#that: Officer Callaghan was promoted. SMALL CLAUSE
Like (142), the predications described in (144) and (145) are entailed by the sentence: (144)
entails that Barb was nervous, and (145) entails that Callaghan was promoted. Never-
theless, these propositions are not available for anaphoric reference from a subsequent
clause. Just as we observed that a secondary predication small clause proposition is avail-
able for reference within that small clause (in (143)), the same is true for causative small
clauses. The proposition ‘Barb was nervous’, associated with the small clause of (144), is
available from within a coordinated predication that is part of the same small clause, as
in (146), but not from a coordinated second small clause, as in (147).
(146) Steve made Barb nervous, and unhappy that that was true.
??that: Steve made Barb nervous. MATRIX CLAUSE
Xthat: Barb was nervous. SMALL CLAUSE
(147) Steve made Barb nervous, and Nancy unhappy that that was true.
#that: Steve made Barb nervous. MATRIX CLAUSE
Xthat: Barb was nervous. SMALL CLAUSE
Small clause constructions can also describe the result state of an event (Hoekstra 1988;
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Wilder 1991).
(148) Joyce painted the room red. Jonathan told me that.
Xthat: Joyce painted the room red. MATRIX CLAUSE
#that: The room is red. SMALL CLAUSE
(149) Lucas wiped the table clean, but I don’t think that’s true.
#that: Lucas wiped the table clean. MATRIX CLAUSE
#that: The table is clean. SMALL CLAUSE
In (148), the room was red, as a result of Joyce’s painting. This proposition, describing
just the result state of the event, is not available for anaphoric reference in (148).
In order to try to get at this result state proposition, (149) is presented in the frame
of a potential Moore’s paradox (Moore 1942): φ but I don’t believe φ, with an anaphor. If
the anaphor is taken as referring to the asserted matrix proposition, then the discourse is
“an absurd thing to say” (Moore 1942), because the speaker has just uttered something
they don’t believe as if they believe it.38 If there is another available antecedent, however,
this frame needn’t lead to the same infelicity: there is nothing inherently absurd about
φ but I don’t believe ψ. As we can see in (149), though, there is no alternative proposition
available for anaphoric reference. The anaphor in (149) cannot be taken as referring just to
the proposition ‘the table was clean’. The only available antecedent is the matrix clause,
which renders (149) infelicitous.
Secondary predication, causative, and resultative small clause constructions don’t
make propositions available for anaphoric reference, at least external to the small clause
itself. Epistemic small clause constructions (Wilder 1991), however, behave differently.
Consider (150) and (151), which are presented in the same potential Moore’s paradox
38This is a violation, not a flaunting, of Grice’s (1975) Maxim of Quality.
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frame as (149).
(150) Jonathan considers Nancy brave, but I don’t think that’s true.
#that: Jonathan considers Nancy brave. MATRIX CLAUSE
Xthat: Nancy is brave. SMALL CLAUSE
(151) Barb called Steve a liar, but I don’t think that’s true.
#that: Barb called Steve a liar. MATRIX CLAUSE
Xthat: Steve is a liar. SMALL CLAUSE
In (150), the small clause [Nancy] [brave] describes how Jonathan sees the world, and the
proposition ‘Nancy is brave’ is available for anaphoric reference. In fact, the Moore’s
frame makes this proposition the only antecedent which makes (150) felicitous. Simi-
larly, in (151), the anaphor that cannot refer to the proposition conveyed by the matrix
clause, ‘Barb called Steve a liar’, without falling into Moore’s paradox. It can, however,
felicitously refer to the proposition associated with the small clause, ‘Steve is a liar’. The
propositions associated with epistemic small clauses, then, are available for anaphoric
reference, even from subsequent clauses.
This observation, that the propositions associated with some small clauses are avail-
able for anaphora, presents a challenge to Krifka 2013. Small clauses, whether VPs or
PrPs, are below TP, and so following Krifka 2013 should not introduce propositional dis-
course referents. To account for these data, one could argue that some (and only some)
small clauses TPs, and then explain why tense is not present in these TPs. Alternatively,
one could argue that these epistemic small clauses move for scope, thus putting them
above TP (making them eligible to introduce a propositional discourse referent), while
still remaining relativized to the doxastic worlds of the subject opinion-holder, not the
speaker. I won’t sketch these defenses of Krifka 2013 further here before examining the
rest of the data we’d like to consider.
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There is one other observation worth making about anaphora to small clauses, which
also stands in contrast to the Krifka 2013 proposal. Krifka 2013 has a syntactic phrase
introduce a discourse referent for itself: TP introduces a discourse referent for TP, NegP
introduces a discourse referent for NegP. If this were extended to small clauses, we would
expect a small clause—say, a PrP—to introduce a discourse referent for itself. The data
we’ve seen so far, however, suggest that the difference between the small clauses that do
and don’t make propositions available for anaphoric reference is not the small clauses
themselves, but rather the verbs that embed them. We can make this point clearer by
looking at a minimal pair, two different embedding verb contexts, each embedding (at
least string-identical) small clauses.
(152) [Francine and Rosa were wed in an airport casino, officiated by an Elvis
impersonator.]
The clerk considered Francine and Rosa married, but I don’t think that’s true.
(153) [Francine and Rosa were wed in a Baptist church.]
The pastor pronounced Francine and Rosa married, # but I don’t think that’s true.
(152) and (153) have (at least what appears to be) the same small clause: [Francine and Rosa]
[married]. In (152), this small clause is under an epistemic embedding verb, consider, and
the anaphor that can felicitously refer to the proposition ‘Francine and Rosa are married’
despite the potential Moore’s frame. In (153), the same small clause is under a resultative
embedding verb, pronounce, as the event described is not one of having an opinion but
of creating the state described. And in the context of this resultative embedding verb,
the proposition ‘Francine and Rosa are married’ is not available for anaphoric reference.
(And, due to the Moore’s frame, this renders the second clause altogether infelicitous, as
there are no non-absurd antecedents.) So, unless one wants to argue that the two small
clauses in (152) and (153) are structurally different, then it is not the small clause itself
doing the introduction (or non-introduction) of discourse referents, but the embedding
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verb.
There is such a structural argument available: If one takes the small clauses under
epistemic embedding verbs to be derived from infinitives, then not only are the small
clauses in (152) and (153) distinct, but the former is a TP, and thus accords with the pre-
diction from Krifka 2013. As was pointed out to me by John Whitman (p.c.), the small
clause in (152) (but not the small clause in (153)) can take modal adverbs, as in (154).
(154) a. The clerk considered Francine and Rosa
{
possibly
probably
}
married.
b. ?? The clerk pronounced Francine and Rosa
{
possibly
probably
}
married.
Additionally, the small clause in (152) can be coordinated with an explicitly infinitival
small clause, as in (155) (which is not the case for (153)).
(155) a. The clerk considered Francine and Rosa married and Joe and Bill to have
been married.
b. ?? The clerk pronounced Francine and Rosa married and Joe and Bill to have
been married.
Both (154b) and (155b) are strange given the meaning of pronounce: it’s not much of a
performative if it needs modal hedging, as in (154b); and the infinitive in (155b) would
have to be understood as a retroactive pronouncement, which is unusual (if not legally
attested). Nevertheless, the felicity of (154a) and (155a) give some credence to the notion
that the small clauses in (152) and (153) are in fact structurally distinct. This would be a
departure from current analyses of small clauses, however (Bowers 1993; Balazs 2012).
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3.2.7 Adverbials
The final category below the level of TP we will consider are adverbials (AdvPs). First,
we will look at adverbs which modify a DP (via an adjective).
(156) Joyce’s recently single nephew went on a date, and she told Hopper that.
Xthat: Joyce’s nephew went on a date. MATRIX CLAUSE
#that: Joyce’s nephew is recently single. ADVP
#that: Joyce’s nephew is single. MODIFIED BY ADVP
In (156), the adverb recently composes with the adjective single, to modify the DP recently
single nephew. There are several propositions—potential propositional discourse referents,
really—worth looking at in the first clause of (156). The proposition conveyed by the
matrix clause is ‘Joyce’s nephew went on a date’, the proposition conveyed by the adverb
is ‘Joyce’s nephew is recently single’, and the proposition conveyed by the structure the
adverb modifies—that is, the DP minus the adverb—is ‘Joyce’s nephew is single’. We’ll
distinguish between these last two not because it matters for (156), but because it bears
on the distinction made in the previous subsection between (i) a phrase introducing its
own propositional discourse referent and (ii) a discourse referent being introduced by an
embedder for its argument.
As just hinted at, this distinction doesn’t matter for (156): the only proposition avail-
able for anaphoric reference is the one conveyed by the matrix clause. The adverb doesn’t
introduce a propositional discourse referent, either for its own phrase or for the phrase
it modifies. This isn’t true just of recently; in fact, a wide range of DP adverbs show the
same behavior.
78
(157) Dustin moved a surprisingly heavy box, but Lucas didn’t believe that.
Xthat: Dustin moved a box. MATRIX CLAUSE
#that: The box was surprisingly heavy. ADVP
#that: The box was heavy. MODIFIED BY ADVP
(158) Just before the storm, Mike found a fortunately large umbrella, but I didn’t believe
that.
#that: Mike found an umbrella. MATRIX CLAUSE
#that: The umbrella was fortunately large. ADVP
#that: The umbrella was large. MODIFIED BY ADVP
(159) I just emailed a Craigslist poster about a hopefully available apartment, but Steve
doesn’t believe that.
Xthat: I emailed a Craigslist poster. MATRIX CLAUSE
#that: The apartment is hopefully available. ADVP
#that: The apartment is available. MODIFIED BY ADVP
The proposition associated with each matrix clause in (157)–(159) is available for
anaphoric reference, except for in the Moore’s paradox frame in (158). Just like (156),
none of the adverbs in (157)–(159) make a proposition available for anaphoric reference,
either for the proposition they convey or for that of the phrase they modify. This includes
adverbs which are intensional (surprisingly in (157), fortunately in (158)) and an adverb
derived from an attitude verb (hope, in (159)).
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Epistemic adverbs, however, are a systematic exception to this pattern.
(160) The magician presented a seemingly normal deck of cards, but I didn’t believe
that.
#that: The magician presented a deck of cards. MATRIX CLAUSE
#that: The deck of cards was seemingly normal. ADVP
Xthat: The deck of cards was normal. MODIFIED BY ADVP
(161) Steve introduced Nancy to the candidate apparently most qualified for the job, but
she didn’t believe that.
X/?that: Steve introduced Nancy to a candidate. MATRIX CLAUSE
#that: The candidate was apparently the most qualified for the job. ADVP
Xthat: The candidate was the most qualified for the job. MODIFIED BY ADVP
(160) is presented in a Moore’s frame which renders the matrix clause proposition an
unsuitable antecedent for anaphora. Trying to understand the anaphor that as refer-
ring to the proposition associated with the adverbial—‘The deck of cards was seemingly
normal’—results in a similarly Moore’s-like sense of self-contradiction. The sentence does
have one very natural felicitous reading, though: the speaker didn’t believe the deck of
cards was real. This reading has the anaphor coreferential with the phrase being modified
by the adverb, so the adverb must be introducing a discourse referent. The same is true in
(161), where the phrase modified by the adverb has an associated propositional discourse
referent available for anaphoric reference. (Here, understanding the matrix clause as an-
tecedent requires accommodating a disagreement about memory, where Nancy didn’t
remember being introduced to a candidate.)
And, just to make the case that much stronger, we can construct minimal pairs to
parallel (157) and (159) above.
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(162) Dustin moved a seemingly heavy box, but Lucas didn’t believe that.
Xthat: Dustin moved a box. MATRIX CLAUSE
#that: The box was surprisingly heavy. ADVP
Xthat: The box was heavy. MODIFIED BY ADVP
(163) I just emailed a Craigslist poster about an allegedly available apartment, but Steve
doesn’t believe that.
Xthat: I emailed a Craigslist poster. MATRIX CLAUSE
#that: The apartment is allegedly available. ADVP
Xthat: The apartment is available. MODIFIED BY ADVP
(162) differs from (157) only in which adverb is used, where only the epistemic seemingly
makes a proposition available for anaphoric reference. The same is true for (159), which
replaces (159)’s hopefully with the epistemic allegedly, with the consequence of now having
an additional proposition as an available anaphoric antecedent. We can observe, then,
that epistemic adverbs do introduce a propositional discourse referent for the phrases
that they modify.
Like the small clause data, this represents a challenge to the Krifka 2013 proposal in
two ways. Empirically, these epistemic adverbs are structures below TP which never-
theless introduce a propositional discourse referent. And, theoretically, they suggest that
the discourse referent introduced is for the phrase modified by the introducer, not for the
clause containing it.
This last point is of particular note, here, because the adverb cases highlight a point
that the small clauses make unclear: the structure for which a discourse referent is intro-
duced isn’t obviously a syntactic constituent. For small clauses, there has been debate in
the literature whether a small clause like [Nancy] [brave] is a constituent, but the brack-
eting for an adverbial structure like (162) is [a [[seemingly heavy] box]]. The words most
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closely associated with the non-matrix proposition we can felicitously refer to in (162) are
heavy box, but [heavy box] is not a constituent of the sentence. This might be assuaged by
having the epistemic adverb move out of the DP such that it can scope over (and take
as an argument) the phrase which had contained it, but I won’t sketch out such an ac-
count here. Even so, these data still represent a sub-TP structure introducing a discourse
referent, contra Krifka 2013.
We can also look at adverbs which modify VP. Like the adverbs which modify DPs,
most such adverbs don’t make a proposition available for anaphoric reference.
(164) Nancy ran quickly. Jonathan told me that.
Xthat: Nancy ran quickly. MATRIX CLAUSE
#that: Nancy ran. MODIFIED BY ADVP
(165) Dustin sat still, but the teacher didn’t believe that.
Xthat: Dustin sat still. MATRIX CLAUSE
#that: Dustin sat. MODIFIED BY ADVP
(166) Steve immediately fled, but Nancy doesn’t believe that.
Xthat: Steve immediately fled. MATRIX CLAUSE
#that: Steve fled. MODIFIED BY ADVP
In (164), we can’t understand Jonathan to have said only that Nancy ran (not mentioning
the speed at which she ran): the anaphor that can’t be taken to refer to the phrase that
the adverb modifies. The anaphor can only be taken to refer to the proposition associated
with the matrix clause—here, ‘Nancy ran quickly’. The same is true for (165) and (166).
In (165), it is perfectly consistent to believe that Dustin sat but didn’t sit still, but we
can’t interpret (165) as felicitously describing such a situation; similarly, it is consistent to
believe that Steve might have fled but not immediately, but (166) can’t describe Nancy as
having that belief.
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On the whole, most VP adverbs don’t make a proposition available for anaphoric
reference. But, once again, the same class of exceptions exist here:
(167) Steve apparently fled, but Nancy doesn’t believe that.
Xthat: Steve apparently fled. MATRIX CLAUSE
Xthat: Steve fled. MODIFIED BY ADVP
(168) Steve allegedly fled, but I don’t believe that.
#that: Steve allegedly fled. MATRIX CLAUSE
Xthat: Steve fled. MODIFIED BY ADVP
Here we have two variants of (166), but with epistemic adverbs. (167) is a minimal pair
with (166), and (168) is a near-minimal variant, only in a Moore’s frame to make the
availability of the non-matrix proposition even clearer. In (167), the anaphor that can
be taken to refer to either the matrix clause proposition (‘Steve apparently fled’) or to
the proposition associated with adverb-modified VP (‘Steve fled’). In (168), the Moore’s
frame precludes felicitous anaphoric reference to the matrix clause proposition; there is
still a felicitous reading of (168), though, where the anaphor refers to the proposition
donveyed by the allegedly-modified VP ‘Steve fled’.
VP adverbs with epistemic modal flavor make the proposition associated with the
phrase they modify available for anaphoric reference, just like DP adverbs. And, just
as with DP adverbs, this constitutes an objection to the Krifka 2013 proposal, in that VP
adverbs operate below TP. On the whole, we can conclude that where most adverbs do
not introduce propositional discourse referents, epistemic adverbs do.
A summary of the observations made about subclausal constructions in this section is
presented in Table 1.
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Table 1: Subclausal constructions
Construction
Introduce
Propositional
Discourse
Referent?
Subclausal Names no (131)
Definites no (132)
Possessives no (133)
Intersective adjectives no (136)
Verbs with lexical presuppositions no (139)
Small clauses Secondary Predication no (141)
Causative no (144)
Resultative no (148)
Epistemic yes (150)
Adverbials Modifying DP some (160)
Modifying VP some (167)
3.3 Monoclausal constructions
In this section, we’ll look at monoclausal constructions, including looking across sen-
tence types, to see when propositional discourse referents are introduced. While some
of these data might seem more ‘basic’ than the data covered in the previous section—
and indeed, every example in the previous section had a matrix clause with an associated
propositional discourse referent—, it seemed more fitting to progress up from the smallest
structures to the largest. And while all of the examples thus far have been in declarative
sentences, because the constructions being investigated were sub-TP, the results should
be consistent across sentence types. In this section, however, we will pay more attention
to the differences among sentence types.
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3.3.1 Declaratives
Voice
As we have seen in the examples thus far, the proposition conveyed by an active voice
matrix clause is available for anaphoric reference. To return to a basic example, consider
(169):
(169) Barb went to a party. Nancy told me that.
Xthat: Barb went to a party. MATRIX CLAUSE
The first sentence of (169) only has one clause, and it has an associated propositional
discourse referent which is picked up by the anaphor that in the second sentence.
This is not specific to the active voice; passive matrix clauses also have an associated
propositional discourse referent.
(170) A party was thrown last week. Steve told me that.
Xthat: A party was thrown last week. MATRIX CLAUSE
The first sentence of (170) denotes a proposition which is available for felicitous anaphoric
reference. This is perhaps unsurprising, and there is nothing about the Krifka 2013 pro-
posal which might make us expect that passive clauses behave differently than active
clauses in this respect, but it is nevertheless worth stating explicitly.
Negation
Under sentential negation, both the negative matrix clause proposition and the
negated embedded clause proposition—the prejacent of negation—are available for
anaphoric reference (recall Krifka 2013 and (124a)). To illustrate this, consider (171) and
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(172):
(171) Barb didn’t go to the party. Nancy told me that.
Xthat: Barb didn’t go to the party. MATRIX CLAUSE
(172) Barb didn’t go to the party. Nancy told me that, but she’s mistaken.
#that: Barb didn’t go to the party. MATRIX CLAUSE
Xthat: Barb went to the party. PREJACENT OF NEGATION
In (171), the anaphor that in the second sentence refers to the proposition denoted by the
matrix clause of the first. In (172), the matrix proposition is not a suitable antecedent,
because the follow-up clause denies the truth of whichever proposition is selected as
antecedent, and denying the truth of the already-asserted first sentence would be self-
contradictory. The other—and thereby only felicitous—reading of (172) is for the anaphor
to refer to the prejacent proposition ‘Barb went to the party’.
Sentential negation clearly involves the introduction of two propositional discourse
referents. But what about constituent negation?
(173) a. It’s not the case that Nancy has been able to go skiing, though people believe
that.
b. Nancy has not been able to go skiing, though people believe that.
c. # Nancy has been not able to go skiing, though people believe that.
d. # Nancy has been able not to go skiing, though people believe that.
e. # Nancy has been able to not go skiing, though people believe that.
f. # Nancy has been able to go not skiing, though people believe that.
(173a–b) are sentential negation, so there is a proposition available for anaphoric reference
that does not result in contradiction when contrasted with the though follow-up—namely,
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the prejacent proposition, ‘Nancy has been able to go skiing’. Examples (173c–f) are ex-
amples of constituent negation, and are infelicitous. To understand why, it is important
to notice that the sentence connective though requires a contrast between two clauses (see
Webber et al. 2003). A sentence without any negation can be infelicitous without this
contrast: consider (174).
(174) # Dustin napped, though people believe that.
There is no proposition for that to pick up other than ‘Dustin napped’, which cannot
then contrast with itself. In just the same way, (173c–f) have no alternative proposition
available other than the proposition expressed by the first clause. These examples of con-
stituent negation, then, don’t make any additional propositions available for anaphoric
reference beyond that of the matrix clause, which is available in the absence of con-
stituent negation. Sentential negation introduces a propositional discourse referent, but
constituent negation does not.
Modals
For sentences which contain modals, the proposition associated with the matrix clause
is available for anaphoric reference, just as in (169–171). This is the case whether the
modal has epistemic ‘flavor’, as in (175)–(176), or root flavor (Hoffman 1966, 1977), as in
the deontic examples (177)–(178), and whether the modal is a possibility modal ((175) &
(177)) or a necessity modal ((176) & (178)).
(175) Barb might have gone to the party. Nancy told me that, but she’s not sure either.
Xthat: Barb might have gone to the party. MATRIX CLAUSE
(176) Barb must have gone to the party. Nancy told me that after she looked at all the
evidence.
Xthat: Barb must have gone to the party. MATRIX CLAUSE
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(177) Barb should have gone to the party. Nancy told me that, she thought it would
cheer Barb up.
Xthat: Barb should have gone to the party. MATRIX CLAUSE
(178) Barb must have gone to the pep rally. Nancy told her that after she read the cheer-
leader handbook.
Xthat: Barb must have gone to the pep rally. MATRIX CLAUSE
More interesting is whether the prejacent of a modal is available for anaphoric refer-
ence in the same way that the prejacent of negation is. von Fintel & Gillies 2007 showed
that the prejacent of an epistemic modal can be available for anaphoric reference, their
context repeated in (179).
(179) [Pascal and Mordecai are playing Mastermind. After some rounds where Morde-
cai gives Pascal hints about the solution, Pascal says:]
There might be two reds. (von Fintel & Gillies 2007: (20))
[Mordecai, knowing the solution, responds:]
a. That’s right. There might be.
b. That’s right. There are.
c. That’s wrong. There can’t be.
d. That’s wrong. There aren’t. (von Fintel & Gillies 2007: (21))
The responses in (179a) & (179c) target the matrix proposition, ‘There might be two reds’,
while the responses in (179b) & (179d) target the prejacent, ‘There are two reds’. (179)
shows that both propositions can be suitable antecedents; we can further demonstrate
the availability of the prejacent by making the matrix clause proposition an unsuitable
choice, as in (180) and (181).
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(180) Barb might have gone to the party. Nancy told me that, but I don’t quite trust her.
#that: Barb might have gone to the parry. MATRIX CLAUSE
Xthat: Barb went to the party. PREJACENT OF MODAL
(181) [John’s friend see him holding a red Solo cup at a party, and walks over to guess
what he might be drinking. She says:]
You may have a beer, but I don’t think that’s true. (I think you have red wine.)
#that: John might have a beer. MATRIX CLAUSE
Xthat: John has a beer. PREJACENT OF MODAL
The follow-up in (180) provides a reason for the speaker to disbelieve whatever propo-
sition the anaphor that refers to. Interpreting the anaphor to refer to the matrix clause
proposition would be self-defeating, as the speaker would both endorse and disbelieve
the proposition ‘Barb might have gone to the party’. Instead understanding the anaphor
to refer to the prejacent ‘Barb went to the party’ allows (180) to be internally consistent and
felicitous. Similarly, the follow-up I don’t think that’s true in (181) makes the matrix clause
proposition an unsuitable antecedent for that, as it would give rise to a Moore’s paradox
interpretation of the sentence. The sole felicitous reading of (181) is for the anaphor to
refer to the prejacent of the modal, ‘John has a beer’. Sentences with epistemic modals,
parallel those with sentential negation, introduce a propositional discourse referent for
the prejacent of the modal.
There are multiple ways to divide modals according to their modal ‘flavor’, each of
which captures a different body of evidence a modal is sensitive to. Epistemic modals, for
instance, as we have seen above, are evaluated with respect to what is known. Hacquard
2011 gives the following examples of different modal flavors:
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(182) a. Epistemic
(In view of the available evidence,) John must/might/may be the murderer.
b. Deontic
(In view of his parents’ orders,) John may watch TV, but he must go to bed at
8pm.
c. Ability
(In view of his physical abilities,) John can lift 200 lbs.
d. Teleological
(In view of his goal to get a PhD,) John must write a dissertation.
e. Bouletic
(In view of his desire to retire at age 50,) John should work hard now.
(Hacquard 2011: (1))
f. Metaphysical
(In view of the evidence that was available during the 3rd lap,) John might (still)
have won the race. (cf. Hacquard 2011: (40b))
We can look at each of these flavors in turn.
Deontic modals are interpreted relative to a set of laws or rules. Because they are about
obligations, they frequently target an addressee, as in (183):
(183) [John’s doctor sees him holding a red Solo cup at a party. His doctor says to him:]
You may have a beer, but I don’t think that’s true.
#that: John is allowed to have a beer. MATRIX CLAUSE
#that: John has a beer. PREJACENT OF MODAL
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The sentence in (183) is string-identical to (the first two sentences of) (181); the only differ-
ence is whether may is interpreted epistemically (as in (181)) or deontically. Here, the doc-
tor’s presence biases a deontic reading, where John’s doctor is perhaps reminding him of
possible interactions between beer and John’s medication. The Moore’s frame precludes
the interpretation of the anaphor that as referring to the matrix (modal) proposition, but,
where (181) is felicitous due to the availability of an alternative antecedent proposition,
(183) is infelicitous. We can’t interpret (183) as meaning ‘You are allowed to have a beer
but I don’t think you do have one’, even though that is perfectly consistent. The propo-
sition ‘John has a beer’ doesn’t seem to be available for anaphoric reference in (183) the
way it is in (181). There doesn’t seem to be an alternative proposition available, which
renders (183) infelicitous.
One might be wonder about the tense of the follow-up, given the future orientation
of the permission being granted in (183). But modulating the tense doesn’t change the
felicity of the discourse.
(184) [John’s doctor sees him holding a red Solo cup at a party. His doctor says to him:]
a. # You may have a beer, but I don’t think that was true.
b. # You may have a beer, but I don’t think that is true.
c. # You may have a beer, but I don’t think that will be true.
Regardless of the tense of the follow-up, the prejacent of the deontic modal is unavailable
for anaphoric reference. (In the modal examples that follow, I will abstract over the tense
of the follow-ups, as modulating the tense doesn’t change the resulting (in)felicity.)
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We can also construct past oriented examples parallel to (180), which show the same
behavior:
(185) The chaperone should have gone to the party, but Nancy told me that’s not true.
Xthat: The chaperone was obligated to go to the party. MATRIX CLAUSE
#that: The chaperone went to the party. PREJACENT OF MODAL
(186) The chaperone should have gone to the party, but that’s not true.
#that: The chaperone was obligated to go to the party. MATRIX CLAUSE
#that: The chaperone went to the party. PREJACENT OF MODAL
The matrix clause proposition, the modal proposition, is available for anaphoric reference
in (185), while that same reading is rendered self-contradictory in (186). The anaphors
cannot be interpreted as referring to the proposition ‘The chaperone went to the party’ in
either follow-up. There are natural follow-ups to the first sentence in (185)/(186) which
make use of the anaphor that and which are perfectly felicitous, as in (187) & (188):
(187) The chaperone should have gone to the party, but that didn’t happen.
Xthat: (the chaperone’s) going to the party EVENT ANAPHORA
(188) The chaperone should have gone to the party. That was her job.
Xthat: (the chaperone’s) going to the party EVENT ANAPHORA
These variants are examples of anaphoric reference to an event, though—the chaperone’s
going to the party—not to a proposition. The predicate happen can only apply to events,
not to propositions. Examples (183)–(186) illustrate that sentences with deontic modals
do not make the modal’s prejacent available for propositional anaphora.
Ability modals are interpreted relative to an entity’s abilities or capabilities. By virtue
of this meaning, sentences with ability modals tend to be considered relative to (the
present estimation of) some future eventuality, as in (189).
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(189) Nancy can win the race next week, but I don’t think that’s true.
#that: Nancy can win the race. MATRIX CLAUSE
#that: Nancy will win the race. PREJACENT OF MODAL
The Moore’s frame in (189) precludes an interpretation of that as referring to the matrix
clause proposition about Nancy’s ability. And this renders (189) infelicitous, as there
does not seem to be an available alternative proposition. The prejacent proposition about
Nancy (actually) winning the race is not available for anaphoric reference. One might
reasonably worry that the result in (189) is a reflex of its future orientation, so we should
also consider a past oriented ability modal, as in (190). The past ability modal could is
homophonous with the past metaphysical modal could, so we’ll add some additional ma-
terial which biases the ability reading, not the metaphysical reading.39
(190) Barb could have gone to the party last week. After all, she had the free time and a
car. But Nancy doesn’t think that’s true. (She thinks Barb was overseas.)
Xthat: Nancy could have gone to the party. MATRIX CLAUSE
#that: Barb went to the party. PREJACENT OF MODAL
The anaphor in (190) can felicitously refer to the modal proposition denoted by the matrix
clause. It can’t refer to the prejacent proposition about Barb’s attendance, it must refer to
her (past) ability to attend.
Just like with the deontic modals, there are felicitous anaphor-containing follow-ups,
but they are eventive rather than propositional.
(191) Nancy can win the race next week, but I don’t think that’ll happen.
Xthat: Nancy’s winning the race EVENT ANAPHORA
39This intervening material is an explanation of the first clause, where explanation is a subordinating
discourse relation. This intervening material, then, shouldn’t advance the Right Frontier.
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(192) Barb could have gone to the party last week. After all, she had the free time and a
car. But Nancy doesn’t think that was ever likely (to happen).
Xthat: Nancy’s going to the party EVENT ANAPHORA
The prejacent of an ability modal is not available for propositional anaphora.
Teleological modals are interpreted relative to a set of goals. These can be future ori-
ented, as in (193), or about past goals, as in (194).
(193) There’s an accident on the highway. Nancy should take the train, even if Mike
doesn’t believe that.
Xthat: Nancy should take the train. MATRIX CLAUSE
Xthat: There’s an accident on the highway. PRIOR SENTENCE
#that: Nancy will take the train PREJACENT OF MODAL
(194) Oh, I see what went wrong with your cake. You had to add the flour before you
add the eggs. But I doubt that.
#that: You had to add the flour before the eggs. MATRIX CLAUSE
#that: You added the flour before the eggs. PREJACENT OF MODAL
We can interpret (193) as meaning that Mike disbelieves that there’s an accident—the
anaphor referring to the proposition denoted by the first sentence—, or as disbelieving
that Nancy should take the train—the anaphor referring to the proposition denoted by
the matrix clause of the second clause. We seem to be unable to interpret (193) as meaning
that Mike disbelieves that Nancy will in fact take the train, which would be the reading
if the anaphor could felicitously refer to the prejacent of the modal. In (194), the matrix
clause proposition is about the addressee’s obligation (relative to their goals) to add the
flour before the eggs, where the prejacent proposition is about that sequence actually ob-
taining. It is a perfectly consistent set of beliefs to think that the addressee was supposed
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to have behaved in some way but did not in fact do so, but we can’t interpret (194) as
meaning that: the anaphor that can’t be taken to felicitously refer to the prejacent propo-
sition. As a result, (194) is infelicitous: the only available antecedent for that makes the
sentence a Moore’s paradox. The prejacent of a teleological modal, then, is not available
for propositional anaphora.
Bouletic modals are interpreted relative to a set of desires, and can similarly be future
oriented, as in (195), or past oriented, as in (196).
(195) Barb wants to have fun tonight. She should go to the party. But I don’t think that’s
true.
#that: Barb should go to the party MATRIX CLAUSE
#that: Barb will go to the party. PREJACENT OF MODAL
(196) Dustin should have taken me to the dance, even if Lucas doesn’t believe that.
Xthat: Dustin should have taken me to the dance. MATRIX CLAUSE
#that: Dustin took me to the dance. PREJACENT OF MODAL
The follow-up in (195) makes the matrix clause proposition an unsuitable antecedent for
the anaphor that, as the speaker would publicly both endorse and reject the proposition
‘Barb should go to the party’. The modal prejacent is not available for anaphoric reference
in (195), even though it is consistent to believe that Barb should go to the party but will
not in fact do so. (196) does not have the same self-contradictory frame, and so the matrix
clause proposition is still a suitable antecedent for the anaphor. Just like in (195), though,
the prejacent in (196) is not available for anaphoric reference. Sentences with bouletic
modals, then, don’t make their modal prejacents available for anaphora.
Metaphysical modals are the modals involved in counterfactuals, and they are inter-
preted relative to other ways the world could be or have been. In a branching time model
of possible worlds (Prior 1967 and much subsequent work), this amounts to interpreta-
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tion relative to the available evidence at some non-present time. For example, the modal
in (197) is evaluated relative to the evidence available during the third inning of the game.
(197) In the third inning, the Phillies (still) might have won. Lucas didn’t believe that,
though.
Xthat: The Phillies might have won. MATRIX CLAUSE
#that: The Phillies won. PREJACENT OF MODAL
Here, the anaphor that felicitously refers to the proposition denoted by the matrix clause
of the first sentence: ‘The Phillies might have won’. We can’t take (197) to mean that
Lucas doesn’t believe the Phillies won, the modal prejacent. That said, the counterfactual
in (197) implies that the Phillies did not, in fact, win—but this fact cannot explain the
infelicity of anaphoric reference to the prejacent, as (198) illustrates.
(198) It didn’t matter that Lucas struck out. The Cubs would have lost anyways. He
doesn’t believe that, though.
Xthat: The Cubs would have lost. MATRIX CLAUSE
#that: The Cubs lost. PREJACENT OF MODAL
The counterfactual in (198) carries the opposite implication, that the prejacent is true in the
actual world—here, that the Cubs in fact lost. Nevertheless, the prejacent is not available
for propositional anaphora: we cannot understand (198) as meaning that Lucas doesn’t
believe that the Cubs lost. Regardless of its truth in the actual world, then, the prejacent
of a metaphysical modal is not available for propositional anaphora.
We have observed that the prejacents of epistemic modals are available for proposi-
tional anaphora (von Fintel & Gillies 2007, (180)), but that the prejacents of other modals—
at least deontic, ability, teleological, bouletic, and metaphysical modals—are not. The pre-
jacents of non-epistemic modals may be available for other kinds of anaphora, including
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event anaphora, but they do not have associated propositional discourse referents.
This distinction between epistemic modals on the one hand and all other modals on
the other hand has been made previously in the literature. Following Hoffman 1966, 1977,
Hacquard 2011 groups the non-epistemic modals together as ‘root’ modals, noting that
there are empirical observations which fall along these lines. Epistemic modals tend to
be speaker-oriented, where root modals are subject-oriented (Bybee, Perkins & Pagliuca
1994). There are also scopal differences, as epistemics can (and perhaps must) take scope
over quantifier subjects (Brennan 1993; von Fintel & Iatridou 2003; Tancredi 2007; Huitink
2008), where root modals cannot: “epistemic modals tend to take widest scope whereas
root modals take narrowest scope with respect to each other, and to various scope bearing
elements” (Hacquard 2011: 1487). These classes also interact differently with tense, where
root modals allow a forward or backshifting in time of evaluation, while epistemics do
not (Hacquard 2011: 1513).
There have been different attempts to formally account for the differing behaviors of
epistemic and root modals. I will focus on one in particular, that of Cinque 1999, not
just because it is an influential account, but also because it is syntactic in nature, and
thus bears on the Krifka 2013 proposal for the introduction of propositional discourse
referents. Cinque 1999 argues for a strict hierarchy of functional projections, including
modals; the relevant part of the hierarchy is provided in (199):
(199) Modepistemic >Tense >Aspect >Modvolition >Moddeontic >Modability
Importantly, epistemic modals are functionally higher than both Tense and Aspect, where
all other kinds of modals are lower. If we take the Krifka 2013 proposal to be “TP or
higher”, then the modal data presented here are compatible with Krifka 2013 under
this Cinque 1999 syntax. Under Krifka 2013, epistemic modals, being higher than TP,
would introduce their own propositional discourse referent for the matrix clause, while
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TP would introduce a propositional discourse referent for the prejacent. Root modals,
meanwhile, being below the level of TP, would introduce no propositional discourse ref-
erents, with the matrix clause referent introduced by TP.
Hacquard 2011 notes the connection between Cinque 1999 and propositions. Hac-
quard 2011 proposes a reconciliation of Kratzer 1981, 1991 (where all modals are given
a uniform analysis) and Cinque 1999 by binding modals not to worlds but to events (in-
cluding a matrix speech event), and restricting which modal base is possible (epistemic
vs. root) by the structural location of the binding event:
“I propose that, usually, only modals relative to speech and attitude events
can combine with an epistemic modal base because only those events have
associated ‘propositional content’ (i.e., the propositions that make up the atti-
tude, such as a set of beliefs), which provides an information state required by
an epistemic modal base. VP-event-relative modals, on the other hand, get a
default circumstantial modal base”. (Hacquard 2011: 1518)
Epistemic modals are those that are associated with propositional content—which might
have its own associated propositional discourse referent—, while root modals have no
such associated proposition—and thus there is no proposition to assign a discourse refer-
ent to. The prejacents of root modals, being event-relative, can be antecedents for event
anaphora, but not propositional anaphora.
The syntactic proposal of Krifka 2013 thus accounts for the modal data we have seen
in this section. It is less obvious, however, whether this story can be successfully extended
to the subclausal data from the previous section. We have observed the systematic behav-
ior of words with epistemic modal flavor, including sentential modals (as here), but also
epistemic adverbs and epistemic small clause embedding verbs, all of which introduce
propositional discourse referents. The Cinque 1999 hierarchy, however, doesn’t itself ex-
plain the behavior of epistemic-flavor words outside of the normal phrasal hierarchy of
functional projections, unless we insist on assuming a full Cinque 1999 hierarchy within
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a single adverbial adjunct, for instance. That this epistemic/root distinction is robust and
has been noted elsewhere allows us to feel more confident about the generalization we
are heading towards, but the current approaches to formalizing that distinction don’t yet
obviously account for the anaphoric data explored here.
3.3.2 Interrogatives
We now turn to interrogative sentences. Where a declarative sentence is standardly
taken to denote a proposition, an interrogative sentence is thought to denote a set of
propositions (Hamblin 1973), the set of possible answers to the question.
Polar questions
Krifka 2013 proposes that the TP within a polar question introduces a proposition
discourse referent:
(200) a. Did Ede steal the cookie?
b.
(Krifka 2013: (21))
This propositional discourse referent is for the proposition which partitions the universe
of possible worlds into possible answers. That is to say, for a question φ? which partitions
the universe into φ-worlds and ¬φ-worlds (and therefore has possible answers φ and ¬φ),
there is a discourse referent for φ. Under the Krifka 2013 proposal there is no discourse
referent for ¬φ, the complement proposition, even though it is also a possible answer and
thus, under a Hamblin semantics for questions, one of the two propositions denoted by
the question.
Krifka 2013 posits a second discourse referent for the complement proposition only in
a polar question containing sentential negation, as in (201b):
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(201) a. Did Ede not steal the cookie?
b.
(Krifka 2013: (53))
Here, according to Krifka 2013, the two propositional discourse referents are introduced
by TP and NegP. Even though (200a) and (201a) have the same set of answers ({{Ede stole
the cookies}, {Ede didn’t steal the cookies}}), only the latter has discourse referents for both
propositions.
We investigate this proposal for propositional anaphora in general, and not just re-
sponse particles (as in Krifka 2013).
(202) Did Barb go to the party? Because Nancy told me that (and she’s unreliable).
#that: Did Barb go to the party? / whether... MATRIX CLAUSE
Xthat: Barb went to the party. PARTITIONING PROPOSITION
#that: Barb didn’t go to the party. COMPLEMENT PROPOSITION
(203) Did Barb go to the party? Steve refuses to believe that.
#that: Did Barb go to the party? / whether... MATRIX CLAUSE
Xthat: Barb went to the party. PARTITIONING PROPOSITION
#that: Barb didn’t go to the party. COMPLEMENT PROPOSITION
In (202), the anaphor that can refer to the proposition which matches the polarity of the
question. We cannot understand (202) as meaning that Nancy told the speaker Barb didn’t
go to the party, so the complement proposition is not an available antecedent for the
anaphor. We see the same behavior in (203). These facts comport with Krifka’s (2013)
proposal: the complement proposition, though denoted by the question, is not available
for anaphoric reference.
The question itself also is not available/suitable for anaphoric reference in (202)–(203).
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This is perhaps not surprising in (203), as believe cannot take embedded interrogative
complements, as in (204).
(204) * Nancy believes whether Barb went to the party.
The predicate in the second sentence in (202), tell, though, can take both that- and whether-
complements.
(205) a. Nancy told me whether Barb went to the party.
b. Nancy told me that Barb went to the party.
(206) a. Nancy knows whether Barb went to the party.
b. Nancy knows that Barb went to the party.
The sentences in (205) differ in whether the complement of tell is an interrogative, as in
(205a), or a declarative, as in (205b). They don’t mean the same thing, either: (205b) entails
(205a), but (205a) does not entail (205b). The same is true of know in (206); though know,
unlike tell, allows anaphoric reference to the question, as in (207).
(207) Did Barb go to the party? Steve didn’t know that.
Xthat: Did Barb go to the party? / whether... MATRIX CLAUSE
#that: Barb went to the party. PARTITIONING PROPOSITION
(208) Did Barb go to the party? I asked Mike that (but he ignored me).
Xthat: Did Barb go to the party? / whether... MATRIX CLAUSE
#that: Barb went to the party. PARTITIONING PROPOSITION
(207)–(208) are not examples of anaphoric reference to a proposition, but to a set of propo-
sitions. I won’t discuss this sort of anaphora further here, nor why tell and know should
allow for both that- and whether-complements but force argument anaphors to refer se-
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lectively to different antecedents. For now, it is sufficient to note that polar interroga-
tives allow for non-propositional anaphoric reference to the question they denote, and
for propositional anaphoric reference to the proposition that partitions that question (but
not its complement).
wh- questions
Krifka 2013 doesn’t take any stance on wh- questions, except in the context of Italian
“polarity fragments” (Servidio 2012), where Krifka 2013: 8 suggests that, on an anaphoric
theory of pronouns, “we can assume that the question introduces a propositional dis-
course referent for each felicitous answer.” If the question Who was at the party? de-
notes the set of propositions which answer it—{{Barb was at the party}, {Nancy was at the
party},. . .}—then we might have a discourse referent for each of those propositions. Be-
cause wh- questions also convey another proposition via presupposition—e.g., ‘Someone
was at the party’—, we will consider anaphoric reference to that proposition as well.
(209) Who was at the party? Because Nancy told me that.
#that: Someone was at the party. EXISTENCE PRESUPPOSITION
?that: Who was at the party? / who... MATRIX CLAUSE
?that: {x |x was at the party} TRUE ANSWER
The discourse in (209) can’t be interpreted as meaning that Nancy told the speaker only
that someone was at the party—the existence presupposition. There can be felicitous use of
the anaphor that, but it’s not entirely clear whether this anaphora to the question, or to the
proposition which is the cell of the partition which is the true answer to the question. This
latter use is perhaps odd, because the speaker presumably doesn’t know which cell that
is (if this is a true information-seeking use of a question), but (209) doesn’t distinguish
between the two.40
40For another example which is perhaps easier to get than (209), and which doesn’t have an information-
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We can use another predicate, doubt, which embeds propositions but crucially not in-
terrogatives (Ginzburg 1993: 278, fn. 10), to pull these readings apart.
(210) Who was at the party? Because Steve doubts that.
#that: Someone was at the party. EXISTENCE PRESUPPOSITION
#that: Who was at the party? / who... MATRIX CLAUSE
#that: {x |x was at the party} TRUE ANSWER
There are no felicitous readings for (210), which is the same as (209) but with doubt. As
intended, anaphoric reference to the question is ruled out by the predicate which does not
select for interrogative complements. And the true answer, while indeed a proposition,
is not available for anaphoric reference. (The existence presupposition continues to be
unavailable.) This leaves no available propositional antecedents for the anaphor, so (210)
is infelicitous.
And, just to show that indeed doubt makes for a suitable diagnostic for this difference
between polar questions and wh- questions:
(211) Did Barb go to the party? Because Steve doubts that. POLAR
(212) # Who was at the party? Because Steve doubts that. WH
Polar questions make a proposition available for anaphoric reference, while wh- questions
do not. This indicates that one of the other explanations for Italian polarity fragments sug-
gested by Krifka 2013, such as those involving the background of the question (cf. Krifka
2001), is more appropriate than any proposal which assigns propositional discourse ref-
seeking use, consider the following:
(vii) [Elle and Mike have been caught robbing a bank, and are being interrogated in separate rooms by
the police. After speaking to Elle, Chief Hopper enters Mike’s room, and says “If you want a deal,
you’ll cooperate.” He then asks:]
Who sold you your equipment? Because Elle already told me that.
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erents to each answer to a wh- question.
Alternative questions
Krifka 2013 discusses alternative questions, asserting that alternative questions are
“typically not based on a questioned proposition”, such as (213), and hence don’t have
associated propositional discourse referents.
(213) A: Did Ede steal the cookie or the lollipop?
B: *Yes. / *No. / The lollipop. (Krifka 2013: (64))
Alternative questions with sentential alternatives like (214a) do introduce propositional
discourse referents for each alternative, according to Krifka 2013, even though referring
to them with response particles can be tricky.
(214) a. Is the door open, or is it closed?
b. (Krifka 2013: (65A))
We will examine each of these types of alternative questions in turn.
Alternative questions introduce a list of options (alternatives), where the speaker ex-
pects the answer to be among those options. Because English does not distinguish be-
tween them morphologically, alternative questions can be confused for polar questions,
where the speaker is asking whether the correct answer is among (any of) the options
listed. These forms can be distinguished phonologically, however, with different intona-
tional contours. I’ll indicate the difference using arrows: ↑ for a high/rising intonation,
and ↓ for a low/falling intonation. This allows us to distinguish between an alternative
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question, as in (215), and a polar question, as in (216).
(215) Would you like coffee↑, or tea↓? ALT
a. Tea, please.
b. # Yes, please.
(216) Would you like coffee↑, or tea↑? POLAR
a. Tea, please.
b. Yes, please.
Alternative questions, like wh- questions, also carry an additional sentence implica-
tion. Alternative questions presuppose that the speaker considers one of the alternatives
to be correct (Biezma & Rawlins 2012), so we will examine the anaphoric potential of that
proposition as well.
(217) Would you like coffee↑, or tea↓? Because Dustin told me that.
#that: Would you like coffee or tea? / which... MATRIX CLAUSE
#that: You would like coffee or tea. PRESUPPOSITION
#that: You would like coffee. LEFT DISJUNCT
#that: You would like tea. RIGHT DISJUNCT
There do not seem to be any felicitous readings of (217), which suggests that there are no
suitable/available antecedents for the anaphor that. The presupposition is not available
for anaphoric reference, nor is the question itself, nor either alternative. One might be
concerned that this is simply a failure of context, for example that there is no reason to
refer back to either of these alternatives, nor to expect one to be more salient than the
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other; but consider (218):
(218) Would you like coffee↑, or tea↓? Because Dustin told me that, but I thought you
hated
{coffee
tea
}
.
#that: Would you like coffee or tea? / which... MATRIX CLAUSE
#that: You would like coffee or tea. PRESUPPOSITION
#that: You would like coffee. LEFT DISJUNCT
#that: You would like tea. RIGHT DISJUNCT
The follow-up in (218) tries to make the one alternative more salient, questioning it as
contrary to prior expectations. No matter which of coffee or tea is chosen in last clause of
(218), the anaphor that cannot felicitously refer to either alternative.
We can consider sentential alternative questions by simply expanding the disjuncts of
(218). (From here on we will focus on anaphora to the alternatives, as reference to the
presupposition or to the question is unlikely to be affected by this change.)
(219) Would you like coffee↑, or would you like tea↓? Because Dustin told me that, but I
thought you hated
{coffee
tea
}
.
#that: You would like coffee. LEFT DISJUNCT
#that: You would like tea. RIGHT DISJUNCT
The behavior here is the same as in (218): neither alternative is available for anaphoric
reference.
Krifka 2001 notes an observation of an earlier version of Roelofsen & Farkas 2015, that
no is a more acceptable response to an alternative question when “the second alternative
is the sentential negation of the first”, and explains why both response particles yes and
no can be acceptable, giving (220b) as an example:
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(220) a. Is the door open or not?
b.
(Krifka 2013: (66))
The notion from Krifka 2013 is that because both disjuncts have at their core the same
clause, which is represented by two of the three propositional discourse referents floating
around (d1 & d2), they are available for reference by response particles. I find yes to be a
degraded response to (220a), and make the uncontroversial observation that no can serve
functions beyond being a propositional anaphor. At the very least, we can note that this
pattern does not apply to non-response particle anaphors, as (221) is not improved by
replacing the second disjunct with not:
(221) Would you like coffee↑, or not↓? Because Dustin told me that, but I thought you
hated coffee.
#that: You would like coffee. LEFT DISJUNCT
#that: You would not like coffee. RIGHT DISJUNCT
The version in (221) attempts to bias the anaphor towards referring to the proposition
‘You would like coffee’, which is conveyed both by the left conjunct and as the prejacent
to what is assumed to be sentential negation in the right conjunct. But this proposition
fails to be available for anaphoric reference, leaving (221) infelicitous.
Alternative questions don’t make propositions available for anaphoric reference,
whether the disjuncts are sentential or smaller. (This is not simply a reflex of anaphora to
disjunctions in general, as we will see in section 3.5.) This runs counter to the proposal
of Krifka 2013, unless there is some other reason that the discourse referents claimed to
be introduced by sentential alternatives are unavailable for anaphoric reference. Absent
such an explanation, it seems that propositional discourse referents are not introduced by
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an alternative question, neither for the presupposition trigger by an alternative question,
nor for the alternatives themselves.
3.3.3 Imperatives
There are multiple ways to construe an imperative as conveying a proposition: the
proposition could describe the (new) obligation imposed on the addressee; the propo-
sition could describe the worlds in which the addressee takes the desired action (thus
fulfilling their obligation), or the worlds in which the desired action has been completed
(possibily independently of the addressee). None of these propositions, though, are avail-
able for anaphoric reference:
(222) Shut the door! Nancy told me that.
#that: Addressee should shut the door. IMPERATIVE∼MODAL
#that: Addressee will shut the door. CULMINATION
#that: The door is shut. RESULT STATE
?that: Speaker should instruct Addressee to shut the door. SPEECH ACT
(223) Shut the door! Nancy (already) told you that.
#that: Addressee should shut the door. IMPERATIVE∼MODAL
#that: Addressee will shut the door. CULMINATION
#that: The door is shut. RESULT STATE
#that: Addressee should instruct Addressee to shut the door. SPEECH ACT
We cannot understand (222) as meaning that Nancy told the speaker that the addressee is
obliged to shut the door, which is the meaning we would get if the anaphor that referred
to the imperative itself. Similarly, the anaphor cannot be understood as referring to the
proposition describing the culmination of the action described (the addressee’s shutting
the door), nor the result state of that action. The only reading of (222) which is edging
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towards felicity (but is still highly marked) is the reading where Nancy told the speaker to
instruct the addressee; this is an almost disquotational use of tell, where the anaphor that
refers not to a proposition expressed by the imperative but to the speech act of directing.
Lest we think this is something about the first-person nature of the follow-up in (222), we
can see the same behavior in (223) except for the falling away of the speech act anaphora
reading. Imperatives, then, don’t make a proposition of any sort available for anaphoric
reference.
Some researchers have claimed that imperatives describe propositions (in particular,
desirable ones; see Wilson & Sperber 1988), or that imperatives can be interpreted as
modal statements about the obligations they impose (when uttered in an appropriate
context)—that is, Shut the door! can be understood as equivalent to You should shut the door
(Schwager 2006, 2011). (Note that the attempted antecedent for the matrix imperative
in (222) was glossed with a modal.) There are some reasons to resist this equivalence,
for example, that imperatives crosslinguistically resist embedding and negation (Rupp
2002; Alca´zar & Saltarelli 2014) in a way that modals do not.41 Propositional anaphora is
another reason to add to this list, as the matrix clause of a declarative sentence containing
a modal does make a proposition available for anaphoric reference, as we saw in (175)–
(178), where an imperative does not.
(224) a. # Shut the door, even though Lucas doesn’t believe that.
b. You should shut the door, even though Lucas doesn’t believe that.
(225) a. # Vaccinate your children, even if Jenny McCarthy doubts that.
b. You should vaccinate your children, even if Jenny McCarthy doubts that.
We can, of course, find examples of perfectly felicitous anaphoric reference to an im-
perative, as in (226). In these examples, though, the anaphor refers not to a proposition
41Though see Cormany 2013 for an argument for (limited) embedding of imperatives in English.
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but to an event.
(226) Shut the door! Nancy already told you to do that.
Xthat: shut the door EVENT
(227) Wash your hands! We won’t start dinner until you do (that).
Xthat: wash your hands EVENT
Krifka 2013 mentions imperatives only once, in noting that the response particles yes
and no can be felicitous responses to imperatives in that they indicate compliance to a
speaker’s proposal to update the common ground. For Krifka, this is anaphoric to (a
component of) the speech act, not a proposition. Krifka 2013 doesn’t explicitly mention
whether imperatives should introduce propositional discourse referents. Generalizing
from how the proposal applies to declaratives and interrogatives—where TP introduces a
proposition discourse referent, independent of the speech act operator (ASSERT or QUEST)
it is under—it seems that the Krifka 2001 proposal would expect if imperatives contain a
TP under a directive speech act operator, then that TP should behave no differently.
Krifka’s (2013) proposal can be maintained if one adopts a syntactic theory under
which imperative sentences do not contain Tense, along the lines of Zanuttini 1996, 2001.
This sort of distinction has semantic counterparts, as well, as some consider imperatives
to denote not propositions but properties (Hausser 1980; Portner 2004).
Imperatives, unlike declaratives and polar interrogatives, but like wh- and alternative
interrogatives, do not introduce propositional discourse referents. The observations made
in this section are summarized in Table 2.
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Table 2: Monoclausal constructions
Construction
Introduce
Propositional
Discourse
Referent?
Declarative
Matrix Active yes (169)
Passive yes (170)
Prejacent of Negation Sentential yes (172)
Constituent no (173)
Modals Epistemic yes (181)
Deontic no (183)
Ability no (189)
Teleological no (194)
Bouletic no (195)
Metaphysical no (198)
Interrogative Polar yes (202)
wh- no (209)
Alternative Nominal no (218)
Sentential no (219)
Imperative no (222)
3.4 Multiclausal constructions
In this section, we’ll look at constructions which involve multiple clauses in a sin-
gle sentence, one embedded inside the other. As we have seen in the previous two sec-
tions, the proposition denoted by the matrix clause of a declarative is always available for
anaphoric reference. As such, we’ll be focusing here on whether the propositional content
of embedded clauses (of different sorts) is similarly available.
3.4.1 Non-finite clauses
Much has been written about the behavior and underlying structure of English sen-
tences that contain embedded non-finite clauses, especially comparing raising and control
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constructions, as in (228) and (229) respectively.
(228) a. Joyce seems to understand. RAISING
b. Joycei seems [ ti to understand ].
(229) a. Joyce tries to understand. CONTROL
b. Joycei tries [ PROi to understand ].
Generally speaking, raising constructions are thought to involve an argument raised out
from the embedded clause, while control constructions contain a covert pronoun, PRO,
which allows the matrix subject (the controller) to be interpreted as part of the embedded
clause but without movement (Napoli 1993; Carnie 2007). These constructions appear
similar, but behave differently in certain ways, including famously with expletive subjects
and idioms.42
(230) a. It seems to be raining. RAISING
b. * It tries to be raining. CONTROL
(231) a. The cat seems to be out of the bag. RAISING
b. * The cat tries to be out of the bag. CONTROL
Syntacticians continue to debate the underlying structure(s) of these constructions—e.g.,
whether PRO is base generated (Chomsky & Lasnik 1993) or whether control is derived
via a different type of movement (Hornstein 1999, 2003)—as well as whether they are
really all that different (e.g., arguments for unification along the lines of Bolinger 1961,
1967; Langacker 1995b; Polinsky & Potsdam 2006).
Sidestepping these debates, we will consider each of these differently-named construc-
tions in turn, lest we conflate structures which are importantly different, as we inves-
42The sentence in (231b) is grammatical under a reading where an actual cat is trying to escape an actual
bag, but (231b) cannot get the idiom reading we are interested in here, and so the sentence is marked with
‘*’.
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tigate whether they make a (non-matrix) proposition available for anaphoric reference.
And, while there are also disagreements about whether the embedded clause is a CP or
a TP (Polinsky & Potsdam 2006; Carnie 2007), that debate makes no difference to the
proposal made in Krifka 2013: whether or not a CP layer is present, there is a TP, and
Krifka 2013 proposes that TPs introduce propositional discourse referents.43 So according
to the Krifka 2013 proposal, we should see felicitous anaphoric reference to the embedded
clause content of all raising and control constructions.
Subject raising
Subject raising constructions contain an embedded clause whose missing (non-overt)
subject is interpreted as being coreferential with the subject of the matrix clause; this
subject is analyzed as having been raised out of the embedded clause, as in (228). Typical
subject raising verbs include seem, appear, and consider. As per Krifka’s (2013) prediction,
these constructions make the proposition associated with the embedded clause available
for anaphoric reference.
(232) Nancy seemed to be at the party. That was false, however.
#that: Nancy seemed to be at the party. MATRIX CLAUSE
Xthat: Nancy was at the party. EMBEDDED CLAUSE
(233) Nancy seemed to be at the party. Her dancing shoes in the hallway led me to
believe that.
?that: Nancy seems to be at the party. MATRIX CLAUSE
Xthat: Nancy was at the party. EMBEDDED CLAUSE
(234) Nancy appeared to be at the party, but Barb refused to believe that.
Xthat: Nancy appeared to be at the party. MATRIX CLAUSE
Xthat: Nancy was at the party. EMBEDDED CLAUSE
43Even though these are non-finite clauses, they are thought to include tense information, supplied by
the matrix clause (Stowell 1982).
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(235) Nancy is considered to have been at the party, but that’s not true.
#that: Nancy is considered to have been at the party MATRIX CLAUSE
Xthat: Nancy was at the party. EMBEDDED CLAUSE
All of the examples in (232)–(235) allow felicitous anaphoric reference to the proposi-
tion associated with the embedded clause, ‘Nancy was at the party’. The matrix clause
proposition is unsuitable as an antecedent in (232) because interpreting the sentence that
way would make the speaker contradict herself; the same is true in (235). The matrix
interpretation of (233) sounds particularly hedgey, with the speaker only willing to com-
mit to being led to believe a seem claim, but remains available for some speakers. And
the matrix interpretation of (234) is perfectly felicitous, along with the embedded clause
interpretation. Importantly, though, in all of these subject raising examples we have felici-
tous anaphora to a proposition associated with the embedded clause, which suggests that
these constructions introduce a propositional discourse referent for the embedded clause.
This accords with the proposal made in Krifka 2013, as the embedded clause contains a
TP and so should indeed introduce a propositional discourse referent.
Object raising
Object raising (or exceptional case marking (ECM), or “subject-to-object raising”) con-
structions have the ‘missing’ subject of the embedded clause raised to the object position
of the matrix clause.
(236) a. Steve wanted Nancy to be at the party.
b. Steve wanted Nancyi [ ti to be at the party ].
Typical object raising verbs are want and expect. There is some debate about the status of
these constructions, and whether they constitute true raising, but I will investigate them
all the same, as discussed above.
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Unlike the subject raising constructions seen above, object raising constructions do not
behave as a single class: some object raising verbs allow for felicitous anaphoric reference
to a proposition associated with the embedded clause, while others do not. The verb
expect is an example of the former:
(237) Steve expected Nancy to be at the party, but Mike didn’t believe that. (Mike
thought she would stay home.)
??that: Steve expected Nancy to be at the party. MATRIX CLAUSE
Xthat: Nancy would be at the party. EMBEDDED CLAUSE
The proposition conveyed by the matrix clause of the first conjunct in (237) presumably
has an associated discourse referent, but is a strange choice to antecede the anaphor in
the second conjunct: we have no reason to think Mike has access to Steve’s expectations,
let alone to disbelieve one of them. The much more natural antecedent for that is the
proposition associated with the embedded clause, and indeed that is a felicitous reading
of (237). This reading is reinforced by the final sentence, which supplies Mike’s alternative
view, one which contrasts not with the matrix clause but the embedded clause of the first
conjunct. The proposition associated with the embedded clause of (237) is available for
anaphoric reference.
We can see the same behavior with a present tense (and thus future-oriented) example,
as in (238b).
(238) a. Steve expects Nancy to be at the party. His wearing his best tie leads me to
believe that. MATRIX CLAUSE
b. Steve expects Nancy to be at the party. Her going dress shopping leads him to
believe that. EMBEDDED CLAUSE
The clause embedded under expect has an associated propositional discourse referent.
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We can see different behavior with clauses embedded under want, however, which are
not available for propositional anaphora.
(239) Steve wanted Nancy to be at the party. He told me that.
Xthat: Steve wanted Nancy to be at the party. MATRIX CLAUSE
#that: Nancy would be at the party. EMBEDDED CLAUSE
The anaphor that in (239) can only be felicitously interpreted as referring to the proposi-
tion conveyed by the matrix clause, about Steve’s wants. (239) can’t be taken to mean that
Steve told the speaker anything about Nancy’s actual party attendance. The same is true
even if the follow-up biases an interpretation wherein Nancy did go to the party in the
actual world, as in (240).
(240) Steve wanted Nancy to be at the party. The fact that he came home smelling like
her perfume led me to believe that.
??that: Steve wanted Nancy to be at the party. MATRIX CLAUSE
#that: Nancy was at the party. EMBEDDED CLAUSE
The only available interpretation of (240) is strange, because it’s not immediately clear
why perfume would lead the speaker to learn something about Steve’s desires. Never-
theless, the matrix interpretation is the only one available, if any interpretation is; we
cannot interpret the anaphor (240) as referring to the embedded clause proposition. And
where (240) is a parallel to (238a)—using led me to believe—, the want parallel to (238b) is
simply impossible:
(241) Steve wanted Nancy to be at the party. Her being so kind to him led him to believe
that.
#that: Steve wanted Nancy to be at the party. MATRIX CLAUSE
#that: Nancy would be at the party. EMBEDDED CLAUSE
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In (241), the matrix interpretation is bizarre, as it would mean he was led to have beliefs
about his own desire, and there are no alternative readings available, including the em-
bedded clause reading.44 Regardless of the follow-up, the proposition associated with a
clause embedded under want cannot be the antecedent for a propositional anaphor.
We can have felicitous anaphoric reference to the embedded clause of want, but only
with event anaphora, as in (242).
(242) Steve wanted Nancy to go to the party. That never happened, though.
Xthat: Nancy’s going to the party EVENT ANAPHORA
Object raising constructions do not behave uniformly with respect to their introduc-
tion of propositional discourse referents. Some object raising constructions, such as those
which have expect as the embedding verb, do introduce a propositional discourse refer-
ent, in line with Krifka’s (2013) proposal. Others, such at those which embed under want,
do not have an propositional discourse referent available for anaphoric reference. This
runs counter to the Krifka 2013 proposal, as the TP under want should introduce its own
propositional discourse referent. This difference may be located in the nature of the verbs
themselves: verbs like want may require an irrealis interpretation in a way that verbs like
expect do not. These verbs differ in terms of their semantic classifications (White et al.
in press), and they behave differently in languages with more robust subjunctive mood
systems like Spanish, where the complement of querer ‘want’ gets the subjunctive but the
44The follow-up in (241) uses believe to ensure that the anaphor is propositional. The more natural follow-
up . . . led him to want that is felicitous, but then we’re no longer dealing with a propositional anaphor, as
want doesn’t take propositional arguments. We can see this, as want doesn’t take CP complements. Even in
the Englishes where want can embed that-clauses (e.g., in Jewish English, denoted by ‘C’ in (4), they are not
truly CPs:
(viii) 1. Mike wants the Mets to win.
2. * Mike wants that the Mets will win.
3. * Mike wants that the Mets win.
4. C Mike wants that the Mets should win. (= Mike wants the Mets to win.)
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complement of suponer ‘suppose, expect’ does not.45 These differences in propositional
discourse referent introduction might be attributable to the verbs themselves, but cannot
be captured at the level of the “object raising verb” classification.
Subject control
Subject control constructions contain an embedded clause whose missing (non-overt)
subject is interpreted as being coreferential with the subject of the matrix clause, but un-
like in raising constructions, this coreference occurs via control of a covert pronoun (PRO,
which does not need to move for case assignment).
(243) a. Nancy tried to be at the party.
b. Nancyi tried [ PROi to be at the party ].
The matrix verb of a control construction has a theta role for its external argument, unlike
in a raising construction, which is why control constructions don’t allow for expletive
subjects, and why idioms lose their idiomaticity under control predicates. These are verbs
like claim and try. Regardless of the nature of the embedding verb (and its theta assigning
properties), control constructions are analyzed as involved (at least) an embedded TP, so
Krifka 2013 predicts that there should be a proposition associated with the embedded
clause which is available for anaphoric reference.
Like object raising constructions, however, subject control constructions do not behave
as a uniform class. Control verbs like claim do allow for anaphoric reference to their
embedded clause propositions.
(244) Nancy claimed to be at the party, but that wasn’t true. (She was at the library.)
#that: Nancy claimed to be at the party. MATRIX CLAUSE
Xthat: Nancy was at the party. EMBEDDED CLAUSE
45The Spanish verb esperar also carries the (irrealis) sense of ‘hope’, so is not the most appropriate com-
parison for this purpose. The complement of esperar gets the subjunctive, unlike that of suponer.
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(245) Nancy claims to be at the party, but that isn’t true. (She is at the library.)
#that: Nancy claims to be at the party. MATRIX CLAUSE
Xthat: Nancy is at the party. EMBEDDED CLAUSE
The matrix clause proposition of (244) is an unsuitable antecedent for the anaphor in the
second clause, because immediately denying one’s own assertion makes a speaker self-
contradictory. There is a perfectly natural interpretation of (244), however, where that
refers to the proposition associated with the embedded clause, ‘Nancy was at the party’.
The same behavior pattern can be observed in the present tense version in (245).46
The subject control verb try, however, does not allow for anaphoric reference to its
embedded clause proposition:
(246) Nancy tried to be at the party, but that wasn’t true. (She was at the library.)
#that: Nancy claimed to be at the party. MATRIX CLAUSE
#that: Nancy was at the party. EMBEDDED CLAUSE
The matrix clause interpretation of (246) is ruled out by the self-contradictory nature of the
second conjunct. And, even with the final clause follow-up which biases an interpretation
in favor of resolving the anaphor as referring to the embedded clause proposition, no such
interpretation is available. There is no available propositional discourse referent for the
embedded clause of (246).
46Hankamer & Sag 1976 presents the following example, noting that it refers to the proposition ‘Betty is
pregnant’:
(ix) That Betty is claimed to be pregnant doesn’t make it true. (Hankamer & Sag 1976: (101))
I exclude it from the main text as it doesn’t fit the methodology I have adopted for this chapter.
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We can see the same in the present tense:
(247) a. Dustin tries to be helpful, but Elle doubts that. She thinks he gets in the way
on purpose.
b. # Dustin tries to be helpful, but Elle doubts that. She thinks he ends up getting
in the way.
The follow-up in (247a) makes it clear that what Elle doubts is the proposition associated
with the matrix clause, about Dustin’s trying. And (247a) is felicitous. The follow-up in
(247b), though, indicates that what Elle doubts is that Dustin is indeed helpful, regardless
of his intentions—in other words, the proposition associated with the embedded clause.
This version is infelicitous, however, which indicates that there is no propositional dis-
course referent available for that embedded clause content.
The subject control verb try, then, does not allow for anaphoric reference to its em-
bedded clause content, where the subject control verb claim does. As with object raising
verbs, this presents a challenge to the Krifka 2013 proposal, as both try and claim take
complements which contain (at least) TP. Subject control constructions do not pattern as
a uniform class with respect to their introduction of propositional discourse referents,
which would require a finder distinction (e.g., among different kinds of TPs) than Krifka
2013 provides.
Object control
Object control constructions have the subject of the embedded clause—analyzed as a
covert PRO—interpreted as coreferential with—controlled by—the object of the matrix
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clause.
(248) a. Nancy persuaded Jonathan to leave.
b. Nancyi persuaded Jonathanj [ PRO∗i/j to leave ].
Object control verbs include ask, convince, force, and persuade. As with the other non-finite
clause complement examples we’ve seen, Krifka 2013 predicts that these constructions
should all allow for felicitous propositional anaphora, as the embedded TPs introduce
propositional discourse referents.
In fact this is not the case, as object control constructions do not allow for anaphoric
reference to a proposition associated with the embedded clause.
(249) Nancy asked Barb to be at the party, but Jonathan didn’t believe that.
Xthat:Nancy asked Barb to be at the party. MATRIX CLAUSE
#that: Barb was at the party. EMBEDDED CLAUSE
(250) a. Nancy asked Barb to be at the party, but Jonathan didn’t believe that. He
thought Barb came uninvited.
b. # Nancy asked Barb to be at the party, but Jonathan didn’t believe that. He
thought Barb stayed home.
The anaphor in (249) can only be taken to refer to the proposition conveyed by the matrix
clause—about Nancy’s asking—and not to the proposition associated with the embedded
clause—about Barb’s attendance. We can make this contrast starker by supplying follow-
ups which explain Jonathan’s disbelief (of each intended antecedent proposition), as in
(250). In (250a), the follow-up contrasts with the matrix clause proposition, explaining
why Barb attended (coming uninvited, as opposed to being asked), and this discourse
is felicitous. In (250b), however, the follow-up contrasts with the proposition associated
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with the embedded clause, giving an alternative to Barb’s attending the party. The dis-
course in (250b) is infelicitous, which indicates that that cannot refer to the embedded
clause content.
The same behavior is true for other object control verbs, though they are harder to
demonstrate in the same way. The verbs convince, force, and persuade are factive, so they
entail the truth of their complements.47 Asserting the falsity of their complements, then,
entails their falsity as well: if Nancy didn’t go to the party, then Steve didn’t force force
her to go (though he might have tried). Instead of denying, then, we can demonstrate by
explaining:
(251) a. Steve persuaded Nancy to be at the party. I know that because I overheard
them. MATRIX CLAUSE
b. # Steve persuaded Nancy to be at the party. I know that because I saw her
there. EMBEDDED CLAUSE
(252) a. Barb convinced Nancy to leave the party. I know that because I overheard
them. MATRIX CLAUSE
b. # Barb convinced Nancy to leave the party. I know that because I saw her
driving away. EMBEDDED CLAUSE
The follow-up in (251a) explains that the speaker knows what they know by hearing Steve
and Nancy talk, which is one way that persuasion can occur. The follow-up in (251b),
on the other hand, explains that the speaker’s evidence is seeing Nancy at the party;
this is enough evidence for asserting that Nancy was at the party, but isn’t quite strong
enough evidence for asserting that (she was there because) Steve persuaded her. (Compare
(251b) to a variant with must have persuaded, where suddenly this is good enough evidence
47Lawler 2004 calls these if -predicates, in that they entail the truth of their complements but their nega-
tion entails nothing about the truth or falsity of the same. This contrasts with, e.g., implicative predicates
like manage, which are factive and whose negation entails the falsity of their complements.
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for the matrix conjecture.) That (251b) is infelicitous, despite the speaker having good
evidence that Nancy was at the party, demonstrates that that cannot be taken to refer to
the proposition associated with the embedded clause. There is a propositional discourse
referent available for the matrix clause content, but not for the embedded clause content.
The convince pair in (252) is exactly parallel.
Object control constructions, then, do behave as a uniform class in contrast to object
raising and subject control constructions. But, just like both object raising and subject
control constructions, object control constructions serve as a counterargument to the pro-
posal in Krifka 2013. These are constructions which contain embedded TPs (if not also
CPs), but which nevertheless fail to make a propositional discourse referent available for
subsequent anaphoric reference.
3.4.2 Likely constructions
Likely constructions are those that use the predicate likely (and its peers, including un-
likely, fortunate, etc.). These are sometimes considered raising constructions (e.g., Carnie
2007), as they can appear with expletive subjects and can take non-finite complements, as
in (253). But, these are adjectives, not verbs, and they can also appear with finite comple-
ments, as in (254), so we will consider them separately (erring on the side of redundancy
over conflation).
(253) a. It is likely to rain.
b. Dustin is likely to win.
(254) It is likely that Dustin will win.
These complements are TPs, and so Krifka 2013 predicts that propositional anaphora
should be licensed.
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This prediction is borne out, as likely constructions allow for anaphoric reference to
the embedded clause proposition, whether the complement is finite or non-finite.
(255) It’s likely that Nancy was at the party. She told me that, and I don’t think she has
any reason to lie.
#that: It is likely that Nancy was at the party. MATRIX CLAUSE
Xthat: Nancy was at the party. EMBEDDED CLAUSE
(256) Nancy was likely to be at the party. She told me that, and I don’t think she has any
reason to lie.
#that: Nancy was likely to have been at the party. MATRIX CLAUSE
Xthat: Nancy was at the party. EMBEDDED CLAUSE
(257) It’s unlikely that Barb will be at the party. Dustin told me that’s true, but he’s
always lying.
#that: It’s unlikely that Barb will be at the party. MATRIX CLAUSE
Xthat: Barb will be at the party. EMBEDDED CLAUSE
(258) Barb is unlikely to be at the party. Dustin told me that’s true, but he’s always lying.
#that: Barb is unlikely to be at the party. MATRIX CLAUSE
Xthat: Barb will be at the party. EMBEDDED CLAUSE
In (255), it would be very strange for Nancy to have spoken only about the probability of
her own past behavior (and not to simply say what she did), so the reading of the anaphor
as referring to the matrix clause proposition is infelicitous. The only felicitous reading of
(255) is that Nancy told the speaker she was in fact at the party, which makes that refer
to the proposition associated with the embedded finite clause. (256) is exactly the same,
only with a non-expletive subject and a non-finite embedded clause, those changes not
changing the anaphoric availability of the embedded clause proposition. (257) and (258)
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use unlikely, have a future orientation, and have a liar in the follow-up, but their anaphoric
behavior is unchanged. The follow-up in (257) presents a reason to deny the truth of the
antecedent of that, which renders the matrix clause interpretation self-contradictory and
thus infelicitous. The felicitous reading of (257), instead, has Dustin asserting that Barb
will attend the party, which is the proposition associated with the embedded clause. The
anaphor can refer to this content, which means there is a propositional discourse referent
introduced for the embedded clause. ((258) behaves exactly in parallel.)
Likely constructions, regardless of the finiteness of their embedded clauses, allow
for felicitous anaphoric reference to the propositions associated with those embedded
clauses. This is in line with the Krifka 2013 proposal.
3.4.3 Tough constructions
Tough constructions are those which involve the word tough. Like the likely construc-
tions seen above, tough constructions can appear with expletive subjects, and have also
been argued to be a form of raising construction (either A-movement, Rosenbaum 1965,
or A-bar movement, Chomsky 1977). Regardless of their derivation, the complement
clause is taken to be a CP (Hicks 2009), which means under the Krifka 2013 proposal
these constructions should allow for propositional anaphora to their embedded clause.
This prediction is not borne out, however, as tough constructions don’t allow for
anaphoric reference to the embedded clause.
(259) Moby Dick is tough for Dustin to read. I know that because I saw him reading
it in the library and he only turned one page an hour. MATRIX CLAUSE
(260) # Moby Dick is tough for Dustin to read. I know that because I saw him in the
library and it was open on the table in front of him. EMBEDDED CLAUSE
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The follow-up in (259) biases a matrix clause interpretation, mentioning the slow pace as
evidence for the book being tough. This discourse is felicitous, illustrating that anaphoric
reference to the proposition denoted by the matrix clause is possible. The follow-up in
(260) biases resolution of the anaphor towards the proposition associated with the em-
bedded clause, namely ‘Dustin read Moby Dick’, because the book being open in front of
him is good evidence of his reading (but not sufficient evidence to judge his difficulty).
This discourse is infelicitous, which suggests that the embedded clause proposition is not
available as an antecedent.
We can see the same behavior with an expletive subject.
(261) It’s tough for Dustin to read Moby Dick. I know that because I saw him reading
it in the library and he only turned one page an hour. MATRIX CLAUSE
(262) # It’s tough for Dustin to read Moby Dick. I know that because I saw him in the
library and it was open on the table in front of him. EMBEDDED CLAUSE
Tough constructions do license anaphoric reference with that and it, as in (263), but
these don’t involve reference to propositions.
(263) Moby Dick is tough for Dustin to read, but
{
that’s
it’s
}
easy for Elle.
The anaphora in (263) involves reference to an event (reading Moby Dick is easy) or to an
individual (Moby Dick is easy), but not to a proposition (*Jesse read Moby Dick is easy).
Tough constructions don’t make a proposition associated with the embedded clause
available for anaphoric reference. This runs contrary to the prediction of Krifka 2013, as
these embedded clauses contain TPs and so should thus have associated propositional
discourse referents.
126
3.4.4 Finite clauses
There are multiple ways to divide the space of possible embedded clauses. Following
Karttunen’s (1969) lead overall, I’ve been focusing on syntactic characterizations, hence
non-finite vs. finite, and raising vs. control within the non-finite complement clauses.
Within the space of finite clauses, the divisions are largely semantic ones, though, of
course, semantic distinctions can map onto syntactic ones (e.g., see White et al. in press).
Whether a verb is representational (i.e., represents a belief about the world, using White
et al.’s (in press) term) has already been taken into account, as non-representational verbs
reliably embed only non-finite clauses (White et al. in press). Within the set of represen-
tational verbs, then, we can divide further based on whether a verb entails the truth of its
complement (i.e., is factive) or not.
Factives
Factive verbs entail the truth of their complements. The standard example is know
(though see Wiegand 2015 on the non-factivity of focused know), but other examples in-
clude doubt, prove, realize, etc.
These sorts of verbs allow anaphoric reference to the propositions associated with their
embedded clauses:
(264) Nancy knows (that) Steve threw a party. Barb told her that.
#that: Nancy knows Steve threw a party. MATRIX CLAUSE
Xthat: Steve threw a party. EMBEDDED CLAUSE
(265) Nancy proved (that) Steve threw a party, so now I believe that.
#that: Nancy proved Steve threw a party. MATRIX CLAUSE
Xthat: Steve threw a party. EMBEDDED CLAUSE
The anaphor that in (264) cannot be taken to felicitously refer to the proposition conveyed
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by the matrix clause of the first sentence, because (absent an amnesia scenario) Barb does
not have the authority to tell Nancy what Nancy knows. Instead, the felicitous interpre-
tation of (264) is for the anaphor to refer to the proposition conveyed by the embedded
clause, ‘Steve threw a party’. Similarly, the matrix clause interpretation of (265) is ruled
out by the follow-up: an assertion is not adequate evidence for itself (where so indicates a
conequence), and a speaker presumably typically forms a belief prior to asserting it. The
natural interpretation of (265) is for the speaker, having witnessed the proof, now believes
that Steve threw a party—which is the embedded clause proposition. These factive pred-
icates allow for anaphoric reference to their complement clause propositions; the same is
true for doubt and realize, and the emotive factive love.
(266) Hopper remembered (that) Joyce was vegetarian even though she didn’t tell him
that.
(267) Nancy realized (that) Steve cared about her. She hadn’t known that, and now it
was crystal clear.
(268) Lucas loves that Nancy won the award. She told him that on Monday and he’s
been beaming ever since.
The contexts of these sentences make each matrix proposition an unsuitable an-
tecedent, but each embedded clause proposition is perfectly appropriate and available
for anaphoric reference.
The data above also cross-cut the White et al. in press feature of assertivity: realize
is assertive, but love is not. That is to say, uttering a sentence with realize can be used
to assert its complement, where the matrix content becomes backgrounded (see Simons
2007). Assertivity is also correlated with the ability of a verb to be slifted (Ross 1973), as
non-assertive verbs like love can’t be backgrounded, nor do they allow their complements
to be slifted (White et al. in press). Nevertheless, both realize and love—and thus, both as-
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sertive and non-assertive verbs—allow the proposition denoted by the embedded clause
to be available for anaphoric reference.
Non-factives
Verbs which do not entail the truth of their (finite sentential) complements also make
the propositions denoted by those complements available for anaphoric reference. This
includes speech reports, as in (269), as well as other attitude reports, as in (270)–(272).
(269) Nancy said (that) Steve threw a party. Barb told her that.
#that: Nancy said Steve threw a party. MATRIX CLAUSE
Xthat: Steve threw a party. EMBEDDED CLAUSE
(270) Nancy thought (that) Steve threw a party. Barb told her that.
#that: Nancy thought Steve threw a party. MATRIX CLAUSE
Xthat: Steve threw a party. EMBEDDED CLAUSE
(271) Nancy supposed (that) Steve threw a party. Barb told her that.
#that: Nancy supposed Steve threw a party. MATRIX CLAUSE
Xthat: Steve threw a party. EMBEDDED CLAUSE
(272) Nancy heard (that) Steve threw a party. Barb told her that.
#that: Nancy heard Steve threw a party. MATRIX CLAUSE
Xthat: Steve threw a party. EMBEDDED CLAUSE
The discourses in (269)–(272) are bizarre on a reading where the anaphor that refers to the
matrix clause proposition, as outside an amnesia context, Barb presumably does not have
the authority to tell Nancy what Nancy said/thought/suppose/heard. (And, because
the second sentence of each discourse is an explanation of the first, such an interpretation
would require Nancy to say/think/suppose/hear on the basis of Barb’s authority.) The
matrix interpretation of each is unavailable, but these discourses still manage to be felic-
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itous because there is an alternative antecedent available for the anaphor: the embedded
clause proposition.
These also cross-cut another two characteristics discussed in White et al. in press: say
is communicative and not perceptual, hear is perceptual and not communicative, and
think is neither communicative nor perceptual.48 Nevertheless, they all make available
anaphoric reference to the proposition denoted by their complement clause.
Both factive and non-factive finite clauses conform to the Krifka 2013 generalization:
the embedded clauses contain TPs, and they have associated propositional discourse ref-
erents. These TPs are not sensitive to the semantic character of the verb that embeds
them, and introduce a propositional discourse referent regardless of the factive, assertive,
communicative, or perceptual status of the embedding verb.
Slifting constructions
Slifting constructions are those where, as described by Ross 1973, an embedded sen-
tence is lifted (sentence-lifted, or slifted) to a higher syntactic position, leaving what
would have been the matrix embedding verb in a slifting parenthetical. (For Grimshaw
2011, the slifted clause is the main clause, and the slifting parenthetical is an adjunct. For
now, I use Ross’s (1973) term but take no stance on the syntactic derivation of these con-
structions.) For example, compare the embedding construction in (269), repeated in (273),
to its slifted counterpart in (274).
48White et al. in press characterizes hear as factive, but I think this is mistaken. A normal use of hear as
in (x) may give rise to the presumption of the truth of its complement, but this implication is defeasible (as
in (xi)a) in a way that is not available to truly factive verbs (as in (xi)b–c).
(x) Dustin heard (that) there was a party last night.
(xi) a. Dustin heard (that) there was a party last night, but that’s not true. (There was no party.)
b. # Dustin hated that there was a party last night, but that’s not true. (There was no party.)
c. # Dustin discovered (that) there was a party last night, but that’s not true. (There was no party.)
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(273) Nancy said (that) Steve threw a party. =the first sentence of (269)
(274) Steve threw a party, Nancy said.
Slifting parentheticals differ from their matrix counterparts in several ways noted in the
literature: they usually cannot host negation (Ross 1973 and others); they do not allow
some normal embedding predicates or are restricted in person or tense (Ross 1973; Rein-
hart 1983; Simons 2007); they do not allow for adverbial modification (Simons 2007); and
they usually cannot modify subordinate clauses, where normal embedding verbs can be
multiply embedded (Koev 2016).
To this list, we can add differing behavior for propositional anaphora: where a normal
embedding sentence like (269) makes both the embedded clause proposition and the ma-
trix clause proposition available for anaphoric reference, a slifting construction like (274)
does not. Consider (275), which tests the anaphoric potential of (274).
(275) Steve threw a party, Nancy said. But Barb doesn’t believe that.
#that: Nancy said Steve threw a party. SLIFTED PARENTHETICAL
Xthat: Steve threw a party. ‘EMBEDDED’ CLAUSE
The proposition denoted by the first clause of (275), ‘Steve threw a party’—which would
be the embedded clause in a normal embedding construction—, is a possible antecedent
of the anaphor that. The proposition conveyed by the slifted parenthetical is not an avail-
able antecedent: we cannot understand (275) to mean that Barb doesn’t believe Nancy
said something.
We can see the contrast between slifting constructions and ordinary embedding con-
structions in (276).
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(276) a. Nancy said Steve threw a party. He told me that and then laughed. I didn’t
get the joke.
b. # Steve threw a party, Nancy said. He told me that and then laughed. I didn’t
get the joke.
In a context where the person named Nancy uses the pronoun she and not he, the embed-
ding construction in (276a) allows for felicitous anaphoric reference to the ‘Nancy said. . . ’
proposition. The slifting construction in (276b) does not.
Murray 2014 calls the proposition conveyed by an English slifted parenthetical the
evidential proposition, drawing a parallel with the propositions conveyed by Cheyenne
evidentials. On that account, Cheyenne evidential propositions are not assigned propo-
sitional discourse referents, and Murray 2014 suggests the same for English slifting con-
structions. The data here support this proposal: an English slifting construction intro-
duces only one propositional discourse referent, for the ‘embedded’ clause proposition;
no discourse referent is introduced for the evidential proposition, as it is not available
for anaphoric reference. Slifting constructions have different anaphoric properties from
embedding constructions, even those that use the exact same words.
3.4.5 Relative clauses
Relative clauses are clauses which modify a head, conveying some information about
the head. In the case of restrictive relative clauses, the head must be a noun phrase, and
the added information shrinks the set of possible referents being discussed, as in (277).
Non-restrictive relative clauses add information about the entire (possibly singleton) set
and don’t reduce it, as in (278).
(277) [There are twenty students in my class.]
The two students who performed the worst in the class may retake the exam.
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(278) [There are two students in my office.]
The two students, who performed the worst in the class, are retaking the exam.
In addition, non-restrictive relative clauses can modify structures other than noun
phrases, as in (279) (examples and labels from Arnold & Borsley 2008: (14), (17); see also
Jackendoff 1977; Fabb 1990; Arnold 2004):
(279) a. Kim owns a dog, which is regrettable. S
b. Kim owns a dog, which is a dachshund. NP
c. They have done the washing, which they said they would. VP
d. They hid the books under the bed, which is a good place. PP
e. They painted the house red, which is a nice colour. AP
f. They dressed carefully, which is also how they talk. ADVP
There is significant debate about the structural analysis of relative clauses (see, e.g.,
discussion in De Vries 2006). Across these analyses, however, both restrictive and non-
restrictive relative clauses are considered to be full CP structures (e.g., Bhatt 2002), so
Krifka 2013 predicts that they should be available for propositional anaphoric reference.
Restrictive relative clauses
In many cases, the proposition conveyed by a restrictive relative clause (RRC) is hard
to make anaphoric reference to, as the proposition conveyed by the matrix clause is so
much more prominent (being the main point of the utterance, and usually also more
recent). The discourses in (280) & (281), for example, attempt to bias interpretation in
favor of anaphoric reference to the RRC proposition, but end up being degraded.
133
(280) The pair of pants that Lucas wanted was sold out, but Elle didn’t believe that. She
didn’t think they were his style.
#that: The pants were sold out. MATRIX CLAUSE
?that: Lucas wanted that pair of pants. EMBEDDED CLAUSE
(281) The student who cheated on the test met with Principal Coleman today. He
doesn’t know that, though, so he didn’t punish him.
?that: The student met with Principal Coleman today. MATRIX CLAUSE
?that: The student cheated on the test. RELATIVE CLAUSE
In (280), the follow-up explains why Elle didn’t believe the antecedent proposition, and
that explanation is incompatible with the matrix clause—Lucas’s style doesn’t change
what is sold out—so the anaphor cannot be interpreted as referring to the matrix propo-
sition. The follow-up explanation does provide a reason that Elle might disbelieve the
RRC proposition—that Lucas wanted that pair of pants—but this reading seems unavail-
able or at least fairly degraded. Similarly, the context of (281) makes the matrix clause
proposition a bizarre antecedent for that to refer to: presumably the principal knows who
he met with. What the principal might not know, and might have otherwise merited
punishment, is the proposition ‘the student cheated on the test’, which is conveyed by
the RRC. This proposition doesn’t seem to be easily available for anaphoric reference in
(281), though, as the discourse on the whole is degraded.
There are cases, however, where RRCs do make the propositions they denote available
for anaphoric reference. In particular, these are cases where the referring anaphor is in the
matrix clause, as in (282):
(282) Every student who cheated on the test told their mother
{that
so
as much
}
.
Xthat/so/as much: They cheated. RELATIVE CLAUSE
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Each student in (282) needn’t have told their mother anything about other students for the
sentence to be felicitous: the anaphor needn’t refer to the matrix ‘every student’ proposi-
tion. The sentence is felicitous even if each student x tells x’s mother only about x’s own
behavior, that is, if the anaphor refers to the proposition denoted by the RRC (bound un-
der every). The RRC does have an associated propositional discourse referent, then, even
if it was hard to refer to in (280) & (281).
If the anaphor is in a subsequent clause, though—even a conjoined clause, with no
sentence break—. reference to the RRC becomes unavailable, even with a heavily biased
context.
(283) a. Every student who cheated on the test got an A, but the teacher didn’t be-
lieve that. She thought Steve cheated despite his getting a B.
b. # Every student who cheated on the test got an A, but the teacher didn’t be-
lieve that. She couldn’t believe Barb would ever cheat.
The follow-up in (283a) gives a reason that the teacher disbelieves that every student
who cheated got an A, which is the proposition denoted by the matrix clause of the
first conjunct. This is felicitous, unsurprisingly, as the matrix proposition is available
for anaphoric reference. The follow-up in (283b), though, gives a reason that the teacher
might disbelieve about a particular student that she cheated on the test, which is the
proposition conveyed by the RRC. This discourse is infelicitous, demonstrating that the
anaphor cannot refer to the RRC proposition: it does not have a propositional discourse
referent which is available for reference in this second conjunct.
The propositions conveyed by RRCs are similarly unavailable for anaphoric reference
from within an interrogative matrix clause. This is true both for a polar question, as in
(284a), and for a wh- question, as in (284b).
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(284) a. # Were the ingredients for those cookies (that) you made expensive? Because
Joyce doubts that: she thinks they’re store-bought.
b. # What did you put in those cookies (that) you made? Because Joyce doubts
that: she thinks they’re store-bought.
The polar question in (284a) allows for anaphora to the proposition ‘The ingredients for
those cookies (that) you made were expensive’, as we saw in §3.3.2. The reading of (284a)
we’re interested in here, however, where that refers to the proposition conveyed by the
RRC—‘The addressee made those cookies’—is not felicitous. This is perhaps unsurpris-
ing: just as in (283b), there is a propositional discourse referent (associated with the matrix
clause) which is ‘competing’ for anaphora resolution. More surprising from this perspec-
tive is (284b), where there is no such ‘competitor’: the matrix wh- interrogative doesn’t
introduce a propositional discourse referent (see §3.3.2) but the RRC proposition is nev-
ertheless unavailable. RRCs (with declarative mood) embedded in matrix interrogatives
(with interrogative mood) are not available for propositional anaphoric reference to an
anaphor in a subsequent clause, just like RRCs embedded under matrix declaratives (as
in (283b)).
There are some cases where the proposition conveyed by a RRC does appear to be
accessible to an anaphor in a subsequent clause. In particular, these are cases where the
matrix proposition carries minimal content, as in (285):
(285) All right. Now, here’s a woman who has committed perjury. We know that. Plus,
she says on these tapes, I’ve lied all my life. (COCA, Davies 2008–)49
In this example, the first sentence acknowledges the prior discourse and starts a new
turn (not introducing any new propositional content), and the second sentence contains
a RRC which appears to be the antecedent of the anaphor in the third sentence. The main
491998 (19980727). Investigating the President: Movement in Starr’s White House Probe. Crossfire, CNN.
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function of the second sentence is to establish the woman (Monica Lewinsky) as the topic
of the following discourse, leading up to a question about her reliability as a witness. The
matrix clause content of the second sentence—less the contribution of the RRC—amounts
to ‘a woman exists’, which is old information in this context; it is the proposition conveyed
by the RRC, namely that Lewinsky has committed perjury, which is the more relevant
and potentially discourse-new information, and it is this proposition which the anaphor
refers to. This appears to be a counterexample to the pattern that anaphoric reference to
a proposition conveyed by a RRC is possible for an anaphor in the clause containing the
RRC but impossible to anaphors in subsequent clauses. Because of the minimal content
of the matrix clause, however, it is hard to differentiate between anaphoric reference to
‘A woman has committed perjury’ and ‘Here is a woman who has committed perjury’.
This may in fact be an example of anaphora from a subsequent clause to a RRC, or it may
be better explained in some other way—e.g., as a continuation of the prior clause, or as
reference to the matrix clause proposition. Even if it is, however, it does not reflect the
overall trend, and so I put it aside for now.
Restrictive relative clauses do make a proposition available for subsequent anaphoric
reference, but only in a limited fashion. Anaphors within the matrix clause containing the
RRC can access this propositional discourse referent, but subsequent matrix anaphors—
even those in later clauses connected via conjunction—cannot.
This is immediately reminiscent of a DRT approach to anaphora, where the accessibil-
ity of a discourse referent is sensitive to its relation to operators, e.g., a discourse referent
introduced in the antecedent of a conditional is accessible to its consequent(but not vice
versa). On this type of account, the propositional discourse referent introduced for a RRC
must be accessible to the clause (the box) which contains it, but must not be accessible
to the top-most box, the discourse as a whole, or else it would continue to be available
for reference by subsequent anaphors, which we have observed is not the case. More-
137
over, under DRT, both conjunction and sentence concatenation are treated identically, as
DRS-merge (see Muskens 1996), so it is not surprising that a further conjunct and a later
sentence are equally unable to access the RRC propositional discourse referent for the first
conjunct (presuming it is not part of the top-level universe of discourse referents).
This would be a departure from the normal way restrictive relative clauses are treated
in DRT, however. Both Cormack 1992: 347 and Kamp & Reyle 1993: 81–83 argue for a flat
treatment of restrictive relative clauses, one where the discourse referents and conditions
introduced by the RRC are part of the matrix clause box. This might be accurate for
individual discourse referents—which is what Cormack 1992 and Kamp & Reyle 1993 are
interested in—but the same does not appear to be the case for propositional discourse
referents.
This sort of behavior is not accounted for in Krifka 2013, which discusses neither rel-
ative clauses (of any sort) nor any limits on the availability of a discourse referent once
it is introduced. In some sense, the prediction that a propositional discourse referent is
introduced is confirmed, as a RRC contains a TP. However, more work would be needed
to explain how the availability of that discourse referent is constrained under Krifka 2013
theory.
Non-restrictive relative clauses
Non-restrictive relative clauses (NRRCs) convey propositions which are available for
anaphoric reference, and not just within the matrix clause:
(286) Steve, who cheated on the test, got an 100. But Nancy doesn’t know that, she thinks
he’s just really smart.
#that: Steve got an 100 on the test. MATRIX CLAUSE
Xthat: Steve cheated on the test. RELATIVE CLAUSE
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(287) Dustin, whom Joyce had bet against, won the race. She told me that in confidence.
#that: Dustin won the race. MATRIX CLAUSE
Xthat: Joyce bet against Dustin. RELATIVE CLAUSE
The matrix clause proposition of (286) is ‘Steve got an 100 on the test’, and the NRRC con-
veys the proposition ‘Steve cheated on the test’. The follow-up contrasts what Nancy
thinks—that Steve is really smart—with the antecedent proposition that she doesn’t
know; this makes the matrix proposition an unsuitable antecedent for the anaphor, as
being smart is consistent with doing well on a test. The much more natural antecedent
in the context of this follow-up is for that to refer to the proposition that Steve cheated: if
Nancy knew that, she might not think he was so smart. The proposition conveyed by the
NRRC is available for anaphoric reference, then, even with the anaphor in the following
sentence.
Similarly, the follow-up in (287) makes the matrix interpretation of the first sentence
an unsuitable antecedent: it is far more likely that Joyce would want to keep her betting
against someone a secret than that she would tell the results of the race (whose results are
more likely to be public information) in confidence. The matrix clause is not a suitable
antecedent for the anaphor, but (287) still has a felicitous reading in which that refers to
the proposition conveyed by the NRRC, namely ‘Joyce bet against Dustin’.
Non-restrictive relative clauses make propositional discourse referents available for
subsequent anaphoric reference. Unlike those of their restrictive cousins, the proposi-
tional discourse referents introduced for NRRCs can be referred to by later clauses, and
not just within the clause containing them. This comports with the predictions of Krifka
2013, as NRRCs contain TPs.
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3.4.6 Clauses in subject position
Clauses that appear in object position are considered to be embedded under the matrix
verb, begin arguments of that verb; these are the sorts of constructions discussed above.
But sentential clauses can also appear in subject position in English, if they are extracted
from object position.
(288) a. Dustin napped.
b. It horrified Lucas that Dustin napped.
c. That Dustin napped horrified Lucas.
Because propositions, unlike individuals, are not agentive, this sort of clausal subject can
only appear with certain verbs, in particular ones where the object is the experiencer of a
psychological state (Levin’s (1993) amuse verbs), such as astonish, embarrass, or upset.
These clausal subjects are CPs (or, if they are considered to be nominalized, contain
CPs), and thus contain TPs, and so the Krifka 2013 proposal predicts that they should
make propositions available for anaphoric reference. This prediction is borne out:
(289) That Nancy went to the party upset Jonathan. Barb told him that.
#that: Nancy’s going to the party upset Jonathan. MATRIX CLAUSE
Xthat: Nancy went to the party. SUBJECT CLAUSE
(290) That
√
2 is irrational confused Mike no matter how many ways Mr. Clarke proved
it (to be true).
#it:
√
2’s being irrational confused Mike. MATRIX CLAUSE
Xit:
√
2 is irrational. SUBJECT CLAUSE
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(291) That Steve finished in last place embarrassed him. His coach told him that yester-
day, and he’s been hiding in his room ever since.
#it: Steve’s last place finish embarrassed him. MATRIX CLAUSE
Xit: Steve finished in last place. SUBJECT CLAUSE
In (289), Barb is unlikely to be a greater authority on Jonathan’s emotions than he is, so
it is bizarre for her to tell him what upsets him—this would be the interpretation if the
anaphor were understood to refer to the matrix clause proposition. Instead, the more
natural and felicitous interpretation of (289) is for Barb to have told Jonathan that Nancy
went to the party—which is the proposition conveyed by the subject clause—, for Barb to
have been the source of the news which in turn upset Jonathan. The subject clause in (289)
makes the proposition it conveys available for anaphoric reference. We can see parallel
behavior in (290) and (291): Mr. Clarke would have been proving the mathematical fact,
not Mike’s confusion; and Steve’s coach would have told him about the race’s results, not
Steve’s own reaction to them.
There are other clausal subjects which are similarly derived from the complement of
a verb, but which cannot stand alone as complete sentences, and which are not proposi-
tional.
(292) a. It would upset Lucas for Dustin to leave.
b. For Dustin to leave would upset Lucas.
(293) a. It would be a big deal for Huckabee to endorse him.
b. [F]or Huckabee to endorse him would be a pretty big deal. (COCA)50
These future-oriented for. . . to clauses can appear as the complement of hope or yearn
(Levin’s (1993) Long verbs), but not know or believe or doubt. They describe events, not
502011 (111127). Roundtable guests Rich Lowry of National Review; Jon Meacham, executive editor of
Random House; presidential historians Doris Kearns Goodwin and Michael Beschloss; Michael Eric Dyson,
author and professor. Meet the Press, NBC.
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propositions. And, as such, they do not make a proposition available for anaphoric refer-
ence.
(294) # For Nancy to go to the party would upset Jonathan. Barb told him that.
(295) # For Nancy to go to the party would upset Jonathan. Barb would tell him that,
and then he’d get angry.
(296) # For Steve to finish in last place would embarrass him. His coach told him that.
(297) # For Steve to finish in last place would embarrass him. His coach would tell him
that, and he would hide in his room for a week.
Even with a follow-up with proper modal subordination (Roberts 1989), anaphoric refer-
ence to the subject clause is not licit.
The propositional content associated with a clause in subject position is available for
anaphoric reference. This accords with the Krifka 2013 proposal, as these clauses include
TPs.
3.4.7 Conditionals
Conditional statements describe a relationship between an antecedent (in English,
usually an if clause) and a consequent (a then clause).51 Syntactically speaking, English
conditionals are biclausal: the antecedent is a subordinate clause, and the consequent is
an independent clause. If each clause conveys a proposition, we might have two propo-
sitional discourse referents, as in (298). However, philosophers and logicians tend to talk
about conditionals as having two parts of equal status, giving us the triclausal structure in
(299). Under this view, we might expect conditionals to make three propositions available
for anaphoric reference.
51Because the word antecedent is used for both anaphoric antecedents and conditional antecedents, I will
be careful to say conditional antecedent when ambiguity might arise.
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(298) [ [ antecedent ]1 consequent ]2
(299) [ [ antecedent ]1 → [ consequent ]2 ]3
The difference between these anaphoric predictions comes down to whether the conse-
quent alone is available for reference, absent the relationship described by the conditional.
Only the philosophers’ approach (in (299)) could allow for such reference, as the conse-
quent is independent of the matrix conditional statement. Under the syntactic approach,
however, the matrix clause carries both the consequent and the conditional relationship,
which are indivisible. Krifka 2013 does not comment on conditionals, but presumably
would endorse the syntactic approach in (298): both antecedent and consequent contain
TP, and so should make a propositional discourse referent available.
For most conditionals, it is hard to distinguish reference to the consequent from refer-
ence to the whole conditional, because a hearer is evaluating the truth of the consequent
only within the antecedent worlds. That is to say, by the time we’re thinking about the
consequent, we are already taking the antecedent into account, and thus are effectively
considering the whole conditional. For example, consider (300), where each follow-up
attempts to force a different antecedent for the anaphor that:
(300) If Dustin goes to the party, (then) a fight will break out.
a. # But Elle doesn’t believe that; she thinks Dustin will stay at home.
b. ? But Elle doesn’t believe that; she thinks everyone there is a pacifist.
c. But Elle doesn’t believe that; she thinks everyone gets along with Dustin.
Each follow-up presents Elle’s alternative belief which gives her reason to disbelieve the
antecedent proposition referred to by the anaphor. (300a) contrasts with the conditional
antecedent ‘Dustin goes to the party’, and this follow-up is infelicitous; this suggests that
the conditional antecedent is not available for anaphoric reference. (300c) gives a reason
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to disbelieve the relationship between antecedent and consequent conveyed by the entire
conditional: if everyone gets along with Dustin, then his attending the party is unlikely
to lead to a fight. This follow-up is felicitous, which indicates that anaphoric reference
to the entire conditional is possible. (This does not yet distinguish between the schemas
discussed above.) The follow-up in (300b) attempts to target just the consequent, ‘A fight
will break out’, independently of the conditional antecedent. The interpretation of (300b),
though, if felicitous, is not clearly distinguishable from that of (300c): the attendees’ paci-
fism would explain their not getting into a fight just as much with Dustin’s presence as in
his absence.
We can pull these readings apart if we choose a consequent which is, at its face, less
closely related to the conditional antecedent. These conditionals can be a little harder to
parse out of the blue, specifically because the relation between antecedent and consequent
is less clear. In a proper context, though, these are perfectly sensible (and contexts can
almost always be cooked up which relate two seemingly disparate statements). For (301),
for example, imagine that Dustin and Joyce are research partners, one of whom will need
to get a book out from the library tomorrow.
(301) If Dustin goes to the party, (then) Joyce will go to the library.
a. # But Elle doesn’t believe that; she thinks Dustin will stay home.
b. # But Elle doesn’t believe that; she thinks Joyce will stay home.
c. But Elle doesn’t believe that; she thinks they will stick together.
The follow-up and anaphor in (301a) attempt to target the conditional antecedent, but as
in (300) fail to be felicitous. (301b) attempts to target just the consequent, giving Elle’s
alternative belief for what Joyce will do. Here, we get a clearer judgment of the infelicity
of this follow-up. This is likely due to the (surface) independence of the consequent from
the conditional antecedent. In (300), we understand the fight to be breaking out at [the
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party (which Dustin might attend)];52 in this sense, the interpretation of the consequent
relies on the interpretation of the conditional antecedent in a way that (301) does not.53
(301b) seems to contrast with just the consequent, independently of the conditional an-
tecedent, and it is infelicitous. The consequent alone, then, is not a suitable antecedent
for the anaphor that. The follow-up in (301c), which targets the conditional as a whole, is
felicitous.
This behavior is not limited to future-oriented conditionals, nor to eventive predicates.
We can see the same behavior with stative predicates both in the present, as in (302), and
in the past, as in (303).
(302) If Dustin is at the party, (then) Joyce is at the library.
a. # But Elle doesn’t believe that; she thinks Dustin is at home.
b. # But Elle doesn’t believe that; she thinks Joyce is at home.
c. But Elle doesn’t believe that; she thinks they go everywhere together.
(303) If Dustin was at the party, (then) Joyce was at the library.
a. # But Elle doesn’t believe that; she thinks Dustin was at home.
b. # But Elle doesn’t believe that; she thinks Joyce was at home.
c. But Elle doesn’t believe that; she thinks they were together all day.
In all of these conditionals, neither the conditional antecedent nor consequent are avail-
able for subsequent propositional anaphoric reference. We can have felicitous anaphoric
reference from a subsequent clause, but only if it is event anaphora:
52This is defeasible: in the right context, we might understand the fight to be elsewhere, e.g., if his
parents are at home fighting about whether he should have been allowed to go.
53Our temporal interpretation of the consequent may be taken to rely on the that of the conditional
antecedent, in that a natural of reading of (301) has Joyce at the library at the same time that Dustin is at
the party (see Partee 1973). However, this too is defeasible: we can understand (301) as meaning ‘If Dustin
goes to the party tonight, then Joyce will go to the library next week’. Such a meaning might require a little
more contextual work, but it is not impossible.
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(304) If Dustin goes to the party, (then) Joyce will go to the library.
a. But Elle doesn’t think that will happen; she thinks Dustin will stay home.
EVENT ANAPHORA
b. But Elle doesn’t think that will happen; she thinks Joyce will stay home.
EVENT ANAPHORA
Conditional antecedents do make propositional discourse referents available, how-
ever, for anaphoric reference from within the consequent.
(305) If Nancy is at the party, then Steve will want to know that.
Xthat: Nancy is at the party.
(306) If Mike cheated on the test, then his mother already knows (that).
Xthat/∅: Mike cheated on the test.
And, this internal availability can be extended to subsequent clauses which are modally
subordinate (Roberts 1989, see also Frank 1997; Geurts 1999).
(307) If Nancy is at the party, then Steve will want to know that. Lucas will want to
know that, too.
Xthat: Nancy is at the party.
(308) If Dustin was at the party, then Joyce was at the library. But Elle wouldn’t have
believed that, anyways; she thought they were inseparable.
Xthat: Dustin was at the party.
This is similar to what we observed for restrictive relative clauses in §3.4.5, where a propo-
sitional discourse referent was introduced, but only available within a limited domain.
And, as discussed there, this is reminiscent of a DRT treatment of discourse referents; in
fact more so here, as DRT allows (individual) discourse referents introduced in the an-
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tecedent of a conditional to be accessible to conditions in the consequent. However, just
as with restrictive relative clauses, the DRT analysis of individual discourse referents in
conditionals cannot be perfectly extended to propositional discourse referents.
In DRT, the accessibility relationship of a conditional is unidirectional: the antecedent
is accessible to the consequent, but not vice versa. However, just as the conditional an-
tecedent proposition is available for an anaphor in the consequent in (305), so too is the
consequent available for (cataphoric) propositional anaphora from within the conditional
antecedent.
(309) If Einstein believes it, then
√
2 is irrational.
Xit:
√
2 is irrational.
(310) If Trump doubts it, then climate change is real.
Xit: Climate change is real.
The consequent (independent of the antecedent) is available for anaphoric reference if
the anaphor is within the conditional antecedent. This extends beyond what DRT allows
for individual discourse referents, and suggests that propositional discourse referents are
subject to different accessibility constraints. Examples like (309) also illustrate that the
consequent can be distinguished from the conditional as a whole, as the anaphor it surely
does not refer to the larger structure containing it. That the consequent is ever differen-
tiable from the conditional as a whole also suggests that we should prefer a philosophical
approach to conditionals (as in (298)) over a syntactic one (as in (298)).
In summary, conditional antecedents and consequents make propositions available for
anaphoric reference, but only from within a given conditional. Neither antecedent nor
consequent proposition is available for anaphoric reference from a subsequent clause,
even if that clause is discourse subordinate to the conditional. The matrix conditional
proposition, however, remains available to subsequent clause anaphors, which is in line
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with general matrix clause behavior as observed thus far. That the antecedent and conse-
quent introduce propositional discourse referents is in line with the Krifka 2013 proposal,
but the limited availability of those discourse referents requires constraints or further
mechanisms not discussed in Krifka 2013.
3.4.8 Sentential adverbs
Sentences with sentential adverbs like only or even convey multiple propositions.
(311) Only [ the Red Sox ]F can beat the Yankees. (Ippolito 2006: (1))
(311) conveys two propositions: the prejacent proposition, that the Red Sox can beat the
Yankees, and the exclusive proposition, that the Red Sox are the only ones who can do
so. Much has been written about the status of these two propositions. It is generally
agreed that the exclusive proposition is the primary content of such a sentence and is
asserted, but the prejacent proposition has been argued variously to be asserted (Atlas
1993), presupposed (Horn 1969, 1996; Geurts & Van der Sandt 2004), conversationally
implicated (McCawley 1981), or derived from the presupposition of a scalar proposition
(Ippolito 2006, following Rooth 1992, 1996).54 In this section, we will look at the anaphoric
availability of these propositions.
Because these sentential adverbs attach high in the syntax, the Krifka 2013 proposal
predicts that the prejacent propositions of these adverbs should be available for anaphoric
reference. The clauses that convey them, modified by these adverbs, contain TPs, and
those TPs should introduce propositional discourse referents for the propositions they
convey.
54It has also been argued to be an illusion, and not a sentence implication at all (Geach 1962).
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Only
In the examples that follow, we’ll be focusing on the focus-sensitive exclusive oper-
ator only, not the discourse connective only (which does not associate with focus). Only
conveys a main exclusive proposition, as well as the prejacent proposition, as discussed
above. The prejacent proposition is not available for anaphoric reference.
(312) Only the Red Sox can beat the Yankees.
a. Dustin doesn’t believe that, though; he thinks the Orioles can, too.
MATRIX CLAUSE
b. # Dustin doesn’t believe that, though; he thinks the Yankees are unbeatable.
PREJACENT
(313) [In a class of 200 students:]
Only Nancy failed the exam.
a. The professor told me that in confidence, though, so don’t tell anyone.
MATRIX CLAUSE
b. ?? She told me that in confidence, though, so don’t tell anyone. PREJACENT
(314) Only Nancy failed the exam.
a. She doesn’t believe that, though; she thinks Dustin failed, too.
MATRIX CLAUSE
b. # She doesn’t believe that, though; she thinks she aced it. PREJACENT
In (312a), the follow-up contrasts with the exclusive proposition conveyed by the matrix
only clause: it’s not just the Red Sox, as the Marlins can, too. This follow-up is felici-
tous, illustrating that the main clause proposition is available for anaphoric reference. In
(312b), however, the follow-up contrasts with the prejacent proposition, and the resulting
discourse is infelicitous. This suggests that the prejacent proposition is not an available
149
antecedent for the anaphor in (312b). We can see the same behavior in (313), whose con-
text is such that the professor, but not Nancy, would have access to knowledge of the
exclusive proposition. In (313a), then, citing the professor as the source of the exclu-
sive proposition (targeted by the anaphor) is reasonable, and the discourse is felicitous.
(313b) attempts to bias resolution of the anaphor towards the prejacent proposition, as
Nancy would be a dependable source for that information (on her own performance),
but would be unlikely to know about the entire class’s performance. This discourse in
highly marked, though, as the only possible interpretation is such that Nancy does in fact
know about everyone’s exam grades. The matrix clause proposition is the only possi-
ble antecedent for the anaphor; the prejacent proposition is not available for anaphoric
reference.
Even
Sentences with the sentential adverb even are thought to convey two or three proposi-
tions.
(315) Even Steve can lift this box.
The sentence in (315) means (i) that Steve can lift the box in question—the preja-
cent proposition—, and (ii) that the information in (i) is maximally informative (Kay
1990)/noteworthy (Herburger 2016), i.e., because Steve is among the least likely to lift
the box (e.g., because he is exceptionally weak)—the scalar proposition.55 Some also posit
that a sentence like (315) also means (iii) that someone other than Steve can lift the box—
an existence/non-uniqueness implication—, though this has been argued to be derived
by pragmatic inference (Herburger 2016).
Of these three propositions, only the prejacent proposition is available for anaphoric
55So called because even locates its associate towards the end of a relevant scale (see, e.g., Rullmann
1997. Additionally, it is worth pointing out that this position on the scale is a relative, not absolute (Kay
1990; Schwenter & Vasishth 2000).
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reference.
(316) Even Nancy failed the exam.
a. She doesn’t believe that, though; she thinks she aced it. PREJACENT
b. # She doesn’t believe that, though; she thinks she’s among the worst in the
class. SCALAR
c. # She doesn’t believe that, though; she thinks she was the only one.
EXISTENCE
(317) Even the Phillies can sell out a stadium.
a. Dustin doesn’t believe that, though; he thinks they simply can’t.
PREJACENT
b. # Dustin doesn’t believe that, though; he thinks they’re one of the few teams
that can. SCALAR
c. # He doesn’t believe that, though; he thinks they’re the only team that can.
EXISTENCE
Each follow-up in (316) provides an explanation which contrasts with one of the three
propositions conveyed by the even sentence. In (316a), she thinks she aced it contrasts with
the prejacent proposition, ‘Nancy failed the exam’. This follow-up is felicitous, which
indicates that the prejacent is an available antecedent for the anaphor that. In (316b), the
follow-up contradicts the scalar proposition: if Nancy is among the worst in the class, then
it is not noteworthy that she failed an exam. This follow-up is infelicitous, which suggests
that the scalar proposition is not available for anaphoric reference. Similarly, the follow-
up in (316c) is infelicitous. This follow-up contrasts with the existence implication: if she
is the only one (who failed), then no other student failed. The infelicity of this follow-up
suggests that the existence implication is not available for anaphoric reference.
(317) has a present-tense ability statement, as opposed to a past-tense event, but the
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behavior is the same. The only propositional discourse referent introduced by the first
sentence of (316) which is available for anaphoric reference is the one associated with the
prejacent, ‘The Phillies can sell out a stadium’.
Even, then, does not make any additional propositional discourse referents available
for subsequent reference. The prejacent proposition is available, but neither the scalar im-
plication nor the existence implication have associated propositional discourse referents.
3.4.9 Embedded interrogatives
Just as declaratives can be embedded within a clause, so can interrogatives. Just as in
§3.3.2, we’ll consider each type of interrogative individually. And, as discussed in that
section, we’ll pay close attention to the verb doubt, which takes propositional arguments
but not interrogative ones (Ginzburg 1993: 278, fn. 10).
We will discuss only embedded interrogatives in object position, leaving aside subject
interrogatives, as §3.4.6 suggests that clauses in subject position behave no differently
than in object position.
Embedded polar questions
Polar questions can be embedded under if -clauses, or under whether-clauses (without
an accompanying or). As we saw in §3.3.2, matrix polar questions introduce a proposi-
tional discourse referent for the proposition that partitions the answer space (but not for
its complement). As such, we might expect the same to be the case for embedded polar
questions; that, however, is not the case.
(318) Nancy knows if Barb was at the party, but Lucas doesn’t know that.
Xthat: Nancy knows if Barb was at the party. MATRIX CLAUSE
Xthat: Was Barb at the party? POLAR Q
#that: Barb was at the party. PARTITIONING PROPOSITION
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(319) Nancy knows if Barb was at the party, but Lucas doubts that.
Xthat: Nancy knows if Barb was at the party. MATRIX CLAUSE
#that: Was Barb at the party? POLAR Q
#that: Barb was at the party. PARTITIONING PROPOSITION
With know in (318), the anaphor that can be taken to refer to either the proposition denoted
by the matrix clause, or to the (true answer to the) question conveyed by the embedded
if -clause. It can’t be taken to refer specifically to the partitioning proposition ‘Barb was at
the party’, unless the speaker knows that to be the truth; if the speaker knows that Barb
actually was at the party, then knowing the partitioning proposition is indistinguishable
from knowing (the true answer to) the embedded question.56 With doubt in (319), though,
the only possible antecedent for that is the proposition denoted by the matrix clause of
the first sentence. The if -complement doesn’t make a proposition available for anaphoric
reference.
We can see the same behavior in whether-complements, which also don’t make a
proposition available for anaphora.
(320) Nancy knows whether Barb was at the party, but Lucas doesn’t know that.
Xthat: Nancy knows whether Barb was at the party. MATRIX CLAUSE
Xthat: Was Barb at the party? POLAR Q
#that: Barb was at the party. PARTITIONING PROPOSITION
(321) Nancy knows whether Barb was at the party, but Lucas doubts that.
Xthat: Nancy knows whether Barb was at the party. MATRIX CLAUSE
#that: Was Barb at the party? POLAR Q
#that: Barb was at the party. PARTITIONING PROPOSITION
56If the speaker knows that to be the truth, then using knows that instead of knows if would be preferable,
unless they were trying to be coy.
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With both if - and whether-clauses, embedded polar interrogatives do not make a
proposition available for anaphoric reference. This is perhaps surprising, because matrix
polar interrogatives do. This also presents another challenge to the Krifka 2013 proposal,
as the TP under an interrogative is presumably the same whether that interrogative is
itself embedded or is a matrix clause. As such, Krifka 2013 would seem to predict that
that TP should introduce a propositional discourse referent in both cases. As we have
observed, though, this is not the case: a matrix polar interrogative introduces a proposi-
tional discourse referent that an embedded polar interrogative does not.
Embedded wh- questions
As we saw in §3.3.2, matrix wh- questions do not introduce propositional discourse
referents, so it is unsurprising that embedded wh- questions also do not.
(322) Barb knows who was at the party, but Mike doesn’t know that.
Xthat: Barb knows who was at the party. MATRIX CLAUSE
Xthat: {x |x was at the party} TRUE ANSWER
(323) Barb knows who was at the party, but Mike doubts that.
Xthat: Barb knows who was at the party. MATRIX CLAUSE
#that: {x |x was at the party} TRUE ANSWER
While know can take as an argument either the proposition denoted by the matrix clause,
or the (true answer to the) interrogative, doubt can only apply to the matrix clause propo-
sition. With doubt in (323), the anaphor can only refer to the matrix clause proposition,
as the embedded wh- complement does not make a proposition available for anaphoric
reference.
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Embedded alternative questions
As we saw in §3.3.2, matrix alternative questions don’t introduce propositional dis-
course referents, regardless of whether the alternatives are nominal or sentential, and
even if one of the alternatives is the negation of the other. As with matrix alternative
questions, we will be careful to control for intonation, lest the utterance be interpreted as
a polar question. And, like matrix alternative questions, embedded alternative questions
presuppose that exactly one of the alternatives is true (Biezma & Rawlins 2012).
As with matrix alternative questions, embedded alternative questions do not intro-
duce a propositional discourse referent: not for the exhaustivity presupposition, nor for
either of the alternatives.
(324) Elle knows whether Mike would like coffee↑ or tea↓, but Dustin doubts that.
Xthat: Elle knows whether Mike would like coffee or tea. MATRIX CLAUSE
#that: Mike would like coffee or tea. PRESUPPOSITION
#that: Mike would like coffee. LEFT DISJUNCT
#that: Mike would like tea. RIGHT DISJUNCT
(325) Elle knows whether Mike would like coffee↑ or he’d prefer tea↓, but Dustin doubts
that.
Xthat: Elle knows whether Mike would like coffee or would prefer tea.
MATRIX CLAUSE
#that: Mike would like coffee or would prefer tea. PRESUPPOSITION
#that: Mike would like coffee. LEFT DISJUNCT
#that: Mike would prefer tea. RIGHT DISJUNCT
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(326) Elle knows whether Mike would like coffee↑ or not↓, but Dustin doubts that.
Xthat: Elle knows whether Mike would like coffee or tea. MATRIX CLAUSE
#that: Mike would like coffee or not. PRESUPPOSITION
#that: Mike would like coffee. LEFT DISJUNCT
#that: Mike would not like coffee. RIGHT DISJUNCT
Regardless of the nature of the alternatives, propositional anaphora is licensed only to the
matrix clause. The alternative question does not make any additional proposition avail-
able for anaphoric reference. Expanded contexts which attempt to bias each alternative,
as in (218), are not provided here, but do not change the anaphoric availability of any
alternative proposition.
3.4.10 Embedded imperatives
In §3.3.3, we observed that matrix imperatives don’t introduce propositional discourse
referents. Unsurprisingly, the same is true of embedded imperatives.
(327) Steve told me ‘Shut the door!’ but I don’t believe that.
#that: Steve told me ‘Shut the door!’ MATRIX CLAUSE
#that: Speaker should shut the door. IMP∼MODAL
#that: The door is shut. RESULT STATE
(328) Steve told me to shut the door but I don’t believe that.
#that: Steve told me to shut the door. MATRIX CLAUSE
#that: Speaker should shut the door. IMP∼MODAL
#that: The door is shut. RESULT STATE
(327) is a quotational embedded imperative, and (328) is a disquotational embedded im-
perative. In both cases, the Moore’s frame (but I don’t believe that) rules out interpreting the
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anaphor as referring to the proposition denoted by the matrix clause. This renders both
(327) & (328) infelicitous, as there are no other available propositional discourse referents.
Anaphora is not licensed to either the imperative clause, nor to the result state.
In §3.3.3, we also contrasted matrix imperatives with modals sentences, noting that
they have different anaphoric properties. The same demonstration can be made with
embedded imperatives, contrasting (328) with (329)
(329) Steve told me I should shut the door but I don’t believe that.
#that: Steve told me I should shut the door. MATRIX CLAUSE
Xthat: Speaker should shut the door. EMBEDDED MODAL CLAUSE
#that: The door is shut. RESULT STATE
The embedded modal declarative in (329) allows for felicitous anaphoric reference to the
embedded modal proposition, while embedded imperatives do not.
A summary of the observations made about multiclausal constructions in this section
is presented in Table 3.
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Table 3: Multiclausal constructions
Construction
Introduce
Propositional
Discourse
Referent?
Non-finite clauses Raising Subject raising yes (232)
Object raising some (238b)
Control Subject control some (244)
Object control no (249)
Likely constructions yes (255)
Tough constructions no (260)
Finite clauses Factives yes (264)
Non-factives yes (269)
Slifted clauses yes (275)
Slifting parentheticals no (276b)
Relative clauses Restrictive limited (282)
Non-restrictive yes (286)
Subject clauses that-clauses yes (289)
for-clauses no (295)
Conditionals Antecedents limited (305)
Consequents limited (309)
Sentential adverbs only Prejacent no (312b)
Exhaustive yes (312a)
even Prejacent yes (316a)
Scalar no (316b)
Existence no (316c)
Embedded interrogatives Polar if -clause no (319)
whether-clause no (321)
wh- no (323)
Alternative no (326)
Embedded imperatives no (328)
3.5 Multisentential constructions
In this section, we’ll look at constructions which combine multiple independent sen-
tences. In particular, we’ll be looking at conjunction and disjunction.
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3.5.1 Conjunction
A conjunction of two declarative sentences (which denote the propositions p and q)
could give rise to as many as three propositional discourse referents: one for p, one for q,
and one for p ∧ q.
Anaphoric reference to the proposition associated with the matrix conjunction is felic-
itous:
(330) A water main burst and they closed off the highway. The announcer said that on
the radio.
The radio announcer is understood to have reported on both the mater main and the
highway, so the anaphor that must refer to a discourse referent associated with the ma-
trix conjunction. This is an unsurprising result, given the behavior of declarative matrix
clauses we have observed thus far.
Anaphoric reference is also available to the right conjunct. The conjunction in (331) is
a variant of an example from Asher & Vieu 2005 attributed to Caroline Heycock:
(331) John fell, and it was Christina who pushed him. He didn’t know that, though.
In this discourse, the natural interpretation is for John (the referent picked out by he) not
to know that it was Christina who pushed him. He presumably knows that he fell, but
not who is responsible. Now, the nature of conjunction is such that because John doesn’t
know [Christina pushed him], he also doesn’t know [he fell and Christina pushed him].
That said, speakers have the strong judgment that in (331) what John didn’t know is the
proposition denoted by the right conjunct, not that of the matrix conjunction.
We can see the same thing in (332), where the matrix conjunction isn’t a plausible
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alternative:
(332) [At a magic show, audience members are asked to secretly pick cards from a deck.
After picking her card, Nancy whispers her choice to Jonathan, and then returns
to her seat without talking to anyone else. Before the magician begins, Jonathan
whispers to Sam:]
The trick is about to begin, and Nancy has the three of hearts. She told me that
in confidence, though, so keep it to yourself!
The context of (332) is such that we know Nancy to have told Jonathan only the content of
the right conjunct, and not the matrix conjunction. In addition, the information conveyed
by the left conjunct is more or less public, is not information that Nancy would have told
in confidence, and also is temporal information which Nancy might not have had access
to at the time of her utterance.57 Instead, we understand the anaphor that to pick out
the proposition denoted by the right conjunct: ‘Nancy has the three of hearts’. The right
conjunct, then, has an associated propositional discourse referent which is available for
subsequent anaphoric reference.
57She could perhaps have said something like When the magician takes out a handkerchief, the trick is about
to begin, but this is not information an audience member is likely to have; more importantly, it is not under-
stood to be part of the antecedent of that.
160
The same is not true for the left conjunct, however:
(333) [At a magic show, audience members are asked to secretly pick cards from a deck.
After picking her card, Nancy whispers her choice to Jonathan, and then returns
to her seat without talking to anyone else. Before the magician begins, Jonathan
whispers to Sam:]
?? Nancy has the three of hearts, and the trick is about to begin. She told me that
in confidence, though, so keep it to yourself!
Speakers judge the discourse in the context of (333) to be degraded, or to mean that Nancy
must have told Jonathan not only about her card but also about the timing of the trick
(which has its own oddities, as discussed above). That is to say, either the discourse is
infelicitous, or the anaphor is understood as referring to the matrix conjunction. (This
depends, in part, on whether speakers are willing to ‘enrich’ the context given, adding to
what Nancy told Jonathan beyond what was stipulated.) Even though the scenario biases
a reading where the anaphor should refer to just the left conjunct content, it cannot be fe-
licitously interpreted that way. The left conjunct is not available for subsequent anaphoric
reference beyond the scope of the conjunction.
Anaphoric reference to the left conjunct is available from within the right conjunct,
however:
(334) Steve got an A on the exam, and he told his mom
{that
so
as much
}
.
(335) Joyce won the lottery, but she couldn’t believe
{that
it
}
We can understand the unavailability of anaphoric reference to the left conjunct after
the conjunction is completed by thinking about the right frontier (Polanyi 1988, e.g., as
formalized in Lascarides & Asher 2008). If syntactic conjunction via and or but requires
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a discourse coordination relation between the two conjuncts (Asher & Vieu 2005), then
conjunction always advances the right frontier. In doing so, discourse referents not in the
right frontier (including, here, non-rightmost discourse units in coordination relations)
become no longer available for anaphoric reference (see Lascarides & Asher 2008). Before
the right conjunct has been computed, though, the left conjunct is still part of the right
frontier, and so remains available for anaphoric reference.
All three propositions associated with a sentence conjunction are available for
anaphoric reference, but to differing extents. The left conjunct is quickly subject to exclu-
sion from the right frontier, and so is only available for anaphoric reference from within
the right conjunct. The right conjunct, however, remains available for anaphoric reference
from subsequent sentences, as does the matrix conditional proposition.
3.5.2 Disjunction
Disjunction, just like conjunction, can be thought of as connecting two propositions
and, in doing so, creating a third. And, just like conjunction, all three of these propositions
have associated discourse referents which are available for anaphoric reference.
The matrix disjunctive proposition is available for subsequent anaphoric reference, as
in (336).
(336) [Nancy’s birthday is approaching.]
Jonathan will buy Nancy flowers or he’ll buy chocolates. She doesn’t know that,
though.
The right disjunct is available as well:
(337) Steve cheated on the test, or he got really lucky. He told the whole class that, but I
don’t quite believe him.
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(338) Steve got really lucky on the test or he cheated. His mother hopes that’s not true.
For the left disjunct, reference is possible from within the right disjunct, as in (339),
but is not available from subsequent sentences, as in (340)–(341).
(339) Either Joyce won the lottery, or she wants everyone to believe
{that
so
as much
}
.
(340) # Steve cheated on the test or he studied really hard, but his teacher hopes that’s
not true.
(341) # Steve studied really hard for the test or he cheated, and his teacher hopes that’s
true.
(339) suggests that Joyce has been spending extravagantly: she either won the lottery, or
wants people to believe that she won the lottery. The anaphor can felicitously refer to the
left disjunct. In (340), though, the left disjunct is not an available antecedent, even though
it alone would make sense as a thing Steve’s teacher might not want to be the case. The
only reading available for (340) is that his teacher hopes he didn’t study, which is a bizarre
thing for a teacher to want, and so the discourse is infelicitous. The same is true for (341),
which further demonstrates that the left disjunct is not available for anaphoric reference
from subsequent sentences.
A summary of the observations made about multiclausal constructions in this section
is presented in Table 4.
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Table 4: Multisentential constructions
Construction
Introduce
Propositional
Discourse
Referent?
Conjunction Matrix clause yes (330)
Left conjunct internally (334)
Right conjunct yes (332)
Disjunction Matrix clause yes (336)
Left disjunct internally (339)
Right disjunct yes (337)
3.6 Generalization and discussion
In the previous four sections, we have examined the availability of propositional
anaphoric reference to a variety of constructions. A summary of all of the data we have
observed is collected in Table 5.
Among the data most surprising are those regarding small clauses, whose anaphoric
availability appears to depend upon the verb under which a small clause is embedded.
Epistemic embedding verbs like consider make the proposition associated with the small
available for anaphoric reference from subsequent clauses, but other embedding verbs do
not. And we observed parallel behavior for adverbials: while it is surprising that any ad-
verbials should introduce a propositional discourse referent, we saw that only epistemic
adverbials do. This pattern continued—perhaps no longer surprising, but certainly still
remarkable—with modal verbs as well, where epistemic modal verbs make their preja-
cent propositions available for subsequent anaphoric reference but root modals do not.
Also notable were the data on interrogatives: only matrix polar interrogatives introduce
a propositional discourse referent, but no wh- or alternative interrogatives do, nor do em-
bedded polar interrogatives (with either if- or whether- complementizers).
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Table 5: The anaphoric availability of a variety of constructions
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Construction
Introduce
Propositional
Discourse
Referent?
Subclausal Names no (131)
Definites no (132)
Possessives no (133)
Intersective adjectives no (136)
Verbs with lexical presuppositions no (139)
Small clauses Secondary Predication no (141)
Causative no (144)
Resultative no (148)
Epistemic yes (150)
Adverbials Modifying DP some (160)
Modifying VP some (167)
Declarative
Matrix Active yes (169)
Passive yes (170)
Prejacent of Negation Sentential yes (172)
Constituent no (173)
Modals Epistemic yes (181)
Deontic no (183)
Ability no (189)
Teleological no (194)
Bouletic no (195)
Metaphysical no (198)
Interrogative Polar yes (202)
wh- no (209)
Alternative Nominal no (218)
Sentential no (219)
Imperative no (222)
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Table 5, continued
Construction
Introduce
Propositional
Discourse
Referent?
Non-finite clauses Raising Subject raising yes (232)
Object raising some (238b)
Control Subject control some (244)
Object control no (249)
Likely constructions yes (255)
Tough constructions no (260)
Finite clauses Factives yes (264)
Non-factives yes (269)
Slifted clauses yes (275)
Slifting parentheticals no (276b)
Relative clauses Restrictive limited (282)
Non-restrictive yes (286)
Subject clauses that-clauses yes (289)
for-clauses no (295)
Conditionals Antecedents limited (305)
Consequents limited (309)
Sentential adverbs only Prejacent no (312b)
Exhaustive yes (312a)
even Prejacent yes (316a)
Scalar no (316b)
Existence no (316c)
Embedded interrogatives Polar if -clause no (319)
whether-clause no (321)
wh- no (323)
Alternative no (326)
Embedded imperatives no (328)
Conjunction Matrix clause yes (330)
Left conjunct internally (334)
Right conjunct yes (332)
Disjunction Matrix clause yes (336)
Left disjunct internally (339)
Right disjunct yes (337)
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Also surprising were the data surrounding the raising and control constructions which
behaved far less uniformly than one might have anticipated. On a similar note, one might
have expected tough constructions and likely constructions to behave similarly, and the
same for sentential adverbs like only and even; but these, too, displayed unexpected differ-
ences. In this section, I will address these various behaviors, and present a generalization
that captures these varied data. But first, it is worth returning to the proposal put forward
in Krifka 2013.
Krifka 2013 proposed that TP and any projections above it (e.g., NegP for sentential
negation) below the level of the speech act introduce a propositional discourse referent for
the proposition denoted by that phrase. Throughout this chapter, we have found that this
proposal has broad coverage, and accounts for the felicity of anaphoric reference to the
prejacent of epistemic modals, likely constructions, factive and non-factive finite clausal
complements, relative clauses, conditionals, and the constituent ’juncts of conjunction
and disjunction. It also successfully predicts the infelicity of propositional anaphoric ref-
erence to a number of subclausal constructions which convey propositional content, as
well as to prejacents of root modals,wh- questions, and possibly imperatives.
There are a number of constructions explored here which constitute challenges to the
Krifka 2013 proposal, however. Epistemic small clause embedding verbs and epistemic
adverbs do not include TPs, but make propositions available for anaphoric reference. And
even noting the structural height distinction between epistemic and root modals (Cinque
1999; Hacquard 2011) does not immediately explain this behavior, unless all verbs and
adverbs with epistemic flavor move up to an epistemic functional projection in the syn-
tax. In addition, Krifka’s (2013) proposal predicts that all embedded clauses in raising
and control constructions—which include at least TPs, if not entire CPs—should be avail-
able for propositional anaphoric reference; many, however, are not. There are a number
of both raising and control verbs which do allow for anaphoric reference to the propo-
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sitions associated with their embedded clauses, but also a number of both raising and
control verbs which do not. That neither the raising verbs nor the control verbs behave
uniformly as distinct classes is a significant challenge to any attempt to make a general-
ization about what introduces propositional discourse referents along syntactic lines: we
cannot explain the introduction of propositional discourse referents simply by making
reference to a syntactic category, nor to a particular type of movement or extraction. Syn-
tactic category alone is not sufficient, because while some raising/control structures are
thought to include CP and others only TP, the split we have observed does not fall along
those same lines. And we observed nonuniform behavior even within single classes of
verbs (like object raising/ECM verbs), where those classes are defined by their structural
composition and the movement which derives them, so that level of syntactic description
is inadequate to capture the anaphoric data we’re interested in here. Let us explore this
difficulty about raising and control verbs, which will motivate the proposal we will ad-
vance here, before returning to the list of data which constitute counterexamples to the
Krifka 2013 proposal.
There are some verbs which can act as either raising or control verbs, depending on
their context. For example, both promise and threaten are normally control verbs, but they
can also be found with expletive subjects when used non-volitionally (Davies & Dubinsky
2004).
(342) a. There promises to be trouble at the concert.
b. It promises to be a beautiful day. (Davies & Dubinsky 2004: (33))
(343) a. There threatens to be a revolution in San Marino.
b. It threatens to be a hard winter. (Davies & Dubinsky 2004: (34))
And this flexibility means that we can see a single verb in constructions that both do
and do not license propositional anaphora. Consider promise used in its normal volitional
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sense, as in (344), and in its non-volitional sense akin to (342), in (345). (I use my own ex-
amples, rather than those of Davies & Dubinsky 2004, to control for the eventive/stative
distinction.)
(344) Nancy promises to be at the party. (She wants to support me.) RAISING
(345) Nancy promises to be a great violinist one day. (She has the talent.) CONTROL
(344) is a report about Nancy’s commitment, and (345) is an assertion of the speaker’s
estimation of Nancy’s future. And these two uses of promise have different anaphoric
effects:
(346) # Nancy promises to be at the party, but Doug doubts that. (He thinks she’ll stay
at home.) CONTROL
(347) Nancy promises to be a great violinist one day, but Doug doubts that. (He thinks
she doesn’t have the nerve for it.) CONTROL
The follow-ups in both (346) and (347) bias the interpretation of their respective embed-
ded clause propositions as the antecedent of that. In (346), this renders the sentence in-
felicitous: there is no discourse referent available for the proposition associated with the
embedded clause. (Doubting the existence of the promise is also bizarre without further
context, but that reading is incompatible with the follow-up anyways.) In the felicitious
(347), Doug simply disagrees with the speaker about the truth of the embedded clause
proposition, ‘Nancy will be a great violinist one day’. The embedded clause of (347) does
have an associated propositional discourse referent.
The different uses of a verb like promise has been argued to be due to lexical ambi-
guity between a raising and control version of the verb (Perlmutter 1970). It is worth
noting, though, that the same is not the case for all control verbs which allow for felici-
tous anaphoric reference to their embedded clause propositions.
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(348) The shit promises to hit the fan. RAISING
(349) * The shit claims to hit the fan. CONTROL
We cannot defend the hypothesis that the distinction between those verbs which allow
for propositional anaphora and those that do not is along the lines of raising vs. control.
The argument that promise is lexically ambiguous between raising and control vari-
ants, then, is not enough to explain the anaphoric effect of this switch, as there is no
simple raising/control split which explains the availability of a propositional discourse
referent. If all raising verbs made a propositional discourse referent available for their
embedded clause, and no control verbs did, then lexical ambiguity would be a sufficient
explanation. As it is, though, we have evidence of raising verbs which do not allow for
felicitous anaphoric reference to an embedded clause proposition, as in (240), as well as
evidence of control verbs which do allow for such felicitous propositional anaphoric ref-
erence, as in (244).
Instead, to explain this differing behavior, we must make use of the semantic dis-
tinction between the two uses of promise above. The volitional/control use in (344)
describes an action (even if a stative one) that Nancy intends to take, where the non-
volitional/raising use in (345) describes a proposition that the speaker expects will ob-
tain. The important difference here is not one of raising or control, but of the argument
type that promise takes. One sense of promise describes (and so, takes as its argument)
an event, and the other describes (and so takes) a proposition. The one that composes
with a proposition introduces a discourse referent for it, and the one that composes with
an event has no proposition to be introducing a discourse referent for. (Such a proposi-
tion can be composed for it, using the event and the controlling subject, but that isn’t the
same as having an already-complete proposition fed as its argument.) This is still an ex-
planation by means of ambiguity, but not simply along the lines of raising vs. control.
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The important difference between these two uses of promise is not whether they require
a raising structure as opposed to a control structure, but whether they combine with an
event-denoting complement or a proposition-denoting complement.
This is the generalization that the data illustrated in this chapter suggest: only op-
erators which take propositions as arguments introduce discourse referents for those
propositions. When I say “operators”, this includes not only negation and modals, but
also verbs (like expect), adjectives (like likely), and sentential mood.58 Most such oper-
ators are unary, like the examples listed above, but binary operators like conjunction,
disjunction, and implication are also included under this generalization. Paying atten-
tion to the semantic type of the argument allows us to distinguish between, for instance,
sentential moods which do and do not introduce propositional discourse referents. The
declarative mood operator takes a proposition as its argument, as does the matrix polar
interrogative mood operator, and so each introduce a discourse referent for its argument
proposition. But the imperative mood and wh- and alternative interrogative mood opera-
tors do not take propositional arguments; they instead take properties as arguments, and
so do not have an associated propositional argument to introduce a discourse referent for.
This generalization also captures the behavior of modal auxiliary verbs: epistemic modal
auxiliaries encode an operator which operates on propositions, and so they have an as-
sociated propositional discourse referent; meanwhile root modal auxiliaries do not take
propositional arguments, but instead relate individuals and properties (Brennan 1993),
and so do not have a propositional argument and thus do not introduce a propositional
discourse referent.
This proposal differs from that of Krifka 2013 in two important ways. First, this gener-
alization relies not on syntactic category, but on semantic type. The Krifka 2013 proposal
locates the introduction of propositional discourse referents in the Tense Phrase, TP be-
58Using the term operator in this way is not novel; see for example Yalcin 2007.
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ing a syntactic category, where here what I propose makes reference the semantic type:
whether a clause denotes a proposition (as opposed to an individual or property, for ex-
ample). This generalization is still syntactic in that it is sensitive to combinatorics—which
things combine with which things—but it requires a level of description beyond the sorts
of categorizations which are typical in the syntactic literature: syntactic category, and
movement/extraction type. As discussed above with raising and control verbs, neither
syntactic category nor movement type are sufficient to explain the data observed in this
chapter. The data presented here might be taken as a reason to reevaluate current syntac-
tic theories59 or to press for more fine-grained syntactic descriptions which could account
for these data. Ultimately, if we want our syntax and semantics to operate hand-in-hand,
we might hope for such a fine-grained syntactic description. As things stand, however,
the standard tools of modern syntax do not provide the means to describe the pattern we
have observed here. Instead, we must make reference to semantic types, to the combina-
torics of operators and their arguments.
Second, though, this proposal differs from that of Krifka 2013 in terms of what is do-
ing the introducing. On Krifka’s (2013) account, a TP introduces a discourse referent for
itself, NegP introduces a discourse referent for itself, and so forth. On the account being
advanced here, an operator introduces a discourse referent for the proposition it takes
as an argument. In a declarative sentence, the declarative mood operator introduces the
discourse referent for the matrix clause (see Bittner 2009, 2011). If a sentence includes
sentential negation, the negation operator introduces a discourse referent for its preja-
cent, and similarly for modals. This allows us to locate the different behavior in (the
operator encoded in) a particular small clause embedding verb, for instance, as opposed
to attributing the (non-)introduction of a discourse referent to the small clause itself. This
59For just one example, the data observed here might be used to argue that epistemic small clauses are
covert infinitives, unlike other small clauses; see discussion of (154) and (155). The data here might also be
brought to bear when considering analyses of adverbials, modals, raising/control verbs, sentential adverbs,
interrogatives, and more.
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is necessary, as a single small clause might or might not have an associated propositional
discourse referent depending on the verb which embeds it, as we saw in (152) & (153). It
is also necessary to explain why a matrix polar interrogative introduces a propositional
discourse referent for the partitioning proposition (as in (202)) while an embedded polar
interrogative does not (as in 321). On Krifka’s (2013) account, if a particular structure
(say, a small clause or a polar interrogative) introduces a propositional discourse referent
in one context, then it should in every context; the introduction of discourse referents in
Krifka 2013 is not sensitive to context. The current proposal can make more fine-grained
distinctions by noting the different operators which embed structures (and by paying at-
tention to the semantic types denoted by those structures).
Let us now return to the data presented in this chapter which present a challenge to
Krifka 2013, to see how the current approach can handle it. The Krifka 2013 proposal pre-
dicts that tough constructions, which embed CP complements, should allow for felicitous
propositional anaphora to those complements; we observed above that they in fact do not
allow for such felicitous anaphoric reference. We can explain this on the current account
by noting that the entities that tough operates over are an individual and a property (e.g.,
Dustin and reading Moby Dick), not propositions. With no proposition as an argument,
no propositional discourse referent is introduced on this account (even if the complement
is syntactically a CP).
The proposal in Krifka 2013 asserts that sentential alternative questions like (219) and
(221) make discourse referents available for the propositions denoted by each alterna-
tive; we observed that this is not the case. On the current approach, we can explain this
behavior as a result of the semantic types of these alternatives. Abstracting away from
intonation for the moment, neither Would you like coffee or you like coffee denote proposi-
tions, so an alternative question operator would not introduce a propositional discourse
referent.
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The proposal in Krifka 2013 also predicts that embedded polar interrogatives, like
their matrix cousins, should allow for anaphoric reference to the proposition which par-
titions the answer space. As illustrated in (321), this is not the case: the partitioning
proposition of an embedded polar interrogative is not available for anaphoric reference.
We can explain this behavior on the current proposal as a difference between the matrix
polar interrogative mood as compared to the polar interrogative embedders whether and
if. This explains the presence of “only” in our generalization: whether does take a propo-
sitional argument (to return a set of propositions), but it doesn’t introduce a discourse
referent for that proposition.
In summary, the data presented here suggest that the explanation of what introduces
propositional discourse referents must be semantic, not purely syntactic. A purely syn-
tactic explanation does not have the tools to distinguish among different small clause em-
bedding verbs, or different control verbs, to the extent required by the facts surrounding
propositional anaphora. Even noticing the epistemic nature of the verbs and adjectives
which give rise to propositional discourse referents, against the background of a theory
which places epistemic modals higher than TP (and root modals below TP), is not suf-
ficient to explain the behavior observed here. A syntactic along the lines of Krifka 2013
account would require all adverbs, adjectives, and even verbs with epistemic modal fla-
vor to raise above TP. And, on top of that, further work would be required to suppress
the introduction of propositional discourse referents in tough constructions and embed-
ded polar interrogatives. Instead, I propose a semantic generalization, one which locates
the introduction of propositional discourse referents not in the syntactic structures which
denote propositions, but in the semantic operators which take propositions as arguments.
The syntax of a structure influences the semantic composition of its parts, so we cannot
ignore the syntactic structure of a construction. And, indeed, the syntax can help to ex-
plain certain behavior: if the main clause of a slifting construction is the slifted clause,
with the slifting parenthetical in an adjunct (as in Grimshaw 2011), then that would allow
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our current generalization to apply to these constructions as well. So, syntactic analysis
is a part of the story, but syntax alone does not explain the data observed here.
This generalization about the behavior of propositional discourse referents is not a per-
fect parallel to Karttunen’s (1969) about individual discourse referents. Karttunen 1969
posits that individual discourse referents are introduced for noun phrases within a given
sentence, so long as “the proposition represented by the sentence is asserted, implied or
presupposed by the speaker to be true” (13). Discourse referents for propositions, as we
have seen, are not subject to this restriction. Propositional discourse referents are intro-
duced for the complement of non-factive verbs (as in (269)), which a speaker may, but
needn’t endorse; for the prejacent of an epistemic modal (as in (181)), which is not a com-
mitment of the speaker; and even for the prejacent of sentential negation (as in (172)), the
truth of which the speaker explicitly denies. The introduction of propositional discourse
referents is sensitive neither to the truth of a proposition nor to the speaker’s attitude
towards it.
And, just for completeness’s sake, this difference in sensitivity is not due to the dif-
ference in containment or ‘height’ between an individual mentioned within a proposition
and the proposition itself. That is to say, where the introduction of an discourse referent
for an individual mentioned in a proposition requires that proposition to be “asserted,
implied or presupposed by the speaker to be true” (Karttunen 1969: 13), the introduction
of a discourse referent for a proposition mentioned within a proposition does not require
that containing proposition to be similarly considered-as-if-true.
(350) It’s not true that Jonathan said Nancy was at the party. Steve said that. (But he’s
wrong. She stayed at home.)
We did not explore multiply-embedded cases above, but here we can see that the behav-
ior observed above extends to those cases as well. In (350), the anaphor that refers to the
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prejacent of the non-factive said, even though the said-proposition is itself the prejacent
of sentential negation. In contrast to the observed behavior of individual discourse refer-
ents, the proposition ‘Nancy was at the party’ gets a discourse referent even though the
proposition containing it is asserted to be false in this discourse. (And, with the paren-
thetical follow-up, we can see that it too can be considered false in the context, but still be
picked up felicitously by the anaphor that.)
This is a genuine difference between individual and propositional anaphora: individ-
ual anaphora requires an antecedent which is (introduced within a proposition which is
taken to be) true, but propositional anaphora does not require the antecedent be (con-
sidered as if) true. This may be due to a difference between the respective domains of
individuals and propositions. The domain of individuals in a discourse is limited to
the individuals we consider to ‘exist’. This includes fictional individuals (e.g., Sherlock
Holmes) and abstract concepts (e.g., the love of one’s country), but excludes individuals
we know not to exist even in that sense (e.g., the only child’s sister). We can always ex-
pand the domain of individuals in a discourse by naming a new individual, including
a new fictional one (e.g., the sister that the only child might have had), but the domain
itself does not include all possible individuals. Propositions, on the other hand, are sets of
possible worlds, where the universe of possible worlds includes all possible worlds. The
common ground contains those propositions which are considered true in a discourse,
and the context set contains those worlds which share the truths known about the actual
world (Stalnaker 1974, 1978), but the universe of possible worlds does not shrink to only
those worlds, rather it continues to include all possible worlds, even those already ruled
out from the context set. Propositions—sets of worlds—include worlds that are already
excluded from the context set.60 There is a sense, then, in which propositions include
60Some theories relativize assertion to the existing common ground, making asserted propositions sub-
sets of the common ground (e.g., AnderBois, Brasoveanu & Henderson 2010), but there are reasons to prefer
that newly asserted propositions not be restricted in this way (see Murray 2014 on evidentials and Snider
2015 on tautologies).
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things that don’t ‘exist’ (worlds that are known to be non-actual), while the domain of
individuals only includes those that ‘exist’. Or, put another way, there is a sense in which
all propositions ‘exist’—in that we can continue to make sets of worlds, even if those
worlds are known to be non-actual, as the universe of possible worlds is unchanged and
exhaustive—where not all individuals do. We track lists of individuals and propositions
that have been mentioned in a discourse, and so are available for anaphoric reference,
separately from their respective domains. But the nature of their domains might explain
why it is that only individuals mentioned in ‘true’ contexts get discourse referents, while
propositions are not subject to this restriction.
While ‘truth’ is one difference, the data discussed here also point to a similarity be-
tween individual and propositional anaphora: discourse referents are introduced only for
those entities which are represented formally by a sentence. (For propositional anaphora,
this means in the semantics, with a proposition taken as an argument of some operator.)
In the individual domain, this has been called the Formal Link Condition (Postal 1969;
Kadmon 1987; Heim 1990, a.o.), which requires that a pronoun have an overt NP an-
tecedent, and that this antecedent cannot be a sub-part of a word. This condition explains
the infelicity of anaphoric reference to individuals which are salient (but unmentioned)
in a discourse (as in (351b)), as well as to individuals whose existence is entailed but who
are not named explicitly (as in (352b) and (353b)).
(351) a. One of the ten balls is missing from the bag.
It’s under the couch.
b. # Nine of the ten balls are in the bag.
It’s under the couch. (Partee 1989)
(352) a. Fritz owns a dog and it bites him.
b. # Fritz is a dog-owner and it bites him. (cf. Evans 1977)
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(353) a. Followers of McCarthy are now puzzled by his intentions.
b. # McCarthyites are now puzzled by his intentions. (Postal 1969)
The formal link condition has been argued to be gradient, not categorical, for individual
anaphora in English, as sentences which ‘violate’ this condition are not judged to be uni-
formly bad (Anderson 1971; Patel-Grosz & Grosz 2010 a.o.). (Patel-Grosz & Grosz 2010
argues that German strong pronouns do observe a strict formal link condition, however.)
Propositional anaphora, similarly, requires a linguistic antecedent to be formally rep-
resented in the semantics. We have already observed that a proposition’s being conveyed
by a sentence is not sufficient for it to have an associated discourse referent: the relation-
ship presupposed by a possessive is not available for propositional anaphoric reference
(as in (133)), nor is the existence presupposition of a wh- question (as in (209)). And we
observed that the complement of the proposition which partitions a polar question is not
available for anaphoric reference, even though it is a possible answer to the question—
we can perhaps consider this to parallel Partee’s (351), in that complementation is not
sufficient to make a discourse referent available.
And, as in the individual domain, sentences which violate this restriction on propos-
tional anaphora seem to exist on a gradient scale, not a categorical one. Consider the sen-
tences in (354), all of which convey the proposition ‘Jonathan is Nancy’s secret admirer’
as new information, and as a commitment of the speaker.
(354) a. Jonathan, who is Nancy’s secret admirer, told her that at lunch today.
b. ? Jonathan, Nancy’s secret admirer, told her that at lunch today.
c. ?? Nancy’s secret admirer Jonathan told her that at lunch today.
The only difference among the sentences in (354) is how this proposition is conveyed: in
(354a), it is denoted by a relative clause appositive; in (354b), it is conveyed by a nominal
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appositive; and in (354c), it is conveyed by a prenominal adjective. Of these, only the
relative clause appositive in (354a) denotes a proposition, and thus conforms to the gen-
eralization proposed here. Both the nominal appositive and the adjective denote prop-
erties, and as such do not conform to our generalization. And, indeed, many speakers
find (354b) and (354c) degraded when compared to (354a), but on a gradient scale. Some
speakers report a binary distinction between (354a) and (354b,c), others a binary distinc-
tion between (354a,b) and (354c), and yet others the full three-way distinction. See Syrett
& Koev 2015 for experimental evidence on anaphoric reference to nominal and clausal
appositives.
And, to confuse matters further, some speakers report a difference between the triplet
in (354) and that of (355), while others report no difference. (I mark the same gradient of
acceptability with ‘?’s, but leave comparison between the triplets to the reader.)
(355) a. Jonathan, who is Nancy’s secret admirer, had lunch with her without ad-
mitting that to her.
b. ? Jonathan, Nancy’s secret admirer, had lunch with her without admitting
that to her.
c. ?? Nancy’s secret admirer Jonathan had lunch with her without admitting that
to her.
In (355), each sentence now has an additional proposition, ‘Jonathan had lunch with
Nancy’, which competes as a potential antecedent. The subordinate clause which contains
the anaphor that biases interpretation away from this competing proposition—it is odd for
Nancy not to know who she had lunch with—but it remains as a competitor nonetheless.
For some speakers, this competing proposition is the only available antecedent for the
(c) (and possible (b)) variant(s), as the admirer proposition is wholly unavailable, which
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renders the sentence bizarre. 61
Both propositional and individual anaphora, then, share a preference for an an-
tecedent which is overtly represented in the prior discourse. In discussions of the formal
link condition on individual anaphora, this representation is syntactic; for propositional
anaphora, as discussed here, the representation that matters is semantic, not syntactic.
And, in both cases, this preference appears to be just that, a preference, as sentences which
do not have this sort of antecedent vary in markedness, which may vary by construction
and by speaker.
There is one other interesting point in the data described above which merits further
discussion, namely the behavior of only and even. Considering how similarly only and
even are thought to behave, it is perhaps surprising that they have different patterns of
anaphoric availability. As demonstrated in §3.4.8, the prejacent proposition of only is not
available for anaphoric reference, but the prejacent proposition of even is available. And
the exclusive proposition of an only sentence is available for anaphoric reference, while
the scalar proposition of an even sentence is not—even though we would associate both of
these propositions with the matrix clause of each type of sentence. This presents a puzzle
of sorts: why should these similar sentence adverbs behave differently?
61Or, consider this alternative example:
(xii) a. Doug McMillon, who is the CEO of Walmart, shopped at the store on Wednesday without
telling the cashier that.
b. ? Doug McMillon, the CEO of Walmart, shopped at the store on Wednesday without telling the
cashier that.
c. ?? Walmart CEO Doug McMillon shopped at the store on Wednesday without telling the cashier
that.
This one, too has the matrix proposition competing but contextually dispreferred, as the cashier would
presumably know he shopped there, but might not know he was the CEO.
And, one final alternative example:
(xiii) a. Kevin Jones, who is an Olympic gold medalist, wrote that on his OK Cupid profile, but nobody
believes it.
b. ? Kevin Jones, an Olympic gold medalist, wrote that on his OK Cupid profile, but nobody be-
lieves it.
c. ?? Olympic gold medalist Kevin Jones wrote that on his OK Cupid profile, but nobody believes
it.
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Given our analysis thus far, the discourse referent for the matrix clause proposition is
introduced by the declarative mood. For the scalar proposition of even, which is arguably
the main point of a sentence with even, to not have an associated discourse referent means
it must somehow be beyond the reach of the declarative mood. Structurally speaking, this
is clearly not the case: we wouldn’t want to analyze even as taking wider scope than the
declarative mood operator. Instead, we might consider the scalar proposition of even not
to outscope the declarative operator, but to escape its scope. If the scalar meaning con-
tributed by even is use conditional (in the sense of Gutzmann 2013, 2015), as opposed to
truth conditional, then that would explain why it escapes the discourse referent introduc-
ing scope of the declarative operator.
This proposal is perhaps surprising, but it is not absurd. It would capture the intuition
of Karttunen & Peters (1979) that the scalar meaning is secondary to the prejacent, as well
as the intuition of Herburger (2016) (which she later discards) that the scalar meaning is
not truth conditional. Potts 2007 describes expressive meaning as non-propositional, but
Gutzmann 2013, 2015 describes for instance German modal particles and Japanese ques-
tion particles, which modify propositional content, as expressive (= use conditional). And
the scalar meaning contributed by even, though it has been discussed in the literature as a
proposition, is doing just that: modifying a proposition. It takes the prejacent proposition
and conveys the speaker’s attitude toward it, namely one of surprise. Like other expres-
sive content, the scalar meaning of even when embedded in a report can describe either
the speaker’s attitude or the matrix subject’s, as in (356).
(356) Barb said even Steve might pass the exam.
OK: Barb thinks Steve was unlikely to pass.
OK: Speaker thinks Steve was unlikely to pass.
And, like other expressive content, the scalar meaning of even cannot be targeted by nega-
tion, as we can see in (357).
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(357) Not even Nancy could pass this exam.
= Even Nancy could not pass this exam.
= Nancy could not pass this exam (which is surprising)
6= Nancy is not among those least likely to pass this exam.
And, like other expressive content, it doesn’t form part of the content of a question.
(358) Did even Nancy pass the exam?
a. Yes, but she’s one of the smartest in the class, so it wasn’t surprising.
b. # No, but she did pass.
Gutzmann 2013 also lists direct dissent as a test for use conditional meaning, but
that makes use of response particles like no which are themselves anaphoric (Krifka
2013; Roelofsen & Farkas 2015), and we have already observed that the scalar mean-
ing of even is not available for anaphoric reference. (This same point may render the
question-answering test similarly redundant, depending on how anaphoric one’s theory
of question-answer congruence is.)
Only does not show the same behavior for these various tests. So we have reason,
perhaps, to consider the scalar meaning of even as inherently different from the exhaus-
tive meaning of only: the former is use conditional, the latter truth conditional. This,
in turn, has consequences for their anaphoric availability. And, under the analysis be-
ing developed here, these facts are not coincidental. A propositional discourse referent
is introduced for a proposition by an operator that takes it as an argument; here, we’re
focusing in particular on the declarative mood operator. The exhaustive meaning contri-
bution of only is truth conditional, and so is taken as an argument by the declarative mood
operator, and so it gets an associated discourse referent. The scalar meaning contribution
of even, however, is use conditional, and use conditional meanings are not computed in
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the same way as truth conditional meanings. They escape targeting by operators, as we
saw with negation above. So the scalar meaning of even is not taken as an argument of the
declarative mood operator, and thus has no associated propositional discourse referent.
The present analysis, then, can neatly account for this asymmetry between only and
even. No extra operators or movements are required, and no discourse referents are
‘erased’. Rather, if we take the use conditional nature of the scalar meaning of even into
account, this behavior falls out naturally from our theory.
Only, meanwhile, makes a discourse referent available for the matrix clause, and not
for the prejacent proposition. Under the current proposal, the only way for this to obtain
is for only to take something other than a proposition as its argument: the discourse ref-
erent for the exclusive implication is introduced by the declarative mood operator, and
only must contribute this meaning (outputting a proposition) without taking a proposi-
tion as its argument. This would require us to insist on a modification to chapter 3 of
Rooth 1985, which moves from an analysis wherein only takes an individual and a prop-
erty to one where the basic meaning of only takes a proposition as its argument. A move
(back) towards only composing first with an individual has been suggested more recently,
however (Zimmermann 2017). While it is indeed standard in the literature for only to
take a propositional argument (e.g., see Coppock & Beaver 2013 and discussion therein),
it has been suggested that understanding only as quantifying over propositions cannot in
all cases capture the same desired meanings as quantification over individuals (Zimmer-
mann 2017). The propositional anaphora data presented here may be yet another push in
this direction, though it would require reevaluation of a good deal of the current literature
on only.
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CHAPTER 4
MODELING PROPOSITIONAL ANAPHORA
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we examined a variety of constructions to see when proposi-
tional discourse referents are introduced. We observed that propositional discourse ref-
erents are introduced for subclausal constructions (including epistemic small clauses and
epistemic adverbials), for monoclausal constructions (including matrix declaratives, and
the prejacents of sentential negation and of epistemic modals), for multiclausal construc-
tions (including some raising and control constructions, embedded finite clauses, and
relative clauses), and for multisentential constructions (like conjunction and disjunction).
Ultimately, the generalization was that operators which take propositional arguments in-
troduce discourse referents for those arguments.
In this chapter, we explore how to formally model this behavior. Modeling a phe-
nomenon formally requires us to be precise about the mechanisms that drive its behavior
and the assumptions that underlie our work. Formal models also make concrete pre-
dictions which can then be confirmed or falsified, advancing our understanding of the
topic at hand. Propositional anaphora is no different: a formal model will help clarify our
understanding of how propositional anaphora works.
First, I introduce the landscape of formal systems in the literature which might bear
on this project. §4.2 reviews existing formalisms that model anaphora, and §4.3 reviews
existing formalisms which use propositional variables. For each formal system, I briefly
discuss what changes to the system (if any) would be necessary for it to be able to handle
propositional anaphora and the behavior observed in Chapter 3. In §4.4, taking inspi-
ration from the various systems discussed, I sketch out a new formalism to model the
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generalization proposed in the previous chapter.
4.2 Background on modeling anaphora
In this section, we’ll look at some of the ways in which anaphora has been mod-
eled formally. In particular, we will consider Dynamic Predicate Logic (Groenendijk &
Stokhof 1991, §4.2.1), Discourse Representation Theory (Asher 1993, §4.2.2), two dynamic
modal predicate logics (van Eijck & Cepparello 1994, §4.2.4; Groenendijk et al. 1995b, 1996,
§4.2.5), Predicate Logic with Anaphora (Dekker 1994, §4.2.3), and Update with Centering
(Bittner 2009, §4.2.6).
4.2.1 Dynamic Predicate Logic (Groenendijk & Stokhof 1991)
In a standard static first-order predicate logic (PL), anaphors are variables. Sentences
are interpreted with respect to both a model, which contains the entities and predicates
relevant for interpretation, and an assignment function, which assigns variables to entities.
For example, a sentence like (359a) is interpreted as in (359b), relative to a modelM and
an assignment function g.
(359) a. She napped.
b. Jnapped(x)KM,g
This sentence will be true if and only if the individual that g maps to x did in fact nap in
the model. Given a model, then, we can consider a sentence to denote the set of assign-
ment functions that verify it.
Dynamic Predicate Logic (DPL; Groenendijk & Stokhof 1991) was created to account
for cross-sentential anaphora and donkey-sentences, and—as anaphors are considered to
be (syntactically free) variables—the binding of variables. In DPL, a sentence denotes not
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a set of assignment functions but a relation between sets of assignment functions, repre-
sented as a set of ordered pairs of assignment functions: input/output pairs of assignment
functions. In this system, formulas with the existential quantifier ∃x change the variable
assignment for x in the output: they change the assignment function in terms fo what
it assigns x to. Formulas without the existential quantifier, including atomic formulas,
are tests on input/output pairs: they don’t change variable assignment in any way, but
they ensure that the assignment pair verifies the formula (just as in static PL). One other
key change in DPL is that the variable binding of ∃x can continue indefinitely rightward,
including across sentence boundaries, unless it is closed by a closure operator. Thus, the
sentences in (360a) and (361a) are translated into DPL as in (360b) and (361b), respectively,
and the discourse in (362a) is translated into DPL as in (362b).
(360) a. A man walks in the park.
b. ∃x[man(x)∧walk in the park(x)]
(361) a. He whistles.
b. whistle(x)
(362) a. A man walks in the park. He whistles.
b. ∃x[man(x)∧walk in the park(x)]∧whistle(x) (Groenendijk & Stokhof 1991)
Even though the final x in (362b) is not contained within the brackets, it is still dynami-
cally bound by the existential quantifier, so we interpret he as referring to the man walking
in the park. DPL is thus compositional at the sentence level: the same DPL translation is
assigned to He whistles regardless of any prior discourse context. It is the dynamic bind-
ing of DPL that allows the pronoun to be interpreted in a way that is sensitive to context.
A fragment of DPL is presented in the Appendix in Figure 2.
In DPL, the meaning of a sentence is not just its truth conditions, but also its dynamic
potential: its (in)ability to bind variables in subsequent discourse.62 Truth conditions
are “an essential ingredient of meaning”, but “truth conditions do not exhaust meaning”
(Groenendijk & Stokhof 1991: 98). Even though the first sentences in (351a) and (351b)
62And presumably, to account for cataphoric pronouns, in preceding discourse as well.
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(repeated here) are truth-conditionally equivalent, they have different anaphoric effects:
only (351a) allows for felicitous follow-up using the anaphor it.
(351) a. One of the ten balls is missing from the bag. It’s under the couch.
b. # Nine of the ten balls are in the bag. It’s under the couch. (Partee 1989)
On a DPL account, only (351a) can ‘capture’ the variable denoted by it because (351a)—
but not (351b)—contains an existential quantifier. (351b) are truth conditionally equiva-
lent, but their dynamic potential is different. Groenendijk & Stokhof 1991 introduces the
notion of a satisfaction set, which reduces a DPL interpretation to a PL interpretation—
that is to say, that looks only at the truth conditions of a DPL formula, but ignores its
dynamic potential.
DPL as designed handles individual anaphora, but not propositional anaphora: Groe-
nendijk & Stokhof 1991 mentions neither propositions nor possible worlds. In order to
account for propositional anaphora within DPL, we would have to extend the vocabu-
lary of DPL to include propositional variables, and to allow for quantification over these
propositional variables. It will be the existential quantifier, in particular, which intro-
duces propositional discourse referents, in that it will allow for the dynamic binding of
the propositional variables denoted by anaphors like that. And, as what goes up must
come down, we will need the existential closure operator to work for propositional quan-
tification as well. This closure operator is necessary to model the behavior of propositions
which are available for anaphoric reference within one domain but not beyond it—or, in
Groenendijk & Stokhof 1991 terms, for structures which are internally dynamic (and allow
for variable binding) but externally static (and thus do not permit subsequent anaphoric
reference). For example, as we observed in §3.4.5, restrictive relative clauses introduce
propositions which are available for anaphoric reference from within the clause contain-
ing the relative clause, but are not available from subsequent clauses. In a propositional
188
extension to DPL, we would need a propositional existential closure operator to capture
this fact.
On this note, it is not obvious that the other logical operators (∧,∨,→) will have the
same dynamic properties for propositional variable binding as they do for individual
variables, as laid out in Groenendijk & Stokhof 1991. For example, concerning individual
anaphora, Groenendijk & Stokhof 1991 describes three versions of disjunction: in sec-
tion 2.5, one which is both internally and externally static; in section 4.3, one (“program
disjunction”) which is internally static but externally dynamic;63 and in section 5.1, one
which is both internally and externally dynamic. Groenendijk & Stokhof 1991 ultimately
leaves the question open, but notes that the first two can be derived from the third via
the closure operator. For propositional anaphora, however, the data observed in §3.5.2
suggest that disjunction must be internally dynamic but, at least for the left disjunct,
externally static. Anaphoric reference to the proposition denoted by the left disjunct is
felicitous for an anaphor in the right disjunct—internally dynamic—but infelicitous for
an anaphor in a subsequent clause—externally static.64 A propositional DPL, then, can-
not simply transpose the logical operators of standard DPL, expecting that the dynamic
behavior of propositions is the same as that of individuals.
Additionally, a propositional DPL would need some method for associating a proposi-
tional variable with its character, that is, with the formula which denotes it. For instance,
on the assumption that the sentence in (360a) denotes a proposition, and considering that
we may want to model reference to that proposition, we would need to associate a propo-
sitional variable (say, p) with the content of (360b). This might be done with an altered
version of = (which would also be needed to be added to the system), though then ques-
63That is to say, an individual variable in one disjunct cannot be bound by the other, but an existential
quantifier in either disjunct can bind a variable in a subsequent sentence.
64Anaphoric reference from a subsequent clause is still felicitous to the disjunction as a whole, but this is
a feature of the sentence as a whole (e.g., of the declarative mood, as discussed in the previous chapter), not
of disjunction. We are talking here about the dynamic properties that disjunction imparts for its arguments,
i.e., the disjuncts.
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tions arise about both the semantic type of a proposition, as well as whether the character
of a proposition can or should include the dynamic potential of a sentence (i.e., the ∃x[. . .]
frame).
We will return to some of these issues in §4.4.
4.2.2 Discourse Representation Theory (Asher 1993)
Asher 1993 explores anaphoric reference to abstract entities (including events, con-
cepts, facts, and propositions) in Discourse Representation Theory (DRT; Kamp 1981) and
an extension thereof, Segmented Discourse Representation Theory (SDRT). In DRT, sen-
tences are translated into discourse representation structures (DRSs), which consist of a
universe of discourse referents and a set of conditions. These are frequently presented in
boxes, as in (363b), with the list of discourse referents on the top line of the box, and the
conditions listed below.
(363) a. A boy kicked Fred. (Asher 1993: 66, (1))
b. (Asher 1993: 66, (K1))
Sequences of sentences are combined via DRS-merge, which unions both the universes
and conditions of the DRSs it combines, as in (364), which also illustrates how anaphora
is handled in DRT. In DRT, anaphors are translated as variables awaiting assignment, that
assignment proceeding after DRS construction, via anaphora resolution.
(364) a. A boy kicked Fred. He cried. (Asher 1993: 67, (3))
b. (Asher 1993: 67, (K3))
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The anaphor he in (364a) is translated as the variable z in (364b), which is not yet linked
to any antecedent; after anaphora resolution, the DRS for (364a) would be as in (364c).
(364) c. (Asher 1993: 68, (K′3))
In DRT, DRSs can be embedded inside one another (making one a subDRS of the
other), and translations of quantifiers, conditionals, and certain embedded clauses make
use of this feature. For example, the donkey sentence in (365a) is translated into the DRS
in (365b) prior to anaphora resolution.
(365) a. If a high school student owns a mustang, he works on it every day.
(Asher 1993: 76, (6))
b. (Asher 1993: 76, (K6))
The structural configuration of how subDRSs are embedded has consequences for
anaphora resolution in DRT, as only certain universes of discourse referents are acces-
sible from one (sub)DRS to another. For instance, discourse referents in the universe of
the antecedent of a conditional are available to its consequent—which allows z1 and z2
from (365b) to be identified with x and y, respectively—but the discourse referents intro-
duced in a consequent are not accessible from the conditional antecedent. A fragment of
DRT is presented in Figure 3.65
Asher 1993 introduces propositional variables for DRT when considering examples
with attitude predicates like believe that take a clausal complement. It is not the case, how-
65Some of the definitions given have unpaired brackets or other minor typographical peculiarities; these
are original in Asher 1993. The condition definitions of the vocabulary of Figure 3 are shortened to reduce
redundancy with the definition of terms above, but otherwise this fragment is copied verbatim, including
numbering.
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ever, that the clausal complement is simply assigned a propositional discourse referent,
which the attitude predicate takes as its argument. Instead, the predicate takes a sub-
DRS as its argument; a propositional discourse referent is only introduced if a subsequent
sentence contains a propositional anaphor. As Asher 1993 explains:
“[A] that clause introduces a DRS, not a discourse referent. Nevertheless, this
DRS has an ontological status. It may be anaphorically referred to”.
(Asher 1993: 172)
“A noteworthy feature of the partial DRS introduced by the complementizer
is that no discourse referents for the propositional argument are introduced. It
will turn out that proposition type discourse referents may occupy the same
argument position in the translation of an attitude verb as the subDRS con-
tributed by an embedded clause. But there is no need to introduce discourse
referents when translating the that clause. A subDRS as an argument to a
predicate of DRSs is rather like a constant or a complex term if it involves
discourse referents that are not declared in its universe; the model theoretic
interpretation of predicates of DRSs implies that a subDRS as an argument
denotes a designated object in the model. Since a subDRS is not a discourse
referent, it is not assigned a value under any embedding function. But by
construing them as constants for abstract objects, they denote the same ob-
ject in the model regardless of the DRS in which they were declared and what
embedding function was being considered. We don’t need to introduce dis-
course referents for that clauses for semantic reasons. Further, such discourse
referents are not needed to account for scope ambiguities or quantificational
dependencies; subDRSs do not have any. Finally, subDRSs are already recog-
nizable constituents of DRSs, should we wish to identify discourse referents
with them anaphorically. Thus, discourse referents introduced by that clauses
appear otiose.” (Asher 1993: 117)
If a subsequent clause includes an anaphor which refers back to the contents of a com-
plement clause, then a propositional discourse referent is introduced and associated with
(an equivalent to) that subDRS, as in (366b).
(366) a. John believes that [Mary is a genius]i. Fred is certain of iti.
(Asher 1993: 241, (23))
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b. (Asher 1993: 242)
The DRS in (366b) is the output of the DRS-merge of two DRSs, one for each sentence. The
first two conditions are associated with the DRS translation of the first sentence, and the
remaining three conditions are associated with the second, containing the anaphor. The
translation of John believes that Mary is a genius alone involves the introduction of discourse
referents for two individuals (x and u1) and for two states (s and s1) but no propositional
discourse referents (let alone the two that we might want, given the previous chapter). As
per the quote above, this translation gives us two boxes (one subDRS and one DRS) which
can be antecedents of propositional anaphora, so no propositional discourse referents are
introduced.
This association of (sub)DRSs with structures that can antecede propositional
anaphora is problematic, however. First, there are subDRSs for structures which aren’t
available for propositional anaphora, such as the restrictor of a quantifier.
(367) a. Most men lifted a piano. (Asher 1993: 92, (15.b))
b. (Asher 1993: 92)
Following Kamp & Reyle 1993, Asher 1993 translates the sentence in (367a) with the DRS
in (367b). This translation contains subDRSs for both the restrictor and the nuclear scope
of the quantifier, but we would not want to say that either men or lifted a piano introduce a
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proposition which is available for anaphoric reference. Making all subDRSs available an-
tecedents for anaphoric reference amounts to saying that (367a) makes three propositions
available for anaphoric reference.
Second, there are constructions which DRT does not translate with a subDRS but
which nevertheless are available for propositional anaphoric reference. For example, rel-
ative clauses are translated as predicative DRSs which are immediately (DRS-)merged
with the matrix DRS, thus moving the universe and conditions associated with the rela-
tive clause into the main ‘top-level’ DRS. The DRS given in (365b) above for If a high school
student own a Mustang, he works on it every day (365a) “is equivalent to the one for every
high school student who owns a Mustang works on it every day” (Asher 1993: 77). As we ob-
served in Chapter 3, relative clauses make propositions available for anaphoric reference;
see (282) & (286), repeated here.
(282) Every student who cheated on the test told their mother
{that
so
as much
}
.
(286) Steve, who cheated on the test, got an 100. But Nancy doesn’t know that, she thinks
he’s just really smart.
In DRT, however, relative clauses are not associated with either a propositional discourse
referent or a subDRS, and so cannot antecede propositional anaphors. DRT as presented
in Asher 1993 cannot account for the data observed here, then, nor is the one-to-one as-
sociation of (sub)DRSs with propositional antecedents sufficient—if this association were
to be maintained, one would need to recast the DRT treatment of at least quantifiers and
relative clauses.
Asher 1993 later introduces an extension of DRT, Segmented DRT, which models the
discourse and coherence relations that connect segments of discourse. Each discourse
segment (i.e., SDRS) is assigned a variable as a label—(e.g., k0–k3,k in (368b))— and those
194
variables are the arguments of relations.66 These variables are not discourse referents,
however: they are not part of the universe of accessible referents in any SDRS.
(368) a. Kathleen is five feet 5 inches tall. She has brown hair and green eyes. She
teaches at a university. (Asher 1993: 276, (7))
b. (Asher 1993: 278)
SDRT introduces explicit labels for every SDRS, but these are not equivalent to propo-
sitional discourse referent variables. Nevertheless, like DRSs, SDRSs themselves are avail-
able antecedents for propositional anaphora. Asher 1993 is careful to note that the rela-
tionship between a propositional anaphor and its SDRS antecedent is different than the
anaphoric relationship for other types:
“There is a question about the interpretation of proposition anaphora now that
we may characterize discourse referents using SDRSs. How are we to interpret
the link between a discourse referent introduced by a pronoun and an SDRS?
It is inadvisable to interpret that link as identity. For if we do, we may commit
ourselves to the view that all discourse structure is integral to the information
content of the discourse itself, and that seems wrong.” (Asher 1993: 319)
“Discourse relations serve to determine what are the possible propositional
antecedents for the discourse referent but at least sometimes are not consti-
tutive of their content. So we cannot understand anaphoric relations involv-
ing SDRSs in just the same way as we do the paradigm cases of individual
anaphoric relations. A natural alternative is to take an SDRS to determine
66The set of relevant discourse segments includes the understood topic k0, even though it is not associ-
ated with any clause in the discourse.
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a proposition–the proposition that is the sum of its leaves–and to take this
proposition as the anaphoric referent.” (Asher 1993: 320)
Ultimately, Asher 1993 draws a parallel between anaphoric reference to SDRSs and
anaphoric reference to plural individuals, which can be constructed ‘on the fly’ for singu-
lar individuals (as in (369)).
(369) Susan went camping with Bill. They enjoyed it. (Asher 1993: 92, (16))
Treating propositional anaphora similarly allows for anaphoric reference to the under-
stood topic of a discourse which is ‘constructed’ in a similar way; in other words, it al-
lows for anaphoric reference to the proposition denoted by a whole sequence of connected
sentences—the proposition, but not the internal structure of the SDRS.
“I will interpret an SDRS K as a group of constituents. My interpretation
of an anaphoric link between a discourse referent and an SDRS follows the ex-
planation of plural anaphora in DRT. A condition of the form z ≈ K is satisfied
relative to an embedding function f, world w and time t just in case f(z) in w
at t is a collection of DRSs, such that there is a bijection g from f(z) onto the
set of DRS constituents <tc K and for K ∈ f(z), K and g(K) are alphabetic vari-
ants. I do not incorporate the discourse relations or the topic structure into the
interpretation of the anaphor. This would yield incorrect results, as I argued
earlier.” (Asher 1993: 334)
For example, to emphasize the connection to plurality, Asher 1993 models the “distribu-
tive” reading of the last sentence of the discourse in (370a), the reading wherein the jury
didn’t believe any of the plaintiffs, with the DRT translation in (370b).
(370) a. One plaintiff had never received his full pay. Another had been passed over
for promotion three times. Yet another had been denied a job because of his
race. But the jury didn’t believe it. (Asher 1993: 330, (13))
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b. (Asher 1993: 334)
Note that the anaphoric variable z is linked to the complex topicK1∧K′0, which represents
the sum of the first three sentences of (370a). SDRT thus allows the relevant SDRS struc-
tures which compose topics to be antecedents of propositional anaphora, even though the
SDRS labels are not part of any universe of discourse referents.
This construction of ‘summed’ propositional antecedents is important, and a feature
we should want in our formal system. And the SDRS in (370b) illustrates another fea-
ture of DRT which comports with the data observed in the previous chapter, namely that
negation (¬) takes a subDRS as its argument. That, alongside the assumption in DRT
that all (sub)DRSs are potential antecedents from propositional anaphora, means that the
prejacent of negation should be similarly available, which the data confirms.
There are some other features of (S)DRT, however, which do not comport with the
data observed in Chapter 3. Negation takes a subDRS argument, and the same is true
for the modal operator , not part of the Asher 1993 fragment but nevertheless used
(Asher 1993: 83,116,247,250). As we observed in §3.3.1, however, the flavor of a modal
has implications for the propositional anaphoric potential of its antecedent: epistemic
modals make their prejacents available for propositional anaphora, but root modals do
not. For DRT to capture this, either only epistemic modals would be translated as having
subDRS arguments (retaining the concept that all (sub)DRSs are potential propositional
antecedents), or only epistemic modals would add a propositional discourse referent into
the containing DRS’s universe (dispensing with that concept). Similarly, DRT translates
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all attitude predicates as taking subDRS arguments, even for infinitival and for-clause
complements (Asher 1993: 181) but as we saw in §3.4.1, the nature of the embedding verb
has implications for the availability of its argument for propositional anaphora. To assign
all embedding verbs subDRS arguments (just like all modals) is insufficient, as it falsely
predicts felicity for many examples of impossible propositional anaphora. And, similarly,
Asher 1993: 183 assigns subDRS arguments for nominalized for-clauses, which we saw
are not available for propositional anaphoric reference (e.g., in (295)).
Adapting (S)DRT to capture the data presented here, then, would require some
changes to the system. Perhaps the most minimal change would be to dispense with the
assumption that all (sub)DRSs are available antecedents for propositional anaphora and
to instead have propositional discourse referents robustly represented in DRS universes.
This would require a change to the DRS construction algorithm such that it would intro-
duce explicit propositional discourse referents for the prejacents of negation, epistemic
modals, and certain embedding verbs, as well as for relative clauses, and so on. Alter-
natively, should one want to maintain that assumption, the DRS construction algorithm
would have to take into account the nature of an embedding verb, for instance, before
assigning a structure to its complement; this strikes me as counter to the intention of DRS
construction.
Matrix clauses, meanwhile, would introduce propositional discourse referents into
a larger discourse-level universe of discourse referents (akin to where the SDRS labels
exist), such that they, too, could be antecedents of propositional anaphors in subsequent
discourse units (but not for anaphors they contain). This also suggests an SDRT approach,
where discourse units are maintained separately, over a DRT approach in which subse-
quent clauses are DRS-merged together, so as to keep track of which clauses’ proposi-
tional discourse referents are accessible to which anaphors. This would also us to main-
tain the other benefits of the SDRT approach, including the construction of ‘summed’
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propositions (discussed in Asher 1993), as well as sensitivity to the right frontier (Polanyi
1988, e.g., as formalized in Lascarides & Asher 2008).
4.2.3 Predicate Logic with Anaphora (Dekker 1994, 2012)
Just like DPL, Predicate Logic with Anaphora (PLA; Dekker 1994, 2012) is an extension
of PL with compositionality as a primary goal. Unlike DPL, however, PLA is an update
semantics, so it involves the tracking (and growth) of information, as formulas update
information states. A PLA information state includes information about subjects: “These
subjects, composed of the possible values of candidate antecedent terms, are the potential
‘referents’ of subsequent anaphoric pronouns’ (Dekker 1994: 80). Rather than treating
anaphors as (syntactically free, semantically bound) variables, as they are in DPL, PLA
treats anaphors as syntactic objects which index the list of possible subjects in the current
information state. A fragment of PLA is presented in Figure 4.
Under this system, a sentence which introduces a(n individual) discourse referent, as
in (371a), is translated as containing an existential quantifier, as in (371b).
(371) a. There is a man.
b. s J∃xMxKg = {e · d | e ∈ s JMxKg [x/d]}
= {e · d | e ∈ s & d is a man} (= s′) (Dekker 1994: (5))
It is this existential quantifier which adds a new discourse referent to the information state
(extending the list of subjects being tracked, e · d). This new expanded information state
is then constrained, to ensure that the output information state (s′) only includes cases in
which the most recent subject is a man.
With an information state tracking subjects, PLA has pronouns refer to those subjects
by the position in the information state, which tracks the order in which they were in-
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troduced. So a pronoun translated as p0 picks out the most recently introduced subject,
p1 picks out the second most recent subject, and so on. How we translate an object lan-
guage pronoun into PLA will determine which referent is picked out, depending on the
information state against which it is interpreted. If we interpret (372a) as occurring imme-
diately after (371a), and translate he as p0, then we get the translation and interpretation
in (372b).
(372) a. (There is a man.) He walks.
b. s′
q
Wp0
y
g
= {e′ ∈ s′ | the last element of e′ walks}
= {e · d | e ∈ s & d is a man & d walks} (= s′′) (Dekker 1994: (6))
This sentence introduces no new discourse referents—it contains no existential
quantifier—but it refers back to the list of existing discourse referents, and constrains
the information state by only retaining cases where the most recently introduced subject
walks. Though the argument of W in (372b) picks out the same referent as the argument
of (371b)’s M , they are not both (bound) variables, as in DPL. The pronoun p0 happens to
pick out the same referent, but isn’t itself a variable, and isn’t bound.
Dekker 1994 deals only with individual anaphora, and while Dekker 2012: chapter 3
adds intensionality and thus worlds, it still doesn’t account for propositional anaphora
(nor does it intend to).67 In order to extend PLA to deal with propositional anaphora,
we would need to add a set of propositional variables. We would also need to add a set
of propositional anaphors, perhaps denoting the type of an anaphor via subscripts, as
in anaphors to individuals pe,0, pe,1. . . and anaphors to propositions pp,0, pp,1. . . This im-
plies that we would need to represent propositional discourse referents in the information
67Dekker 2012: 85, footnote 3 says that “The issue [of propositional anaphora] has been dealt with by
Roberts 1989; Frank 1997; Geurts 1999; Stone & Hardt 1999; Brasoveanu 2006, among many others.” These
works, though, deal with propositional anaphora only infofar as it is involved in cases of modal subor-
dination. None of them deal with anaphoric reference to propositions in the way that I am interested in
here.
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state, though we would have a choice between each case in an information state having
distinct lists (one for individual discourse referents, one for propositional) or having a
single list with typed entries. This latter option would in turn require that the anaphors
pick out their referents from that list not rigidly by position, but by position relative to
type—that is to say, pp,1 would refer to the second most recently introduced proposition,
even if that was the fifth most recently introduced discourse referent overall.68 I won’t
discuss further the consequences of choosing between a one-list and two-list system.
Also, PLA forbids the existential quantifier from occurring under the scope of nega-
tion, to capture the inability of individual discourse referents to be introduced under
negation (Dekker 2012: 15). Propositional anaphora, however, behaves differently.
(373) a. # Steve doesn’t have a car. It is red.
b. Steve doesn’t have a car. Nancy believes that, though.
A propositional extension of PLA, then would need to either (i) lift this restriction for the
propositional existential quantifier, maintaining it for the individual existential; or (ii) en-
sure that the propositional existential always scopes wider than negation. The proposal
advanced in Chapter 3 suggests that sentential negation itself should encode a propo-
sitional existential quantifier, as it introduces a discourse referent for its prejacent, but
that does not decide between these two options. In DPL, negation is a test, so it nullifies
the dynamic potential of any existential operators in its scope, thus no such restriction is
needed.
And, finally, as with DPL, a propositional extension to PLA would need to introduce
a method for identifying a propositional variable with the proposition it represents. This
might be via an adaptation of = which, instead of testing that the referents of two terms
68E.g., in a case whose list of discourse referents looked like 〈. . . , rp, xe, qp, ye, ze〉, the pronoun pp,1 would
refer to r, which is the second most recent propositional discourse referent (counting from the right). It
wouldn’t refer to the second most recent discourse referent overall, y, because y is the wrong type.
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are the same, would assign a variable to a formula of PLA. The same question mentioned
above, about whether to include the existential quantifiers of a formula within the stored
identity of that variable, would apply equally here.
4.2.4 van Eijck & Cepparello 1994
van Eijck & Cepparello 1994) introduces a dynamic modal predicate logic to combine
the dynamic variable binding from DPL (Groenendijk & Stokhof 1991) with the epistemic
updating from Veltman’s (1996) update semantics. The goal of the project is to account
for the anaphoric relationship in (374) and the infelicity of the discourse in (375).
(374) A man walked out. Maybe he was angry. (van Eijck & Cepparello 1994: (1))
(375) Maybe he was angry. *A man walked out. (van Eijck & Cepparello 1994: (3))
“Our aim in this paper is to develop a logic that gives an account of the interaction of the
processes of anaphoric linking and epistemic updating” (van Eijck & Cepparello 1994: 2).
They do this by distinguishing between things which range over possible states of affairs
(like might) and those which range over variable assignments (like DPL’s new variable
introducer).69 Evaluation, then, is relative to both possible states of affairs and an in-
put/output pair of assignments. A fragment of this system is in Figure 5.
In this system, the universe M is the domain of discourse, and W is the set of first
order interpretations over M , possible ways M could be—that is to say, W is a set of
possible worlds. Index sets, then, being subsets of W , are propositions. van Eijck &
Cepparello 1994 models the interpretation of a formula (relative to a pair of assignments)
as a function from index sets to index sets—given a proposition, updating with a formula
brings you to a new proposition. That index set, then, represents the discourse’s current
69Groenendijk & Stokhof 1991 uses the existential quantifier ∃ for this, as given above; van Eijck &
Cepparello 1994 describe this as the random variable assignment v ..=?. This is a notational difference, not
a theoretical one.
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worlds under consideration, akin to the Stalnakerian context set.
The introduction of index sets allows van Eijck & Cepparello 1994 to handle epistemic
might by making reference not just to assignments but to states of affairs. As presented
here, however, these index sets do not suffice to account for the propositional anaphora
we are interested in. This system keeps track only of the current evaluation index set (i.e.,
the context set), but does not maintain a list of past index sets that could be considered a
list of propositional discourse referents. It also doesn’t model index sets for the represen-
tations of (sub)formulas which do not actually update the index set, e.g., the prejacents of
negation or modals. As we have seen in Chapter 3, an adequate model of propositional
anaphora will need to be able to model propositions which are not commitments of the
speaker and which therefore do not update the common ground. The introduction of
propositions in van Eijck & Cepparello 1994 gets us closer to the sort of system we want,
but it alone cannot model the data we are interested in.
4.2.5 Groenendijk, Stokhof & Veltman
Like van Eijck & Cepparello 1994, Groenendijk, Stokhof & Veltman 1995b, 1996 in-
troduce a dynamic modal predicate logic in an effort to combine the dynamic variable
binding of DPL with the update semantics of Veltman 1996. The implementation is dif-
ferent, however. Groenendijk et al. 1995b, 1996 have a different definition for the modal
operator ♦ such that it evaluated against both worlds and assignments, and a different
definition for the existential quantifier so that, when in combination with ♦, it results in
variable-by-variable assignment rather than global assignment. These two systems end
up making different predictions about the consistency of discourses (sequential updates)
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like (376).
(376) Someone has done it. It might be you. But it might also not be you.
∃!xPx ∧ ♦(x = you) ∧ ♦(x 6= you) (Groenendijk et al. 1995b: (28))
These two changes also end up limiting the ability of existential quantifiers to freely (and
equivalently) bind any rightward variables: formulas that include ♦ change the informa-
tion state against which subsequent variables are interpreted. This means that, in this
system, ∃Px ∧ ♦Qx 6≡ ∃x(Px ∧ ♦Qx). A fragment of this system is in Figure 6.
While the system in Groenendijk et al. 1995b, 1996 isn’t explicitly restricted to vari-
ables for individuals, it inherits from Groenendijk & Stokhof 1991 and Veltman 1996 a
focus on individuals (and thus, individual anaphora). Each possibility in an informa-
tion state is interpreted relative to a possible world, and so has a privileged position for
that world. Beyond that evaluation world, though, possibilities don’t track sets of other
worlds (e.g., as presented in Groenendijk, Stokhof & Veltman 1995a). They might be made
to, if propositions were considered to be part of the domain of discourse D in the same
way that individuals are. As described in Groenendijk et al. 1995b: fn. 9, though, “propo-
sitional variables are zero-place predicates”, not true variables. They evaluate to true or
false given a world, but cannot be bound by a quantifier, and so cannot participate in
anaphoric relationships.
Like the van Eijck & Cepparello 1994 system, then, this dynamic modal predicate logic
incorporates worlds but is not a suitable system for modeling propositional anaphora.
Like van Eijck & Cepparello 1994, it does not model propositions beyond the current
context set, so there is no representation of discourse-relevant propositions which can
serve as antecedents for anaphoric relations.
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4.2.6 Update with Centering (Bittner 2009)
Update with Centering (UC; Bittner 2009), like PLA, is an update semantics, but one
which “represents not only changing information but also changing focus of attention in
discourse” (p. 1). PLA represents attention indirectly, in that some discourse referents are
more prominent than others—in particular, the most recent ones, though that an object
language pronoun is more likely to be translated as p0 than as p7 is a fact about the lan-
guage, and not a feature of PLA itself. UC, in contrast, hard-codes those most prominent
positions into the system, in a way we’ll see shortly. And where PLA focused on individ-
ual discourse referents, UC vastly expands the number of types which it deals with.
In UC, a discourse tracks not only information but also attention, so the knowledge
and context against which a sentence is interpreted is a state of infotention. “A state
of infotention is a set of lists of prominence-ranked semantic objects that can currently
antecede discourse anaphors. Refining PLA, a UC-list is structured into a top sub-list
of prominence-ranked topical objects (in the current center of attention) and a bottom
sub-list of prominence-ranked background objects (currently in the periphery)” (Bittner
2009: 2). Just as in PLA, we extend our state by adding new discourse referents and con-
strain it by ensuring that certain properties hold of referents under discussion. And our
attention can be modified just as our information can, so Bittner 2009 also introduces op-
erators which reorder these lists. Where PLA had a single list, UC has pairs of lists, where
each pair describes a way (the assignments on) the world could be. And those lists now
contain more than just individuals: they also contain events, states, times, worlds, and
propositions. A fragment of UC is presented in Figure 7.
As we can already tell by the number of types handled by the system, UC does not
abstract over tense the way many systems (including DPL and PLA) do, and it also is
sensitive to the eventive/stative status of verbs. That, plus the two lists being managed,
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makes the UC translation of a sentence much more comprehensive than its DPL or PLA
equivalent would be. For example, Bittner 2009: (4) gives the sentence in (377a) the UC
translation in (377b), which reduces to (377c).
(377) a. Jim is busy.
b. >[x|x =i jim] >; (P[ϑ>ω>ε ≤i >τ ]; [>ω ∈ >ω‖]; ([s|busy>ω〈s, CTR s〉] ⊥;
[AT>ω〈⊥σ,>τ〉, CTR ⊥σ =i >δ])); >[p|p = >ω‖]
c. >[x|x =i jim] >; P[ϑ>ω>ε ≤i >τ ]; [s|busy>ω〈s,>δ〉,>τ ⊂i ϑ>ωs]; >[p|p = >ω‖]
Stepping through (377b), the first box, >[x|x =i jim] introduces Jim into the discourse in
the >-list, making him a topical individual (and in fact the most topical individual, being
at the top of the >-list). The second box, P[ϑ>ω>ε ≤i >τ ], represents the non-past tense
presupposition carried by is, and ensures that the topic time (>τ ) is no earlier than the
perspective point (here, by default, the speech act time >ε). No topic time has yet been
introduced, so it is still the speech time, so this is satisfied. The third box, [>ω ∈ >ω‖],
represents the modality of the predicate, and asserts that the world of evaluation (the
most prominent world>ω) is in the common ground (>ω‖), which “is trivially true in root
clauses, where the evaluation world is the topic world” (Bittner 2009: 8). The fourth box,
[s|busy>ω〈s, CTR s〉], adds a state of being busy to the background list, and the arguments
of this state (its world, time and individual) are added by the fifth box, which identifies
its world and time with the topic world and time (AT>ω〈⊥σ,>τ〉) and its center with the
topical individual (CTR ⊥σ =i >δ). The sixth and final box takes all of the topic worlds
which meet this description and identifies them with a topical proposition ([p|p = >ω‖]).
For a full derivation of each sequential update, see Bittner 2009.
One thing we can see about UC from this translation, in comparison to DPL and PLA,
is that UC is compositional not just at the sentence level, but at the morpheme level.
The tense presupposition and modal assertion of is are represented as distinct updates,
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which in English are both part of the lexical meaning of is, but could easily be associated
with specific morphemes in a language with richer verbal morphology; see Bittner 2009
for how UC can handle morphological encoding of mood in Kalaallisut. The simplified
translation in (377c) effectively has one update associated with each word, plus an update
for the proposition associated with the sentence which Bittner 2009 associates with the
“full stop prosody” of the declarative mood.
The example in (377) also demonstrates how much of the UC system makes use of
anaphoric relations. Every occurrence of > or ⊥ references the topic lists, either updating
them or checking new information against them. This use of anaphora is not just for
individuals, but also for tense and modality, formalizing the observations of Partee 1973;
Stone 1997 (as mentioned in Chapter 2). Even the naming of new propositional variables
is anaphoric, as we saw with the final update of (377b/c), which refers back to the current
set of topic worlds, and assigns that set a propositional variable.
In addition, as one might expect, Bittner 2009 translates English pronouns as anaphors.
I and you are the center and experiencer, respectively, of the topical speech act event,
where a third person pronoun like he is just the topical individual, either foregrounded
(>δ) or backgrounded (⊥δ). Bittner 2009 never explicitly mentions propositional
anaphors, but presumably they could be translated in parallel, as >Ω and ⊥Ω (where
Ω abbreviates ωt).
UC thus requires little in the way of structural modifications to be able to handle the
data discussed in Chapter 3. Just as the declarative mood is taken to introduce a proposi-
tional discourse referent, so would sentential negation, epistemic modal auxiliaries, and
certain embedding verbs. The way those propositional discourse referents were intro-
duced must be a little different, however: where the declarative mood introduces a dis-
course referent for those topic worlds which have survived the informative update, nega-
tion, modal, and non-factive verbs) would have to introduce propositional discourse ref-
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erents for sets of worlds which were entertained, but which were not identified with the
common ground—and in the case of negation, which were disjoint from the common
ground. Bittner 2011 models these propositional discourse referents as being stored on
the ⊥ list, independent of the representation of the context set in the > list.
The way the declarative mood discourse referent is added is slightly problematic, but
for reasons unrelated to propositional anaphora. The UC declarative mood update makes
all new asserted propositions subsets of the existing common ground, which has been ar-
gued to be undesirable in a theory of conversational update (see Murray 2010, 2014 on
evidentials and Snider 2015 on tautologies). This could be ameliorated if discourse refer-
ents for matrix propositions were added to the⊥ list, like the prejacent of negation. The>
propositional discourse referent would represent the context set, where the propositions
which were intersected to derive that context set—as well as other propositions, like the
prejacent of negation—would be stored in the ⊥ list.70
Other than that, an extension of UC would simply require ensuring that the right mor-
phemes were translated into UC with propositional discourse reference introduction up-
dates. As we have already seen, Bittner 2009 has the declarative mood introduce a propo-
sitional discourse referent; the antecedent of a conditional is also translated as introducing
a propositional discourse referent (Bittner 2009: (23)). In this example, though, the conse-
quent does not, which given our observations in §3.4.7 would need to be amended.71 A
larger fragment of UC with an eye towards propositional anaphora would have to ensure
that negation, epistemic modal auxiliaries, relative clauses, etc., would similarly have the
update effect of adding a propositional discourse referent to one of the >⊥-lists.
70As we’ll see, this is precisely the approach taken in Murray 2010, 2014.
71The data on anaphoric reference to the consequent of a conditional from its antecedent also raise inter-
esting questions for how cataphora could be handled in a system like UC, whose emphasis on morpheme-
by-morpheme update renders it dependent on prior information in a way that makes forward-seeking
anaphors troublesome. (Though, admittedly, DPL and PLA would similarly struggle with such data, nor
was UC designed to handle cataphoric reference.)
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4.3 Background on modeling propositions
In the previous section, we looked at systems which were developed to formally
represent anaphoric relations, in particular between pronouns and their individual an-
tecedents. The sort of system we would need to model the examples of propositional
anaphora observed in the previous chapter would have representations not only of in-
dividuals mentioned in a discourse, but also of propositions, to serve as anaphoric an-
tecedents. In this next section, then, we examine some systems which have formal repre-
sentations of propositions.
4.3.1 Fine 1970
Fine 1970 considers the semantics S5 (Kripke 1959) and the nature of quantification
over propositions. In particular, Fine 1970 contrasts three different conceptions of the set
of propositions being quantified over: whether it is Boolean (closed under complemen-
tation and finite union), closed under formulas, or the power set of the set of worlds). A
fragment of this system as presented in Fine 1970 is in Figure 8.
This system has propositional variables and universal quantification over proposi-
tions, but no means of tracking mentioned propositions as discourse referents; in fact, the
system is not concerned with mention or discourse, as such, at all. There are other reasons
why the Fine 1970 system is not ideal for our representation of propositional anaphora.
For example, the propositional logic of this system means that propositional variables
cannot be embedded under one another, where Chapter 3 suggested that we should want
a single sentence of English to be able to introduce multiple propositional discourse ref-
erents. It is also not straightforward how to incorporate anaphors into such a system,
where the ‘contents’ of a sentence are opaque once it has been translated (presumably)
into a proposition.
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4.3.2 Veltman 1996
Veltman 1996 introduces an update semantics to capture inferences of the form of
(378).72
(378)
premise 1: P ’s normally are R
premise 2: x is a P
conclusion: Presumably, x is R
(Veltman 1996: 225)
Despite the existence of x in (378), the logic of Veltman’s (1996) update semantics is com-
pletely propositional, plus three propositional operators: might, normally, and presumably.
Importantly, these operators take propositional arguments but don’t output propositions,
so they’re not embeddable. “Sentences of the form might φ are not persistent; they do
not express a proposition; their informational content is not context independent. If you
learn a sentence φ of LA0 , you learn that the real world is one of the worlds in which the
proposition expressed by φ holds: the real world is a φ-world. But it would be nonsense
to speak of the ‘might φ-worlds’. If φ might be true, this is not a property of the world but
of your knowledge of the world” (Veltman 1996: 231). A fragment of the Veltman 1996
system is in Figure 9.
The Veltman 1996 system makes use of propositional variables in that all information
about the world is propositional: atomic sentences, and sentences of LA0 denote sets of
worlds. Sentences of LA1 and LA2 involve propositions taken as arguments, but sentences
involving might, normally, or presumably do not themselves denote propositions.
Despite these propositional variables, the Veltman 1996 system was not built for and
cannot handle propositional anaphora. Thus there are no propositions which could easily
be labeled as discourse referents for subsequent reference. It does not ‘store’ the propo-
72An earlier 1991 manuscript was circulated and cited, influencing for instance van Eijck & Cepparello
1994, so it appears earlier in this listing than its publication date suggests.
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sitions involved in updating an information state in a list, nor are those propositions
retrievable from the information state itself (s is a subset of W , it isn’t derived from a
generalized intersection of a set of accepted propositions, for instance). Reworking this
system to handle propositional anaphora would require a complete reworking of the sys-
tem: changing the way propositions are ‘stored’, introducing the anaphors, and making
the output of LA1 and LA2 propositional (as sentences with might, normally, or presumably
can of course be targeted by propositional anaphors).
4.3.3 Geurts 1998, 1999
Geurts 1998, 1999 models belief and attitude reports, presupposition, and modal sub-
ordination in DRT. However, Geurts (1998, 1999) differentiates his proposal from prior ac-
counts of belief in DRT, including that of Asher 1993 among others. According to Geurts
1998: 569, Asher 1993 and others propose a “structural theory of belief”: “belief is con-
strued as a relation between an individual and a syntactic objects, i.e. a DRS”. Instead,
Geurts 1998: 570 construes belief as “a relation between individuals and sets of worlds”,
i.e., propositions.
In this system, rather than having attitude verbs like believe take DRS arguments, they
take propositional discourse markers as arguments. Where on Asher’s (1993) account
a propositional discourse referent is only introduced if a subsequent clause contains a
propositional anaphor, here a sentence containing an attitude verb introduces a proposi-
tional discourse referent immediately—in fact, it introduces two:
(379) a. There is an A who believes that there is a B.
b. [ x, p, q: Ax, x believes p, x believes q, q = p + [ y: By ] ] (Geurts 1998: (44))
The sentence in (379a) is translated into the DRS in (379b)—the structure is written out, as
opposed to in the boxes we saw in Asher 1993, but the two are equivalent: the universe
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of discourse referents precedes the colon, the conditions follow it. (379b) includes two
propositional discourse referents, p & q, where p represents the contents of x’s beliefs not
including the content being discussed (namely, ‘there is a B’) and q represents the sum of
x’s beliefs, including both p and the stated belief. A fragment of Geurts’s (1998) extension
to DRT is in Figure 10.
Moving away from a “structural theory of belief” solves the problems surrounding
the assumption that all and only (sub)DRSs are available antecedents for propositional
anaphora, as discussed in §4.2.2. It raises its own problems, though. Geurts 1998, 1999
is not interested in anaphoric reference to the propositional variables it introduces, so it
makes some incorrect predictions.
As we saw in §3.4.4, sentences like (379a) make two propositions available for
anaphoric reference: (i) the proposition denoted by the matrix clause, and (ii) the propo-
sition denoted by the embedded that clause. The representation in (379b), however, in-
troduces two propositional discourse referents, but not these two. Neither (379b)’s p nor
q represents the proposition denoted by the that clause (call it r): p represents x’s beliefs
not including r; q represents all of x’s beliefs, including r, but also including everything
else x believes. Neither of these propositions, however, are available for reference by a
propositional anaphor:
(380) Jonathan believes that Nancy was at the party. He told Joyce that.
a. # He didn’t tell her anything about Nancy, however.
b. However, he didn’t tell her that he believes Barb was also there.
The first sentence in (380) contains a simple assertion about belief, parallel to (379a) except
with names, and the second sentence contains a propositional anaphor. Just to reiterate,
in this context our r would be the proposition ‘Nancy was at the party’, Geurts’s (1998)
p would be Jonathan’s beliefs not including r, and q would be all of Jonathan’s beliefs:
212
p+r. The follow-up in (380a) asserts that Jonathan didn’t tell Joyce r, which rules out q
as a possible antecedent for that as all q-worlds are r-worlds. This interpretation would
still leave p as a possible antecedent—Jonathan could tell Joyce p without mentioning
Nancy—but this follow-up is infelicitous, suggesting that in fact p is not an available
antecedent. The follow-up in (380b) asserts that Jonathan didn’t tell Joyce about one of
his other beliefs s, where p⊆s (if p represents Jonathan’s prior belief worlds, then all p-
worlds are s-worlds). If all p-worlds are s-worlds, then telling Joyce p amounts to telling
her s as well, so this follow-up is incompatible with p as the antecedent of that. In fact, it
is incompatible with q as an antecedent as well, since q⊆p⊆s. This follow-up is felicitous,
however, which suggests that there is some available antecedent for that other than p
or q. Neither of the propositional discourse referents introduced in a belief report in
Geurts; Geurts’s (1998; 1999) system is actually available for anaphoric reference. The
proposition denoted by the that clause, which is available for anaphoric reference, does
not get a propositional discourse referent on this analysis.
Geurts 1999 has the same two propositional discourse referents introduced for other
attitude predicates like want.
(381) a. Professor Mu¨ller wants to play the accordion.
b. [ x, p, q: PM x, x considers p, q = p+[ x: x plays the accordion ], x prefersp q ]
(Geurts 1999: (70))
“[(381a)] takes some set of alternatives [to x’s doxastic worlds] as given and asserts of this
set, represented here by the reference marker p, that professor Mu¨ller prefers all p-worlds
in which he plays the accordion to any p-world in which he does not” (Geurts 1999: 170f.).
Regardless of the presupposed status of p in (381b), neither p nor q are available for
anaphoric reference, and, as we saw in §3.4.1, neither is the complement of want (here
represented by the subDRS [ x: x plays the accordion ]).
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(382) a. # Professor Mu¨ller wants to play the accordion because he doesn’t believe
that.
b. Professor Mu¨ller wants to play the accordion because his sister doesn’t be-
lieve that he can.
Geurts 1999 treats finite and non-finite complements equivalently in terms of the in-
troduction of propositional discourse referents, which is problematic given the data ob-
served in Chapter 3. Moreover, the predictions this analysis makes for the anaphoric
potential of both finite and non-finite complements are not borne out by the data. Mov-
ing away from the structural account of Asher 1993 might be beneficial for other reasons,
but the account given in Geurts 1998, 1999 does not get us closer to modeling the phe-
nomenon we’re interested in here.
4.3.4 Stone & Hardt 1999
Stone & Hardt 1999 is interested in cases of sloppy identity, especially involving tense
and modals, as in (383).
(383) a. You thought I was crazy. You probably still do.
b. John would use slides if he had to give the presentation. Bill would just use
the chalkboard. (Stone & Hardt 1999: (4))
Stone & Hardt 1999 proposes an extension of Muskens 1995b (CDRT) which has “simple
discourse referents with values of type e (introduced by NPs), τ (introduced by tense),
 (introduced by VP), as well as (wt) (introduced by mood).” (Stone & Hardt 1999: 303)
The system also has dynamic discourse referents for all of these types, so as to account
for sloppy identity. A relevant segment of the system laid out in Stone & Hardt 1999 is
provided in Figure 11.
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Stone & Hardt make use of these discourse referents in defining dynamic transitions,
of the same type as DRT boxes, with their if(ω1, ω2, K) operator, where ω is a variable
over “world-set markers”—that is, for our purposes, a variable over propositions. This
operator introduces a discourse referent for ω2 into the discourse context before relating
it to the rest of the model. And, because both not, may, and might are translated into the
system as terms which include if(ω1, ω2, K) statements, both negation and modality in
the Stone & Hardt 1999 system both (i) introduce a propositional discourse referent for
their prejacent propositions, and then (ii) are anaphoric on a proposition, as they relate ω2
to ω1.
As we will see, the system proposed here captures this same flavor: both negation and
modality introduce discourse referents for their prejacent propositions, and make refer-
ence to that discourse referent as they impose further constraints on their interpretation.
There are some differences between the Stone & Hardt 1999 system and the sort of
system that we would like to capture the data presented in Chapter 3, however. Because
they are interested in modality, Stone & Hardt talk about these “world-set markers” as
representing modalities; for example, the outermost (wt) discourse referent introduced
for the assertion of a conditional is ω0, which is described as “representing reality”, in-
troduced by the verbal mood marker POS (Stone & Hardt 1999: 307). (In contrast, recall
that Bittner’s (2009) Update with Centering has the outermost propositional discourse
referent associated with sentential mood, not verbal mood.) We want the ‘outermost’ dis-
course referent—the one associated with the matrix clause of a declarative sentence—to
represent a set of worlds, but not necessarily one associated with reality.
In addition, while the Stone & Hardt 1999 if operator introduces a propositional dis-
course referent for the antecedent of a conditional, it does not introduce a parallel one for
the consequent. Stone & Hardt 1999 is thinking of these “world-set markers” as represent-
ing modalities, potential antecedents for modal anaphora, not as antecedents for the sort
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of propositional anaphora we’re interested in here. If this system were to be expanded to
cover the data we observed in Chapter 3, however, we would need a discourse referent
for the consequent of a conditional as well.
4.3.5 Aloni 2007
Aloni 2007 is interested in the different behavior of modals and imperatives as they
license free choice any and free choice disjunction. To model this difference, Aloni 2007 in-
troduces a logic for representing alternatives: a modal predicate logic with propositional
quantifiers, building on Fine 1970 and Dekker 2002. A fragment of this system is in Figure
12.
On this account, any and or—represented formally as ∃ and ∨, introduce sets of alter-
native propositions. When propositional quantification interacts with either individual
quantification or disjunction, the nature of these alternative sets can differ, as in (384)
& (385). For example, if the propositional variable p is identified with the entire individ-
ual quantification, as in (384a), then the alternative set introduced is a singleton set, as in
(384a′); if p is identified with the nuclear scope of ∃x, as in (384b), then the alternative set
is a “genuine set of alternatives” (74), as in (384b′).
(384) (Aloni 2007: (19))
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(385) (Aloni 2007: (20))
This distinction allows Aloni 2007 to capture the behavior of modals and imperatives,
which are analyzed as involving quantification over these alternatives.
This formal system, though it contains propositional variables, is not very amenable
to representing propositional anaphora. Aloni 2007 conceives of these propositional vari-
ables as useful for generating alternative sets, not for representing discourse referents.
This results in an equivalence which is visible in the presentation of (384a) & (385a).
“∃p(p ∧ p = r), and r are truth conditionally equivalent. They also induce the same al-
ternative set. The use of a propositional quantifier does not add anything in this case.”
(Aloni 2007: 73f.). This equivalence means that there is no difference between a formula
that is assigned a propositional variable and one that is not, which means that we cannot
hope to use these propositional variables to represent discourse referents.
Even beyond this equivalence, the propositional variables introduced in the Aloni
2007 system do not neatly map onto the propositions that we want to be assigned dis-
course referents, given the observations in Chapter 3. For example, consider the rep-
resentation of disjunction in (385). It is a question of interpretation, whether a partic-
ular disjunction is understood as having a propositional variable assigned to the entire
disjunction (as in (385)a), or assigned disjunctively (as in (385b)). As we saw in §3.5.2,
though, a representation of the anaphoric potential of a disjunction would require propo-
sitional discourse referent for each disjunct and for the matrix disjunctive clause: it is not
a question of interpretation, nor would we want a single disjunctive referent for (one of)
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the disjuncts. This logic of alternatives also leads Aloni 2007 to assign a propositional
variable to a wh- question, as in (386b).
(386) (Aloni 2007: (22))
As we saw in §3.3.2, though, this propositional variable cannot be understood to represent
a discourse referent, as wh- questions do not make any proposition available for anaphoric
reference. The Aloni 2007 system, then, cannot be easily extended to model propositional
anaphora.
4.3.6 Murray 2010
Murray 2010, 2014 uses UC (Bittner 2009, 2011; see §4.2.6) to model the different at-
issue and not-at-issue contributions of different kinds of content, including sentences with
evidentials, parentheticals, and appositives. For a fragment of this system, see Figure 7;
see also the appendix of Murray 2014. On this account, at-issue content is presented as a
proposal to update the discourse context, including the common ground, where not-at-
issue content updates the discourse context directly, with no proposal. As represented in
UC in Bittner 2011, the assertion of at-issue content introduces a propositional discourse
referent into the⊥ list, but does not restrict the context set—represented as a propositional
discourse referent in the > list—at least until a subsequent acceptance update. The asser-
tion of not-at-issue content, meanwhile, imposes a restriction on the context set directly,
and so needn’t necessarily be represented with a propositional discourse referent.
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For example, the propositions associated with the Cheyenne evidentials discussed in
Murray 2010, 2014 are not available for subsequent anaphoric reference, so they are not
assigned a propositional discourse referent on this account. Murray 2010, 2014 discusses
whether this behavior is linked to the at-issue status of Cheyenne evidentials, which Mur-
ray argues are grammatically marked as being not-at-issue. For now, we leave aside the
question of how at-issueness relates to anaphoric potential; we will explore this matter
in more detail in Chapter 5. The Murray 2010, 2014 UC system is compatible with the
introduction of propositional discourse referents for not-at-issue content as well. Such
discourse referents would presumably also be added to the ⊥ list, just like the discourse
referents associated with at-issue content.
The introduction of propositional discourse referents in the⊥ list, as described in Mur-
ray 2010, 2014 following Bittner 2011, brings us closer to our goal of modeling proposi-
tional anaphora over the implementation described in Bittner 2009, which only describes
introducing a propositional discourse referent for the context set. Having propositional
discourse referents for content which extends beyond the context set, or which is dis-
joint from it, allows us to model anaphoric reference to embedded clauses, the prejacent
of negation, etc., and not just to the current context set. This also captures the sense in
which sentential negation is anaphoric on its prejacent, as described in Stone & Hardt
1999. The introduction of discourse referents for not just the context set but also for the
prejacent of negation (Bittner 2011) and for asserted content (Murray 2010, 2014) suggests
one way UC can model propositional anaphora.
4.3.7 AnderBois et al. 2013
AnderBois et al. 2013 is interested in the at-issue and not-at-issue content of English
sentences containing appositive relative clauses, and in particular how anaphora and pre-
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supposition can allow these different types of content to interact.73 Like Murray 2010,
2014, AnderBois et al. 2013 models different update procedures for at-issue and not-at-
issue content: not-at-issue content (e.g., contributed by an appositive) directly updates
the common ground, after which at-issue content introduces a proposal to update the
(now-restricted) common ground. They model these updates in a dynamic semantics
based on DPL (Groenendijk & Stokhof 1991). A fragment of this system is in Figure 13.
In this system, the context set is represented by a propositional variable pcs, as is the
new proposal p put forward by some at-issue content. Upon its introduction, p gets a ran-
dom variable assignment from subsets of the current context set, and then as information
is gained, the cases of p are narrowed down. If the proposal is accepted, p is set as the
new pcs. Appositive content, on the other hand, is not assigned a propositional variable,
and updates pcs directly.
As it stands, we cannot understand the propositional variables in AnderBois et al. 2013
as representing propositional discourse referents: no variable is assigned to the content
denoted by an appositive relative clause, but the data in §3.4.5 showed us that appositive
relative clauses are available for anaphoric reference.74 The AnderBois et al. 2013 sys-
tem could be amended, however, to introduce propositional variables to appositive (and
perhaps other not-at-issue) content. The difference between at-issue and not-at-issue con-
tent, then, would not be the presence or absence of a propositional variable, but whether
the subsequent update was automatic (for not-at-issue content) or was subject to accep-
tance, interlocutor negotiation, etc. (for at-issue content). We will return to a discussion
of at-issueness and its connection to anaphoric potential in Chapter 5.
Another consequence of this system is that all propositional variables introduced are
73An earlier version of this work was published as AnderBois et al. 2010.
74AnderBois et al. 2013 notes that sentence-final appositives are available for direct rejection via response
particles, where sentence-medial ones are not (but see Syrett & Koev 2015; Hunter & Asher 2016). To the
extent that this is true, that data, coupled with the observations in §3.4.5, indicate that response particles
may be more restricted in their use than other propositional anaphors, not that appositives are not available
for anaphoric reference.
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subsets of the context set. This has been previously argued to be undesirable (see Murray
2010, 2014 on evidentials and Snider 2015 on tautologies), and would be further prob-
lematic for representing propositional anaphora. If some variable new p were a subset
of pcs, and the proposition q had already been accepted into the common ground, then a
statement like Nancy told Steve that, where that referred to p, would amount to saying that
Nancy told Steve not only p but also q (because p ⊆ pcs ⊆ q, so p entails q). This doesn’t
reflect how we interpret such anaphors, so we wouldn’t want our model to make such
equivalences.
4.3.8 Murray & Starr 2016
Murray & Starr 2016 is interested in the semantics for sentential mood, and how it
relates to sentential force. Murray & Starr 2016 models this with a dynamic semantics
that tracks both propositional discourse referents and preference states, so as to unify the
update functions of declaratives, interrogatives, and imperatives (and the conjunctions
thereof). A fragment of the Murray & Starr 2016 system is presented in Figure 14.
The Murray & Starr 2016 system tracks discourse referents for propositions in its
states, in an ordered list along the lines of Dekker 1994 (and thus also Bittner 2009, 2011).
However, the core of the system presented in Murray & Starr 2016 is a propositional
logic, translating sentences into (moodless) atomic expressions, and as a result does not
represent embedded clauses or subclausal constituent structures, which as we saw in
Chapter 3 are sometimes relevant for propositional anaphora. It handles some of the op-
erators which introduce propositional discourse referents for their arguments, including
sentential negation, conjunction, disjunction, and (some) sentential mood(s). For these
operators, the Murray & Starr 2016 system could be extended to also represent the dis-
course referents they introduce. 75 It would be considerably more complicated, however,
75Presumably the same is true for modal operators ♦ and , which are not discussed in Murray & Starr
2016 but are frequently represented as sentential operators.
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to extend the propositional logic of the Murray & Starr 2016 system to account for the
propositional discourse referents introduced by embedded clauses and other subsenten-
tial constructions.
4.4 A new formal system
In this section, I propose a new formal system to model the behavior of propositional
anaphora as observed here and in previous chapters. I will begin with simple examples,
and show how this system can be be expanded to handle progressively more complex
cases in subsections §4.4.2, §4.4.3, & §4.4.4. Subsections §4.4.5 & §4.4.6 discuss some limi-
tations of this system. This section will not model every example from previous chapters,
but should be sufficient to demonstrate the shape of the system and its capacity.
4.4.1 Simple sentences
Like Groenendijk & Stokhof 1991; Aloni 2007, this system will have propositional vari-
ables introduced by an existential quantifier, those variables operating as discourse ref-
erents.. These discourse referents won’t be stored in an ordered list as in Dekker 1994,
2012, or a pair of lists, as in Bittner 2009, 2011. Anaphors will be translated as free vari-
ables, which will be dynamically bound, as in DPL. Propositional variables will be iden-
tified with their contents using identity, as in Aloni 2007. In the examples that follow,
English constructions which have an associated propositional discourse referent will be
transcribed with that variable superscripted, and anaphors will be subscripted with the
variable they are bound by. Like Bittner 2009, 2011 and Murray 2014, we will have the
declarative mood contribute a propositional discourse referent, and like Stone & Hardt
1999 we will analyze sentential negation as anaphoric on its prejacent.
One major point of departure between the system proposed here and the systems
reviewed above is in how propositions are represented. For one thing, we want to be
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explicit about the fact that events are interpreted relative to worlds. More importantly,
however, we want to encode that an embedded propositions might be interpreted rela-
tive to different worlds than the proposition denoted by the whole sentence. In a sentence
like Dustin believes Joyce napped, the proposition denoted by the embedded clause is eval-
uated relative to Dustin’s belief worlds, where the matrix clause proposition is evaluated
relative to the worlds under consideration as part of the discourse (in particular, to the
distinguished world, the actual world). In order to capture this, we add not only world
variables w,w′, w′′ . . . of type s but also a lambda abstraction operator λ to bind them. In
this system, declarative sentences are interpreted relative to worlds, so the translation of
a declarative sentence will always start with λw. This introduces a complication: on a
static possible-worlds semantics, a declarative sentence denotes a function from worlds
to truth values; on a dynamic semantics like DPL, a declarative sentence denotes a rela-
tion between sets of assignment functions. A fully dynamic version of this system would
involve a dyanamic λ operator, along the lines of Ty2 (Gallin 1975; see Figure 15) with
added propositional variables, but I have not implemented that here. As it stands, the
system proposed here encloses the DPL-style dynamics in a static wrapper. Where in
DPL a declarative sentence denotes a relation between sets of assignment functions, this
proposed system has declarative sentences denote functions from worlds to relations be-
tween sets of assignment functions. We interpret a declarative sentence as true relative
to a world of evaluation and an input assignment if and only if there is some output as-
signment relative to this pair that makes the proposition described by the sentence true
at that world.
The guiding principles that underlie this system can be described as follows: (a)
propositional variables are assigned only to every proposition which is available for
subsequent anaphoric reference; and (b) a propositional variable is introduced for a
given linguistically-encoded proposition by the operator which takes it as an argu-
ment. Because propositional variables are introduced by the existential quantifier ∃, such
223
proposition-taking operators will be understood in this system as contributing ∃ to the
translation of a sentence.
As we saw in Chapter 3, the matrix clause of a declarative sentence is available for
anaphoric reference. The propositional discourse referent for this clause will be intro-
duced by the declarative mood operator DECL, parallel to Bittner 2009, 2011 and Murray
2014. A simple sentence like (387a), understood as in (387b), will get the translation in
(387c).
(387) a. Joyce napped.
b. DECL [ Joyce napped. ]p
c. λw∃p.p = [λw′.N(w′, j)] ∧ p(w)
Under the lambda abstracting over worlds, we have two conjoined terms. The first term,
∃p.p = [λw′.N(w′, j)], involves a dynamic variable binder ∃, which just as in DPL will
introduce a discourse referent. Here, however, it is a propositional discourse referent,
p. As in DPL, ∃ changes the dynamic assignment, here ensuring that the variable p gets
mapped to something by the output assignment function. By means of propositional
identity =, this discourse referent p is associated with λw′.N(w′, j), the set of worlds w′
where Joyce napped. (Recall that events are modeled here as being interpreted relative to
worlds, where individuals are not.) The second conjunct, p(w), represents the assertion
of p, that the world of evaluation is one of the p-worlds. So the sentence first introduces
a propositional variable as a discourse referent, and then uses that variable to assert the
truth of its contents: both of these are contributions of the declarative mood marker DECL.
The sentence is true, relative to a world of evaluation w and an input assignment f , just
in case there is an output assignment g such that g differs from f just in that it maps p to
[λw′.N(w′, j)], and w is a world in which Joyce napped.
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4.4.2 Sentential negation
Not every proposition which has an associated discourse referent is asserted to be
true, of course. The prejacent of sentential negation, as we have seen, has an associated
propositional discourse referent (Krifka 2013) even though it is certainly not a commit-
ment of the speaker. In our system, the propositional discourse referent for the prejacent
of negation will be introduced by the negation operator NEG, while the matrix negated
proposition will again be introduced by the declarative mood DECL. NEG, like DECL, will
use ∃ to introduce its propositional variable, though unlike DECL it will not then assert
the truth of its argument. We should want a sentence like (388a), understood as in (388b),
to get a translation as in (388c).
(388) a. Joyce didn’t nap.
b. DECL [ NEG [ Joyce napped. ]q ]p
c. λw∃p∃q.q = [λw′.N(w′, j)] ∧ p = [λw′′.¬q(w′′)] ∧ p(w)
By convention, the discourse referent for the outermost proposition, the one denoted by
the matrix clause, will be assigned the variable p, where embedded propositions in a sin-
gle clause will get q, r, p′, etc., from least-embedded to most-embedded. World variables
will be assigned w, w′, etc., in the order as required by the translation. And for ease of
reading, I have moved both existential quantifiers to the beginning of (388c)—I will return
to this in §4.4.5. For now, consider the three terms under the lambda abstraction.
The first, ∃q.q = [λw′.N(w′, j)], is NEG’s introduction of a discourse referent for its pre-
jacent proposition. The second, ∃p.p = [λw′′.¬q(w′′)] is the introduction of the discourse
referent for the matrix clause. In this term, the ∃ is contributed by DECL, and the ¬ in its
nuclear scope contributed by NEG. Note that what defines the character of the content
being negated here is the discourse referent representing the prejacent (along with a vari-
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able over worlds). In this sense, sentential negation is an anaphoric process, as it was in
the Stone & Hardt 1999 system. Finally, the third term, p(w), asserts the truth of p—which
will be expanded to λw′′.¬q(w′′)— in w.
This order of terms makes a sort of intuitive sense if we’re considering this representa-
tion as being built bottom-up: first we translate the prejacent of negation, then the higher
negated clause, and finally the assertoric force of the utterance. This intuition, however,
presupposes a finer grain of compositionality than has been provided just yet: this sys-
tem, like DPL, is compositional at the sentence level, not the morpheme level. We will
return to a discussion of compositionality in §4.4.5; for now, let us move on to proposi-
tional attitude verbs.
4.4.3 Embedding verbs
As we saw in §3.4.4, the propositions denoted by the finite (that clause) complements
of embedding verbs like say and believe are available for anaphoric reference. These com-
plements denote propositions which are taken as arguments by these embedding verbs.
In our system, this means that verbs like say and think must also contribute an existential
quantifier into the translation of a sentence they appear in. For example, the sentence in
(389a), understood as in (389b), is given the translation in (389c).
(389) a. Dustin said (that) Joyce napped.
b. DECL [ Dustin said [ (that) Joyce napped. ]q ]p
c. λw∃p∃q.q = [λw′.N(w′, j)] ∧ p = [λw′′.S(w′′, d, q)] ∧ p(w)
Just as we have seen above, the first term of (389c) associates a discourse referent with the
proposition denoted by the complement of said, the second term associated a discourse
referent with the matrix clause proposition, and the third term asserts the truth of that
matrix clause proposition.
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Just like the negated sentence in (388c), the translation of the report in (389c) intro-
duces a discourse referent for the proposition denoted by the complement clause, and in
both cases that complement is not asserted to be true. A sentence like (389a) can be used
to convey the truth of the complement proposition (here, that Joyce napped), as in (390),
in a way that is not available for the prejacent of negation.
(390) Dustin said (that) Joyce napped, so I asked her how her nap was.
(391) # Joyce didn’t nap, so I asked her how her nap was.
The speaker of a sentence like (389a) can commit herself to the truth of the complement
clause proposition, but that is not an entailment of the sentence: (392) is perfectly coherent
(and thus felicitous).
(392) Dustin said (that) Joyce napped, but that’s not true. (She’s been up for hours.)
(393) # Joyce didn’t nap, but that’s not true.
In contrast, the prejacent of negation cannot be a commitment of the speaker without
rendering the discourse absurd: the matrix clause commits the speaker to the falsity of
the prejacent proposition. (And if the anaphor in (393) targets the prejacent proposition,
the second clause is redundant and the contrast required by but is not satisfied, hence
infelicity.) So even though the complement of a report can be understood as a speaker
commitment, that stronger reading is not part of the translation of the sentence into the
system.
Sentences with multiple embeddings using such verbs are felicitous, and such sen-
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tences can be easily translated into the system along the same lines:
(394) a. Barb thought (that) Dustin said (that) Joyce napped.
b. DECL [ Barb thought [ (that) Dustin said [ (that) Joyce napped. ]r ]q ]p
c. λw∃r∃q∃p.r = [λw′.N(w′, j)]∧q = [λw′′.S(w′′, d, r)]∧p = [λw′′′.T (w′′′, b, q)]∧p(w)
Here, neither embedded clause proposition q nor r are asserted to be true: either or both
could be taken as commitments of the speaker, but either or both could also be negated,
so only p is translated as affecting the truth conditions of the sentence.
4.4.4 Relative clauses
As we saw in §3.4.5, the propositions conveyed by relative clauses are available for
anaphoric reference. This is the case for both restrictive and non-restrictive relative
clauses, though the accessibility of the former is more restricted; I will focus on non-
restrictive relative clauses for present purposes. Given our generalization, a relative
clause must be the argument of an operator—call it REL—where that operator introduces
a discourse referent for the proposition conveyed by the relative clause.
A sentence containing a relative clause, then, will have propositional discourse refer-
ents associated with both the matrix and relative clauses. And, because both propositions
are commitments of the speaker, both will update the truth conditions of the sentence. A
sentence like (395a), then, understood as in (395b), will get the translation in (395c).
(395) a. Joyce, who won the race, napped.
b. DECL [ Joyce, REL [ who won the race, ]q napped ]p
c. λw∃p∃q.q = [λw′.W (w′, j)] ∧ p = [λw′′.N(w′′, j)] ∧ q(w) ∧ p(w)
As we have seen with the examples above, the first two terms of (395c) introduce
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discourse referents for the propositions associated with the relative and matrix clauses,
respectively. Unlike with negation and embedding verbs, however, the matrix clause
translation is not anaphoric on the embedded clause: the character of p does not refer-
ence q. And, unlike negation and embedding verbs, the translation in (395c) has four
terms, as the non-matrix clause proposition here is asserted, where neither the prejacent
of negation nor the proposition denoted by the complement of an embedding verb like
say are commitments of the speaker. In (395c), both the third and fourth terms use the
newly-introduced propositional discourse referents to assert the truth of their contents in
the world of evaluation, as the relative clause proposition is just as much a commitment
of the speaker as the matrix clause proposition.
We will discuss the relative statuses of these propositions in §4.4.6, but first, let us
return to the compositionality of this system as it has been sketched thus far.
4.4.5 Compositionality
As mentioned above, this system at present is compositional at the sentence level—
just like DPL—but not at the morpheme level. Having a system which could identify the
contributions of individual morphemes, especially around the introduction of proposi-
tional discourse referents, is clearly preferable. Is such a system feasible, given our design
parameters?
To make this system compositional at the morpheme level, we would first assign DECL
the translation in (396), so as to ensure that (387a) received the translation in (387c) as
desired.
(396) JDECLK = λp′λw∃p.p = p′ ∧ p(w)
This mood operator, type (st)st, takes a propositional argument, introduces a discourse
229
referent for that proposition, and asserts its truth (in w). Here I give the last term the
newly assigned variable p as opposed to the argument p′ to emphasize the contribution
of DECL, and to reiterate the notion that update happens after the new discourse referent
is introduced, and not before it (in contrast to UC); this is just a notational difference,
however, as identity makes the two formulations equivalent.
Assuming that events are indexed to worlds but for simplicity that individuals are not,
we would derive the translation in (387c) for the simple declarative sentence in (387a) as
in (397):
(397)
λw∃p.p = [λw′.N(w′, j)] ∧ p(w)
λw∃p.p = [λw′.N(w′, j)] ∧ [λw′.N(w′, j)](w)
λw∃p.p = [λw′.N(w′, j)] ∧N(w, j)
λw′.N(w′, j)
napped
λxλw′.N(w′, x)
Joyce
j
DECL
λp′λw∃p.p = p′ ∧ p(w)
This derivation is fairly straightforward, and produces exactly the translation we had
wanted. The clause Joyce napped denotes a proposition—in fact, the same proposition
we want the sentence to assert, but we could stipulate that a clause (even a proposition-
denoting clause) does not constitute a full sentence without sentential mood. It is the
mood operator which introduces the propositional discourse referent for its argument,
and only then is that proposition asserted.
Given our guiding principles, we should want NEG to have a similar translation to
DECL: it must also be (st)st, and also contain ∃ to introduce a discourse referent for its
prejacent proposition. And so, given the translation we would want to derive, we would
build a tree for the negated sentence (388a) compositionally as in (398).
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(398)
λw∃p.p = [λw′∃q.q = [λw′′.N(w′′, j)] ∧ ¬N(w′, j)] ∧ p(w)
λw∃p.p = [λw′∃q.q = [λw′′.N(w′′, j)] ∧ ¬N(w′, j)] ∧ [λw′∃q.q = [λw′′.N(w′′, j)] ∧ ¬N(w′, j)](w)
λw∃p.p = [λw′∃q.q = [λw′′.N(w′′, j)] ∧ ¬N(w′, j)] ∧ ∃q.q = [λw′′.N(w′′, j)] ∧ ¬N(w, j)
λw′∃q.q = [λw′′.N(w′′, j)] ∧ ¬q(w′)
λw′∃q.q = [λw′′.N(w′′, j)] ∧ ¬[λw′′.N(w′′, j)](w′)
λw′∃q.q = [λw′′.N(w′′, j)] ∧ ¬N(w′, j)
λw′′.N(w′′, j)
napped
λxλw′′.N(w′′, x)
Joyce
jNEG
λq′λw′∃q.q = q′ ∧ ¬q(w′)
DECL
λp′λw∃p.p = p′ ∧ p(w)
This derivation raises two points worth noting.
First, the translation of NEG (isolated in (399)) is strikingly parallel to that of DECL.
(399) JNEGK = λq′λw′∃q.q = q′ ∧ ¬q(w′)
The only difference between the two is the presence of ¬ in the final term. And where we
think of the final term of DECL as representing the assertive contribution of the declara-
tive mood, the final term of NEG has no such assertoric force and yet it looks suspiciously
similar. The only difference between the terms p(w) and q(w′) that results in the former,
but not the latter, having the function of an assertive update, is that the proposition asso-
ciated with the matrix clause takes the outermost world variable w as its argument, where
the proposition associated with the prejacent of negation takes a different world variable,
one which happens not to percolate up to the same level. In short, we cannot identify the
assertoric force of a term by its translation alone, but have to consider it in context.
Second, consider the final (bottom-most) line of the derivation in (398), especially in
comparison to the translation we gave in (388c). One thing we can note is that the order
of the terms is different: (388c) assigns a discourse referent to the prejacent proposition
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first, and then the matrix proposition, while in (398) that order is reversed. (In (388c) the
existential quantifiers were in the same order, due to my transposition, but the identity
statements were reversed.) More important, however, is that the matrix clause terms
are not identical. Because of the nature of the composition, p in (398) has ‘captured’ the
assignment of q as well, underlined in (400a)—call this duplicate instance q2 for clarity,
though both qs in the final line of (398) have disjoint scopes.
(400) a. λw∃p.p = [λw′∃q2.q2 = [λw′′.N(w′′, j)] ∧ ¬N(w′, j)] ∧ ∃q1.q1 = [λw′′.N(w′′, j)] ∧
¬N(w, j)
b. λw∃p.p = [λw′¬N(w′, j)] ∧ ∃q1.q1 = [λw′′.N(w′′, j)] ∧ ¬N(w, j)
There are no instances of w′ within the assignment of q2 (as underlined), and there are
no other instances of q2 within the assignment of p: q2 has been captured by p but only
incidentally, as it is not used further. If we were to remove this underlined section, we
would be left with the simplified (400b), which appears quite similar to (388c), albeit with
the order of terms still rearranged.
We might be tempted to assert that it is simply a rule of this system that the introduc-
tion and assignment of propositional variables under a λw can be freely ignored if that
assignment doesn’t contain an instance of w. But of course this rule would also result in
the removal of the assignments of p and q1 in (400b) as well, as both are under λw but
contain no ws. This would leave us with the correct truth conditions but neither of the
propositional discourse referents which were the goal of this system to begin with.
We might instead say that discourse referent assignments within the scope of other dis-
course referent assignments are freely ignored. This would get rid of the underlined
section in (400a) without affecting the other two propositional discourse referents. This
rule, while effective here, is at least inadequate, if not pernicious. The only reason this
rule works is because the translation of DECL copies its argument into the ‘top-level’, as
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though it were no longer embedded, combining it with the evaluation world variable w.
This makes the discourse referent introduced under the scope of DECL—the discourse ref-
erent for the prejacent, introduced by NEG—appear to be on the same ‘top-level’ footing.
NEG, on the other hand, copies it only under the scope of ¬, so any propositional dis-
course referents introduced (not by but) under the scope of NEG will not be on this same
‘top-level’, but instead will stay under neg. We will see an example in a moment, but for
that we need a translation for an embedding verb on this same compositional approach.
(401) JsaidK = λr′λxλw′′∃r.r = r′ ∧ S(w′′, x, r)
An embedding verb like said takes a proposition, an individual, and a world, introduces
a discourse referent for its propositional argument, and then says that the individual said
the proposition in that world. So for a sentence like Dustin didn’t say Joyce napped, our tree
would look like (402).76
76In this derivation, I expand and replace occurrences of p and q as above, but leave r unexpanded. I do
this for two reasons. First, p and q are fed world variables, and thus seeing their respective λ terms makes
the derivation more transparent; r does not take an argument, so it is never further reduced. Second, is for
reasons of space. There are four occurrences of (the introduction and subsequent use of) r in the final line
of the derivation: expanding q doubles it, as NEG contains two instances of q, and the same for DECL and p.
I therefore leave r unexpanded to make the tree easier to read.
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In the final line of the tree in (402), we have ‘top-level’ occurrences of ∃p and ∃q, but the
introduction of the discourse referent for the proposition r remains under the scope of ¬.
Even if we could remove the ‘redundant’ introductions of q and r under p, underlined—
note that this is now a disjoint section, as r is under ¬—that would not suffice to get r
out.
This is not just a fact about NEG, either. Like NEG, an embedding verb like say leaves
its ‘copied’ propositional discourse referent not on the ‘top-level’ but under the scope of
S, so any propositional discourse referents introduced within the scope of the reported
proposition will similarly be ‘captured’. And while any compositional account of ap-
positive relative clauses would be very dependent on the syntactic account adopted, any
account in which the relative clause and the head noun form a constituent (e.g., De Vries
2006) would result in the introduction of the relative clause proposition embedded un-
der the denotation of that constituent DP.77 That is to say, the compositional approach
requires us to interpret the introduction of propositional discourse referents either within
one another, or under the scope of operators (¬, S, etc.), as illustrated in (402). This raises
tricky questions about what it means to have a discourse referent introduced relative to a
world. Or, if the introduction of discourse referents are ‘extracted’ from under the scope
of operators, so that we can turn translations like (400a) into those like (388c), what is
the procedure that allows us to do so? And are there any unwanted side-effects of doing
so? For the meantime, I sidestep these questions by gesturing at a system which is com-
positional only at the sentence level. I save the precise formulation of a system which is
compositional at the morpheme level for future work.
77If the head noun and appositive relative clause form a constituent, and that constituent denotes an
individual (with embedded propositional content), then that might result in the introduction of a proposi-
tional discourse referent under an ι operator.
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4.4.6 The status of a proposition
The translations given here for examples involving sentential negation, embedding
verbs, and relative clauses all involved the introduction of multiple propositional dis-
course referents. Of course, explicitly modeling the introduction of such discourse refer-
ents was the goal of this system from the outset. I haven’t said anything about the status
of these propositional discourse referents, though.
It is clear that not all of the propositions available for anaphoric reference have the
same status. For one, as we saw, the proposition denoted by the complement of an em-
bedding verb is not a commitment of the speaker, but can optionally be endorsed or de-
nied by the speaker. And the prejacent of negation is not only not a speaker commitment,
but in fact is asserted to be false. So right there we have propositional discourse refer-
ents for propositions which a speaker is committed to consider true, for those which a
speaker is committed to consider false, and for propositions whose truth a speaker is not
committed to in any way.
And while the proposition denoted by the matrix clause of a declarative sentence is
asserted to be true, and the prejacent proposition of sentential negation is asserted to
be false, not all propositions are conveyed via assertion. While the embedding verbs
exemplified here (say and think) do not, some embedding verbs presuppose the truth of
their complement propositions. And as we saw in §3.4.4, those complement propositions
are indeed available for anaphoric reference, and they too have a different status. That
status might be captured in this system if we were to add a method for marking content
as presupposed (e.g., with a δ operator); the system as described thus far does not account
for that distinction.
Further, the two propositions introduced in the relative clause example (395a), both of
which the speaker is committed to consider true, and neither of which is presupposed,
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have different statuses. The proposition denoted by the matrix clause, ‘Joyce napped’, is
the main point of the utterance, while the proposition denoted by the appositive relative
clause, ‘Joyce won the race’, is considered to be backgrounded or somehow less central
to the utterance. This has been described and modeled by Potts 2005; AnderBois et al.
2013, among others. This different status has consequences for, among other things, how
content is responded to. For example, consider the possible responses by another speaker
B in (403).
(403) A: Joyce, who won the race, napped.
a. B: Yes, that’s true, but she didn’t win the race. She came in second.
b. ?? B: Yes, that’s true, but she didn’t nap. She did lay down, but she was awake.
The response in (403b), which rejects the matrix clause proposition but endorses the ap-
positive proposition, is considered to be significantly degraded in comparison to the re-
sponse in (403a), which rejects the appositive proposition but endorses the matrix propo-
sition.
The system as described here does not have the tools to represent this difference: both
propositions have associated discourse referents, as we observed in §3.4.5, and that’s all
that can be said about those propositions on the current account.78 But these different sta-
tuses do merit further discussion, especially as they seem to be related to the behavior of
propositional anaphora in particular. For example, note that the responses in (403) make
use of propositional anaphors. For this reason, in the next chapter we will take a detailed
look at these different statuses and how they intersect and interact with propositional
anaphora.
78The system also does not pay close attention to the relative order of introduction of propositional dis-
course referents, as might be relevant in a system which modeled the relative salience of discourse referents
via a list, as in PLA or UC. That, too, would be desirable in a future model of propositional anaphora, but
is beyond the current scope.
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4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we considered the question of how to formally model propositional
anaphora in discourse. We reviewed a number of existing formal systems, some of which
model anaphora and some of which model propositions (by means of propositional vari-
ables). For each system, we discussed how these systems might handle the data observed
in Chapter 3, and what changes (if any) would be necessary before they could do so.
In the process, we identified some qualities that are desirable in a system for modeling
propositional anaphora, which comport well with the generalization proposed in Chapter
3 for when propositional discourse referents are introduced. For example, associating the
introduction of propositional discourse referents with matrix declarative mood, as in Bit-
tner 2009, 2011; or taking sentential negation to be anaphoric on its prejacent proposition,
as in Stone & Hardt 1999.
These qualities were then incorporated into a new proposed formal system in §4.4,
with the goal of implementing the generalization from the previous chapter. This sys-
tem is DPL-like in that it introduces discourse referents via the existential quantifier ∃:
propositional anaphors are treated as free (propositional) variables, which are bound by
∃. In addition to propositional variables and propositional identity, this system intro-
duces lambda binding over world variables. This allows for careful treatment of beliefs
and other intensional operators, and would eventually be useful in capturing de re and
de dicto attitudes. In the present proposal, however, it also has the effect of rendering the
system static; a fully dynamized version of this system, with a dynamic λ and dynamic
binding across sentences, remains for future work.
This proposed system was introduced with a simple declarative example sentence,
and then with examples involving sentential negation, embedding verbs, and relative
clauses. Each of these structures involve a type of operator which takes a propositional
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argument and so—in keeping with the Chapter 3 generalization—involves the introduc-
tion of a propositional discourse referent. For each example, we observed how the propo-
sitional variable representing this discourse referent is introduced, and how it interacts
with other operators in the sentence. This approach afforded us a look into how propo-
sitional content is represented, and in the process how integral propositional anaphora
is to meaning construction. Not only is sentential negation anaphoric—in that what is
negated is the variable associated with the prejacent proposition—, as in Stone & Hardt
1999, but so are embedding verbs: the argument of a verb like say isn’t directly the logical
formula (here, the lambda expression) representing the complement clause proposition,
but rather the propositional variable which is associated with that formula. The same is
likely true for other operators not presented here, including epistemic modal operators
and epistemic adverbials.
Like DPL, the system proposed here is compositional at the sentence level, and not
at the morpheme level. The generalization put forward in Chapter 3 identifies the in-
troduction of propositional discourse referents with particular morphemes, namely the
operators which take propositional arguments, including the declarative mood. But
ultimately, the system proposed here runs into trouble when dealing with multiply-
embedded clauses. As discussed in §4.4.5, the introduction of propositional variables
ends up ‘captured’ under the scope of one or more lambdas, in a way which is problem-
atic. As such, the current proposal presents only a sentence level compositionality, just
like DPL. The next step improvements on this system, which should include not only
fully dynamic ∃ and λ operators, but also compositionality down to the morpheme level,
will remain for future work.
This system also raises some important questions about the status of a proposition in
a discourse, and how it should be represented. As discussed in §4.4.6, the formal system
proposed here can model whether a proposition is or isn’t available for anaphoric refer-
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ence (via the presence or absence of an associated propositional variable) and whether a
proposition is or isn’t a commitment of the speaker (via whether it is applied to the world
of evaluation). This system as presented does not, however, model whether a proposition
is presupposed or asserted, even among those propositions which are speaker commit-
ments. This system also doesn’t model the discourse status of a proposition, in terms of
whether the proposition is the main point of an utterance, in the sense used in the dis-
cussion of (403). This discourse status, whose definition is a point of disagreement in the
literature, has been argued to have important consequences for the way a proposition is
interpreted in a discourse, and so it is worth asking whether a model of propositional
anaphora like this should reflect this information. This sort of discourse status, how it is
defined and diagnosed, and how it interacts with propositional anaphora, are the topics
which will be addressed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 5
PROPOSITIONAL ANAPHORA AND AT-ISSUENESS
5.1 Introduction
As we noted in the previous chapter, not all propositions mentioned in or conveyed by
an utterance have the same status in a discourse. Even among those propositions which
are speaker commitments (unlike the prejacents of modals or negation), and which are
not presupposed, some propositions are considered to be more central to an utterance
in a discourse. This has attracted considerable attention in the literature (e.g., Potts 2005
and much subsequent work), as researchers discuss what it means for a proposition to be
“at-issue” in a discourse.
Throughout the literature, a tight linking has been posited between the at-issue sta-
tus of a given proposition—even though there is ongoing debate about how at-issueness
should be defined—and that proposition’s availability for anaphora. In particular, the
(in)felicity of direct assent/dissent to a proposition is often used as a diagnostic for the
at-issue status of that proposition (including for evidentials, e.g., Murray 2010; and ap-
positives, e.g., Tonhauser 2012; Syrett & Koev 2015). For example, the sentence in (404)
conveys two propositions of arguably different statuses.
(404) Tivi, who is a cat, enjoys chasing her tail. (Murray 2014: (7))
a. No, she doesn’t.
b. # No, she isn’t.
The matrix proposition—that Tivi enjoys chasing her tail—is available for direct dissent,
as shown in (404a), but the proposition conveyed by the appositive relative clause—that
Tivi is a cat—cannot be directly dissented with, as shown in (404b). This has been taken
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as evidence that the matrix proposition is at-issue where the appositive proposition is
not-at-issue.
This tight linking between at-issueness and anaphoric potential is also reflected in
formal representations of discourse which have been posited in the literature. For ex-
ample, the update semantics of Murray 2009, 2014 has at-issue content and not-at-issue
content update the discourse context in different ways, and at-issue content introduces
a propositional discourse referent while not-at-issue content does not. A similar notion
is implemented in AnderBois et al. 2013 for appositives, where propositional variables
only represent at-issue content; not-at-issue content updates the context set without in-
troducing a propositional variable. And in Hunter & Asher’s (2016) extension of SDRT,
all material which is available for anaphora is necessarily at-issue.
In this chapter, I investigate the interaction between at-issueness and propositional
anaphora, and argue that there is no tight link between at-issueness and anaphoric
availability—that these two properties of propositions are distinct—at least on one def-
inition of at-issueness. I argue that one of the common diagnostics for at-issueness, the
assent/dissent test, is not truly diagnostic of this kind of at-issueness, but is instead sensi-
tive to the anaphoric availability of a proposition. I present data which demonstrate that
a proposition’s at-issue status alone is not sufficient to determine whether it will be avail-
able for anaphoric reference (including but not limited to direct assent/dissent), as well
as data which show that a proposition’s being available for anaphoric reference cannot be
used to diagnose its at-issue status.
In §5.2, I provide some background on at-issueness, with the goal of identifying a
diagnostic for at-issueness which does not rely on anaphoric availability. In §5.3, I ex-
plain the differing behavior of sentence-medial and sentence-final appositives, which has
been implicated in the literature on at-issueness, in the context of our new perspective
on at-issueness and anaphoric availability. This behavior supports the choice of diag-
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nostic identified in §5.2. Using such a diagnostic, in §5.4 I argue that at-issueness and
anaphoric availability are distinct, by illustrating felicitous anaphoric reference to not-
at-issue propositions (in §5.4.1) and examples of some at-issue content which cannot be
referred to anaphorically, including by direct dissent (in §5.4.2). §5.5 concludes, and dis-
cusses what this new perspective means for our theories of at-issueness and anaphora.
Some of the content of this chapter is an expansion of work in Snider 2017, in press.
5.2 Diagnosing at-issueness
Content which is at-issue is frequently described as the “main point” of an utterance
(Potts 2005; Roberts, Simons, Beaver & Tonhauser 2009, among many others). This no-
tion has been formalized in Simons et al. 2010 as relevance to the current Question Under
Discussion (QUD, Roberts 1996). At-issueness has also been described formally as a pro-
posed update to the common ground (Murray 2010, 2014; AnderBois et al. 2013; see also
Farkas & Bruce 2010). Hunter & Asher 2016 defines at-issueness structurally, as content
which is on the “right frontier” of a discourse structure (as described in Polanyi 1988).
For the purposes of this chapter, I’ll be using the Simons et al. 2010 definition, because
it has associated diagnostics which make testable predictions. We will return to these
other notions in §5.5. The Simons et al. 2010 definition is as follows, where ?p denotes the
question whether or not p:
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(405) Revised79 definition of at-issueness (Simons et al. 2010: (26))
a. A proposition p is at-issue iff the speaker intends to address the QUD via ?p.
b. An intention to address the QUD via ?p is felicitous only if:
i. ?p is relevant80 to the QUD, and
ii. the speaker can reasonably expect the addressee to recognize this inten-
tion.
Using this definition of at-issueness, Tonhauser 2012 lists three features of at-issue
content and then lays out six diagnostics for identifying the at-issue status of a sentence
implication.
(406) Features of at-issue content: (Tonhauser 2012)
I. At-issue content can be directly assented or dissented with
II. At-issue content addresses the question under discussion (QUD)
III. At-issue content determines the relevant set of alternatives
Feature (406II) hews closest to the Simons et al. 2010 definition in (405): content is (defined
as being) at-issue if a speaker intends to use it to address the QUD, so at-issue content
addresses the QUD. Feature (406III) is a sort of forward-looking counterpart to (406II).
Where (406II) is about the relevance of at-issue content to its prior context, (406III) is about
how at-issue content shapes what things count as relevant in subsequent discourse. These
two features are of a kind, and the diagnostics associated with them pattern together in
a way to be demonstrated shortly. Feature (406I), on the other hand, is further removed
79Simons et al. 2010 includes an earlier version of this definition which does not make reference to
speaker intention. The differences between the two definitions, discussed in the paper, are immaterial
here.
80Relevance is defined for assertions (and questions) as entailing (or having an answer which entails) a
partial or complete answer to the QUD (Simons et al. 2010: (13)).
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from the Simons et al. 2010 definition of at-issueness: at least a priori, whether something
is available for direct assent/dissent is distinct from whether it addresses the QUD.
In the remainder of this section, I will introduce these two classes of diagnostics and
then compare them. The goal here is to identify a diagnostic for at-issueness which
doesn’t rely on anaphora, so that we can then investigate the relationship between at-
issueness and anaphoric potential without accidentally conflating the two.
5.2.1 The question/answer tests
The diagnostics that Tonhauser 2012 associates with features (406II) and (406III) look
at what content establishes or addresses the QUD. These diagnostics, namely Diagnos-
tics #2 & #3a,b, work by constructing and examining the congruence of question/answer
pairs, so they constitute what I’ll call the question/answer tests.
Diagnostic #2 uses the target sentence (the one whose contents we want to test) as the
answer to a question (per (406II)). Diagnostics #3a,b turn the target sentence into a ques-
tion, and then respond to its contents (per (406III)) with a positive/negative answer and
a follow-up: either a “positive continuation” (e.g., Yes, she is) for #3a, or an “adversative
continuation” (e.g., Yes, but she is) for #3b. The idea here is that because at-issue content
addresses and establishes the QUD, content which fails to address the QUD or which fails
to establish a QUD must be not-at-issue.81
To illustrate the question/answer tests, Tonhauser’s (2012) Diagnostic #2 is given in
(407) and exemplified in (408–409), and Diagnostic #3a is given in (410) and exemplified
in (411). To demonstrate these tests, I’ll be using sentences with appositives, which are
thought to convey content which is in some way less central to the utterance (e.g., Potts
2005; Tonhauser 2012; AnderBois et al. 2013; Murray 2014).
81An explicit question, like those used in all three question/answer tests, might not override an overar-
ching Domain Goal, but it is enough to establish an immediate Discourse Goal (Roberts 1996).
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(407) Diagnostic #2: Create a discourse in which speaker A utters a question with mean-
ing ?~x.m and an addressee B utters answers that convey ∃~x.m(~x) as at-issue con-
tent and not-at-issue content, respectively. Ask the consultant about the accept-
ability of these answers to the question. (Tonhauser 2012: (16))
(408) Who did Food Network interview?
a. Pauline, who is Margaret’s cousin, was interviewed by Food Network.
(409) Who is Margaret’s cousin?
a. # Pauline, who is Margaret’s cousin, was interviewed by Food Network.
The same sentence is used to answer the different explicit questions in (408) and (409).
The response in (409a) fails to felicitously address the QUD, even though the content
conveyed by the appositive entails an answer to the question in (409), so the appositive
content must be not-at-issue. (If it were at-issue, it would be able to address the QUD.)
The felicity of the response in (408a), meanwhile, is consistent with the matrix clause
content being at-issue.
(410) Diagnostic #3a: Let S be a sentence that gives rise to hypothesized at-issue content
m and hypothesized not-at-issue content n. Form a polar question Q from S. Create
a discourse where interlocutor A utters Q and addressee B’s positive (negative)
response is followed by utterances of simple sentences that convey m or n (¬m or
¬n) as at-issue content. Ask the consultant about the acceptability of B’s answers.
(Tonhauser 2012: (19))
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(411) Was Pauline, who is Margaret’s cousin, interviewed by Food Network?
a. Yes, she was.
b. No, she wasn’t.
c. # Yes, she’s Margaret’s cousin / she is.
d. # No, she’s not Margaret’s cousin / she’s not / she isn’t.
The (c) and (d) responses of (411), which respond to the content conveyed by the ques-
tion’s appositive clause, are infelicitous, which is evidence that that appositive content is
not-at-issue. (If the question’s appositive clause content were at-issue, it would establish
the very alternatives that the (c) and (d) responses convey.) The felicity of the (a) and (b)
responses, which respond to the question’s matrix clause content, is consistent with that
matrix clause content being at-issue.
The question/answer tests look at the way at-issue content interacts with the QUD,
both in terms of responding to an existing QUD (as in Diagnostic #2) and in setting up a
QUD to be addressed (as in Diagnostics #3a,b).
5.2.2 The direct assent/dissent tests
The other three diagnostics from Tonhauser 2012 (Diagnostics #1a–c) trade on feature
(406I), that “at-issue content can be directly assented or dissented with”. These tests rely
on identifying the content which is targeted by a statement of direct assent/dissent.
For Diagnostic #1a, a sentence which conveys multiple contents is directly as-
sented/dissented with, and consultants are asked what is being assented/dissented with.
In Diagnostics #1b,c, this judgment is less overt, as consultants are asked only to judge
the felicity of discourses with direct assent/dissent. In Diagnostic #1b, assent/dissent is
followed up with a “positive continuation” (e.g., Yes, that’s true, he did), and in Diagnostic
#1c it is followed up with an “adversative continuation” (e.g., Yes, that’s true, but he didn’t).
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Overall, the idea is that because at-issue content can be directly assented/dissented with,
content which cannot be assented/dissented with in this way must be not-at-issue (be-
cause if it were at-issue, it would be able to be assented/dissented with).
Though feature (406I) and its associated diagnostics are described as dealing with both
assent and dissent, the two do not behave identically. There are cases where dissent is
felicitous but assent is not.
(412) Bill has spoken to Mary, who is Martin’s best friend.
a. No, Mary is not Martin’s best friend / she isn’t.
b. ? Yes, Mary is Martin’s best friend / she is.
Indeed, where assent seems to be the ‘default’ result of an unopposed assertion, dissent
requires an overt action. Overtly agreeing, then, is often marked. As such, I will focus
for the remainder of this paper only on direct dissent, and refer to this as the direct dissent
test.
For an example of the direct dissent test in action, Tonhauser’s (2012) Diagnostic #1b,
given in (413), is demonstrated in (414). As Tonhauser 2012: 244 points out, ”This diag-
nostic has been applied in e.g. Faller (2002), von Fintel and Gillies (2007), Matthewson et
al. (2007) and Murray (2010).”82
(413) Diagnostic #1b: Create a discourse in which interlocutor A utters the target ut-
terance and in which addressee B responds to A’s utterance with a simple as-
sent(dissent) utterance followed by an utterance that conveys (the negation of) the
hypothesized at-issue content, or where B responds with a simple assent (dissent)
utterance followed by an utterance that conveys (the negation of) a hypothesized
82Faller 2002, Matthewson, Davis & Rullmann 2007, and von Fintel & Gillies 2007 use the direst dissent
test to determine whether (evidential or modal) content contributes to the truth conditions of a sentence;
they don’t mention at-issueness as such. Tonhauser 2012 understands these uses as in fact diagnosing
Simons et al. 2010 at-issueness.
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not-at-issue content. Ask the consultant about the acceptability of B’s responses.
(Tonhauser 2012: (10))
For the reason discussed above, I exemplify this diagnostic with only the direct dissent
variation.
(414) Pauline, who is Margaret’s cousin, was interviewed by Food Network.
a. No, she wasn’t interviewed by them.
b. #/?? No, she isn’t Margaret’s cousin.
The questionable felicity of (414b), which targets the appositive content of (414), is taken
as evidence that this appositive content is not-at-issue: if it were at-issue, it should have
been perfectly felicitous to directly dissent with. The felicity of (414a), meanwhile, is
consistent with the matrix clause content being at-issue.
The direct dissent test looks at the ability of content to be directly rejected, taking at-
issue content to be always available for direct dissent. Tonhauser 2012 makes no claims
about the ability of not-at-issue content to be directly dissented with, but if all at-issue
content can be directly dissented with, then any content which cannot must be not-at-
issue.
5.2.3 Comparing the question/answer and direct dissent tests
The question/answer and direct dissent tests align in many cases. For example, the
above examples all point to the content conveyed by appositive clauses being not-at-
issue. There are differences between these classes, though, which I will argue make
them crucially different. Tonhauser 2012 notes that the six diagnostics presented don’t
always behave identically, but attributes those differences to the type of implication be-
ing tested: “not all diagnostics are conclusive for all projective contents” (p. 251). At the
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end of the day, though, Tonhauser asserts that they are all indeed testing for at-issueness:
“they are all useful to diagnose (not-)at-issueness with at least one kind of content” (p.
252). I’ll argue that where the question/answer tests are indeed useful for diagnosing
(not-)at-issueness, the direct dissent tests are mediated by the anaphoric availability of a
propositional antecedent, and so are in fact testing not for at-issueness but for anaphoric
availability.
The anaphoric nature of the direct dissent tests is apparent in their reliance on propo-
sitional anaphors. The mechanisms that underlie direct assent/dissent are themselves
anaphoric: response particles, which have been argued to be anaphoric (Murray 2010;
Krifka 2013; Roelofsen & Farkas 2015), and other propositional anaphors like that (e.g., in
That’s not true). The direct dissent tests explicitly rely upon the anaphoric nature of the
response particles, identifying the antecedent content (Diagnostic #1a) and looking for
inconsistencies between the antecedent content and explicit follow-up material (Diagnos-
tics #1b,c).
In contrast, the question/answer tests do not rely on the use of propositional
anaphors. This difference is easy to miss in the presentation of the diagnostics in Ton-
hauser 2012, where two of the three question/answer tests are demonstrated with exam-
ples that make use of response particles. The Guaranı´ follow-ups begin with hee˜ ‘yes’ or
naha´niri ‘no’, and if these response particles work like those of other languages (i.e., those
discussed in Krifka 2013; Roelofsen & Farkas 2015), then they’re likely best analyzed as
propositional anaphors themselves. But this illustration with explicit anaphors is only
incidental for the question/answer test: the examples shown in (411) return the same
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results even without the use of response particles.
(415) Was Pauline, who is Margaret’s cousin, interviewed by Food Network?
a. She was.
b. She wasn’t.
c. # She’s Margaret’s cousin / she is.
d. # She’s not Margaret’s cousin / she’s not / she isn’t.83
The responses in (415a) and (415b), which morphologically agree with the tense of the
question’s matrix clause, are felicitous answers to the question, suggesting that the ques-
tion’s matrix clause content establishes a QUD to be addressed (and so is at-issue). The
responses in (415c) and (415d), meanwhile, which agree with the question’s appositive,
are infelicitous, suggesting that the question’s appositive content is not-at-issue, as it does
not establish a QUD. This is the same behavior as we saw in (411), unchanged despite the
removal of the response particles.
The question/answer tests return the same results regardless of the presence/absence
of anaphors (response particles) because their use of them is only incidental. In contrast,
the direct dissent tests rely on explicit anaphors by design; an anaphor-less equivalent to
the direct dissent test in (414) ceases to be the same diagnostic, as demonstrated in (416).
(416) Pauline, who is Margaret’s cousin, was interviewed by Food Network.
a. She wasn’t interviewed by them.
b. She isn’t Margaret’s cousin.
The responses in (416) are both understood to be corrections, and there is no apparent dif-
83To the extent that She’s not Margaret’s cousin is a felicitous discourse move, it is not a response to the
question posed, but rather a correction. It does not address the QUD. Note, in contrast, that She’s not and
She isn’t don’t have the same potential to be felicitous in this context, perhaps because they are too elliptical
to be a useful correction.
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ference in acceptability between a correction of the matrix clause content and a correction
of the appositive clause content. While there is still work to be done in precisely defining
what “direct dissent” is, the presence of these response particles is not incidental. Rather,
the direct dissent tests critically rely on them, and cease to be the same tests without such
anaphors.
The direct dissent tests are mediated by the anaphoric availability of a propositional
antecedent, and thus do not in fact diagnose at-issueness, at least not directly. It could
only be taken to diagnose at-issueness if at-issueness and anaphoric potential were one
and the same: if all and only at-issue content were available for anaphoric reference. In
section §5.4 I will show that this is not the case. I’ll use the question/answer test (Diagnos-
tic #2) to establish the at-issue status of content independently of its anaphoric availability.
I won’t use the anaphora-based direct dissent tests, because as I will demonstrate, one can
directly dissent felicitously to both at-issue and not-at-issue content, and there is at-issue
content which cannot be directly dissented with.
First, however, I will address a potential objection to the presentation of the data we
have seen thus far, namely the difference between sentence-medial and -final appositives.
I’ll argue that their behavior in fact provides further support for my characterization of
the direct dissent test as anaphoric and thus less reliable for diagnosing Simons et al. 2010
at-issueness.
5.3 Medial & final appositives
All of the appositives diagnosed as not-at-issue in Tonhauser 2012, and here in the pre-
vious section, were sentence-medial, but it has been noted that the ability of an appositive
to be targeted by direct assent/dissent is sensitive to the position of the appositive clause
in a sentence (AnderBois et al. 2013; Syrett & Koev 2015). In this section, I explain this
sensitivity as a consequence of the anaphoric nature of the direct dissent test, and demon-
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strate that the question/answer tests do not show the same behavior. This is further
evidence for my claim in §5.2 that the question/answer tests truly diagnose at-issueness,
in contrast to the direct dissent tests, which diagnose only anaphoric availability.
AnderBois et al. 2013 gives (417b) as an example of felicitous direct dissent to a
sentence-final appositive.
(417) a. He told her about Luke, who loved to have his picture taken.
b. No, he didn’t like that at all.
c. No, he told her about Noah. (AnderBois et al. 2013: (52))
This was tested experimentally in Syrett & Koev 2015, which examined participants’ will-
ingness to accept direct dissent to appositives in medial and final positions (for both nom-
inal and clausal appositives). Syrett & Koev 2015 confirmed the intuition that sentence-
final appositives are more acceptable targets for direct dissent than medial appositives.
Syrett & Koev 2015 takes the existence of felicitous dissent to appositives, both me-
dial and final, as evidence for the “shifting at-issue status” of appositives. “[W]e believe
we have reason to think that these appositives may take on at-issue status, provided we
assume that being the target of a direct rejection is one of the main diagnostics for be-
ing at issue. (See, for example, Tonhauser 2012.)” (p. 551–552). This analysis explicitly
presumes that direct rejection (that is, direct dissent) is evidence for at-issue status.
Syrett & Koev 2015 comes to this conclusion because it relies exclusively on the direct
dissent tests as a diagnostic for at-issueness. As discussed in §5.2, the direct dissent tests
rely on anaphoric availability, so they can be misleading as to the interaction between
at-issueness and anaphoric potential. To make this point even clearer, we can observe
the anaphoric nature of the direct dissent tests in their behavior around medial and final
appositives.
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The direct dissent tests, demonstrated in §5.2 only with medial appositives, are sensi-
tive to the position of an appositive: compare the direct dissent test with a medial appos-
itive in (414), repeated here, to a final appositive, as in (418).
(414) Pauline, who is Margaret’s cousin, was interviewed by Food Network.
a. No, she wasn’t interviewed by them.
b. #/?? No, she isn’t Margaret’s cousin.
(418) Food Network interviewed Pauline, who is Margaret’s cousin.
a. No, they didn’t interview her.
b. ? No, she isn’t Margaret’s cousin.
The response in (418b) is significantly less marked than that of (414b). This is the same
effect noticed by AnderBois et al. (2013) and confirmed by Syrett & Koev (2015). We
can explain this behavior if we consider the anaphoric nature of the direct dissent tests.
Anaphora resolution is sensitive to recency, among other things (Ariel 1988 and refer-
ences therein), so it shouldn’t be surprising that the direct dissent tests, which crucially
rely on anaphora, return different results for more recent material (here, sentence-final
appositives).
The question/answer tests, in contrast, show unchanging behavior for both medial
and final appositives. Diagnostic #2 identifies matrix content as at-issue (in (408)) and
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appositive content as not-at-issue (in (409)), regardless of the position of the appositive:
(408) Who did Food Network interview?
a. Pauline, who is Margaret’s cousin, was interviewed by Food Network.
b. Food Network interviewed Pauline, who is Margaret’s cousin.
(409) Who is Margaret’s cousin?
a. # Pauline, who is Margaret’s cousin, was interviewed by Food Network.
b. # Food Network interviewed Pauline, who is Margaret’s cousin.
Diagnostic #3a is similarly unaffected by the position of the appositive. The same behav-
ior we saw with a medal appositive, in (411) repeated here, can be observed with a final
appositive, as in (419).
(411) Was Pauline, who is Margaret’s cousin, interviewed by Food Network?
a. Yes, she was.
b. No, she wasn’t.
c. # Yes, she’s Margaret’s cousin / she is.
d. # No, she’s not Margaret’s cousin / she’s not / she isn’t.
(419) Did Food Network interview Pauline, who is Margaret’s cousin?
a. Yes, they did.
b. No, they didn’t.
c. # Yes, she’s Margaret’s cousin / she is.
d. # No, she’s not Margaret’s cousin / she’s not / she isn’t.
The question/answer tests show the same results for all appositives, regardless of their
position in the sentence, and do not appear to be sensitive to recency. They are sensi-
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tive to discourse structure—the QUD—but not the sentential position of the material that
establishes or addresses that QUD.
The direct dissent tests show differing behavior based on the position of the appositive
in the sentence, as they are sensitive to recency. This supports the notion that the direct
dissent tests are in fact not diagnosing at-issueness, but the anaphoric availability of a
proposition. The QUD-based question/answer tests, in contrast, are not sensitive to the
position of an appositive in a sentence. These diagnostics illustrate that neither medial
nor final appositives can address or establish a QUD, and are thus not-at-issue on the
Simons et al. 2010 definition.
Syrett & Koev 2015 acknowledges the existence of these QUD-based diagnostics, but
argues that appositives in fact can address the QUD, discussing two examples. I’ll now
argue that neither example offers conclusive evidence that appositives can address the
QUD, and that the behavior observed here shows both medial and final appositives to
be not-at-issue. Thus, I argue, the question/answer tests are reliable diagnostics for at-
issueness in a way that the direct dissent tests are not.
First, Syrett & Koev 2015 discusses an example where an appositive alone does not
address the QUD but nevertheless “helps to provide an answer to either of the two QUDs
preceding it” (586). Those explicit questions, though, are why interrogatives, in contrast
to the polar and wh- interrogatives used in Tonhauser 2012 (and here). Why questions
are crucially different from these other questions in that they seek explanations. Because
they seek explanations, such questions have no single comprehensive answer: any an-
swer given is defeasible84 or can be considered insufficiently precise, and additional con-
textual information can always contribute to an explanation (see discussion in Bjorndahl
84For example, even a straightforward answer to a why interrogative is defeasible.
(xiv) Q: Why are these flowers on the table?
A: Edgar put them there this morning.
A′: Edgar put them there this morning. But then at noon, he moved them to the bookshelf. Vanessa
moved them back to the table after Edgar left. So, Vanessa is why those flowers are on the table.
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& Snider 2016). The appositive might contribute information which bolsters an explana-
tion, supporting the matrix clause’s answer to the QUD, but that alone does not constitute
addressing the QUD. If the matrix clause does not address the QUD, then an appositive
alone cannot be taken to address the QUD, even in a why question, as in (420).85
(420) Why did Sophie perform a piece by Mozart?
a. Sophie, who received the longest ovation, adores Mozart.
b. # Sophie, who adores Mozart, received the longest ovation.
c. # The longest ovation went to Sophie, who adores Mozart.
A sentence-final appositive, as in (420c), fares no better at addressing a why QUD than a
medial one, as in (420b).
Syrett & Koev 2015: 587 further points to an example where an appositive appears to
“address one part of a coordinated QUD”, inspired by an example from Koev 2013.86
(421) Q: Who did you see at the potluck and what dish did they bring?
A: I saw Rene´e, who brought an artichoke dip. (Syrett & Koev 2015: (47))
But the concept of a “coordinated QUD” is novel: Roberts 1996 describes no such struc-
ture, instead describing sequences of “relevant sub-questions to some super-question” as
85The only way to get a felicitous reading for (420b) is if one understands Sophie to have chosen her
piece with the intention of getting the longest ovation of the night, along with the assumption that she
knew Mozart to be a crowd favorite. On this reading, of course, it is the main clause which addresses the
QUD, supported by a body of contextual knowledge; the appositive still does not address the QUD.
86Koev 2013 also points to (xv) from Simons et al. 2010 as evidence that appositives can address the
QUD.
(xv) Q: Who’s coming to the dinner tonight?
A: Well, I haven’t talked to Charles, who probably won’t be able to come, but I did talk to Sally,
who is coming. (Simons et al. 2010: (27))
Simons et al. 2010, however, doesn’t describe this as a case of the appositive addressing the QUD. They
describe the example as follows: “Rather than directly answering the overt question, A instead answers the
question of who she has talked to about the dinner” in a way that “includes answers to the overt question”
(324). It includes answers to, but it does not itself answer the explicit question—see the discussion of (421).
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an “enumeration, suggesting a plan for how to attack the super-question”, and says that
one “can only address such sub-questions one at a time” (5). The response in (421A) thus
addresses the first sub-question—as it must, because the second requires an answer to the
first—and not both at once. Rather than thinking of the appositive in (421A) as address-
ing the second sub-question, we should consider it to merely add extra information to the
answer that addresses the first, in just the same way that the appositive in (421A′) does.
(421) A′: I saw Rene´e, who is a doctor. (She brought an artichoke dip.)
A subsequent sentence could address the second sub-question, as in (421A′), but the re-
sponse in (421A) only addresses the first sub-question about who the addressee met. The
appositive in (421A) does entail an answer to the second sub-question, but it is not rele-
vant to the current QUD (the first sub-question), and so it is not at-issue on the Simons
et al. 2010 definition.
We have seen, then, that the question/answer tests return the same results for both
medial and final appositives; being QUD-based, they are indifferent to the sentence posi-
tion of an appositive. Appositives cannot address the QUD, even in why questions, and so
are not-at-issue. The direct dissent tests, in contrast, are sensitive to recency, because they
are anaphora-based and so do not reliably diagnose at-issue status. In the next section,
then, we will make use of the question/answer tests—and not the direct dissent tests—to
establish the at-issue status of propositions whose anaphoric availability we want to test.
5.4 Distinguishing at-issueness from anaphoric availability
Having identified the question/answer tests as reliable diagnostics for the at-issue
status of a proposition, we can now carefully observe the interaction between the at-
issue status of a proposition and its availability for subsequent anaphoric reference. In
this section, I’ll argue that the two are distinct: at-issue status is neither a necessary nor
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sufficient condition for the anaphoric availability of a proposition.
5.4.1 At-issueness is not necessary for anaphora
In this section, I’ll present data which illustrate felicitous anaphoric reference to not-
at-issue content. This demonstrates that a proposition’s being available for anaphoric
reference cannot be used to diagnose its at-issue status. In other words, at-issue status is
not necessary for anaphoric availability, either for direct rejection or for anaphora broadly.
This calls into question the tight linking between at-issueness and anaphoric potential, as
well as the explicit assumption made in Syrett & Koev 2015 that being targeted by direct
rejection implies at-issue status.
As discussed in the previous section, I’ll be using a question/answer test to diag-
nose content as being at-issue or not-at-issue. The novel examples that follow will have
an explicit question establishing the QUD and some at-issue content which addresses
that QUD, both presented in boldface for ease of identification. Propositional anaphors
(including but not limited to response particles) will be presented in italics, with their
antecedents underlined.
First, let’s look at an appositive, which as we’ve already seen is typically taken to
convey not-at-issue content.
(422) [Mark is a high school teacher. His parents come to visit during a school assembly.
His father is looking around the auditorium, curious about Mark’s students.]
Dad: Where are Mark’s students sitting?
Mom: Lisa, who is Mark’s favorite, is sitting in the front row.
He told me that in confidence, though, so don’t tell anyone.
The QUD in (422) is about where Mark’s students are sitting, and is addressed by the
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matrix clause content of the response: Lisa is sitting in the front row. The content con-
veyed by the appositive, that Lisa is Mark’s favorite, does not address the QUD, and so
is not-at-issue by the question/answer test (and so is not in boldface). The anaphor that
in (422) most plausibly refers to the content conveyed by the appositive, even though
it is not-at-issue: the context of (422) makes it very odd for where someone is sitting—
presumably public knowledge—to be something Mark would say in confidence, making
the matrix content an ill-fitting referent for that to pick up. In contrast, that a teacher has
a favorite student is precisely the sort of thing a teacher might want to keep secret, so
the appositive content is a fitting antecedent. The matrix proposition has an associated
discourse referent, and so is a competitor as potential antecedent, but the context makes
the matrix proposition an ill-fitting antecedent, leaving instead the more plausible appos-
itive proposition. So here we have felicitous anaphoric reference to a truly not-at-issue
proposition.
(422) shows us a propositional anaphor (that) referring to a not-at-issue proposition,
but not direct dissent. On its own, (422) suggests that felicitous direct dissent of appositive
content, such as was demonstrated by Syrett & Koev 2015, needn’t invoke a “shifting”
at-issue status: if this sort of not-at-issue content is available for anaphoric reference by
means other than direct dissent, then why posit a change in status when it is also available
for direct dissent? It may be the case that in fact direct dissent is more restricted than
propositional anaphora generally (at least in English87). As we’ll see in a moment, though,
there is also felicitous direct dissent to not-at-issue content.
The anaphoric availability of not-at-issue content is not a feature only of appositive
content; we can also see parallel behavior in speech/attitude reports. Such reports con-
vey multiple propositions which can be at-issue in a given context (Simons 2007, see also
Hunter 2016). For any given report, the matrix clause content which describes the report-
87Krifka 2013 accounts for the more restricted behavior of yes compared to German ja by positing a
syntactic difference, that the latter is at the level of TP while the former is an ActP.
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ing event may be at-issue, or the embedded clause content which conveys the report may
be at-issue, depending on context. For example, the B responses in (423) and (424) are the
same, modulo pronoun resolution and ellipsis, but they differ in terms of which content
is at-issue.
(423) A: Who was Louise with last night?
B: Henry thinks she was with Bill. (Simons 2007: (2))
(424) A: What is bothering Henry?
B: He thinks Louise was with Bill last night. (Simons 2007: (3))
In (423), the QUD is about Louise and who she was with. This is addressed by the em-
bedded clause content of B’s response; the matrix content about Henry only provides the
source of the relevant at-issue information, and is itself not-at-issue. Hunter 2016 calls
this use a “discourse parenthetical report”, as the matrix clause serves to parenthetically
supply the attribution of the embedded report. In contrast, the context of (424) makes the
QUD about Henry and his state of mind. This is addressed by the matrix clause content
of B’s response, so it’s what’s at-issue. The reported content itself is not-at-issue.
In the context of an explicit question which makes the at-issue content clear (that is,
using a question/answer test), we can see felicitous anaphoric reference to a not-at-issue
proposition in a speech report, as in (425):
(425) Q: Who was at the party?
A: Kevin said Meghan was there. Erin told me that.
In the context of (425), it is the embedded clause content of A’s response which is at-issue:
the QUD is about who was at the party, and the embedded clause is what addresses it.
The matrix clause content attributes the source of this report, but is itself not-at-issue.
And yet, a very natural interpretation of (425) is for Erin to have spoken about Kevin, i.e.,
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for the anaphor that to target the not-at-issue matrix clause content.88
As in (422), the example in (425) uses a propositional anaphor in a single speaker
follow-up. We can also see direct assent/dissent to not-at-issue content in a parallel
speech report example:
(426) A: Who was at the party last night?
B: Gabrielle said Polly was there.
a. C: Yes, that’s true, but she’s mistaken. Polly was at the movies.
b. C: No, that’s not true, she said [PAULIE]F was there; you must have misheard
her.
Just like in (425), the QUD in (426) is addressed by the embedded clause content of B’s re-
sponse, both in boldface. The matrix clause content of B’s response introduces the source
of the report, but doesn’t address the QUD, and so is not-at-issue. Nevertheless, this not-
at-issue matrix clause content is available for direct assent in (426a) or direct dissent in
(426b). In (426a), the anaphors yes and that refer to the matrix clause content of B’s re-
sponse: C affirms the reporting but then goes on to deny the content of the report itself.
(426a) addresses the QUD only in the final clause: Polly was at the movies, and thus was
not at the party. In (426b) as well, the anaphors no and that refer to the matrix clause
content of B’s response, here denying the reporting itself (explained as a mishearing).
(426b) doesn’t itself address the QUD, in that it doesn’t entail even a partial answer to
Who was at the party? nor does it preclude Polly from having in fact been at the party
(independently of Gabrielle’s report). It does serve to prevent perhaps-false information
88(425) is at least very marked, if not infelicitous, as a way to report that Erin said something about
Meghan directly. Contrast (425) with (xvi):
(xvi) A: Who was at the party?
B: Kevin said Meghan was there. Erin told me that, too.
The embedded clause content is still available for anaphoric reference, but without the addition of too, the
anaphor in (425) more naturally is interpreted as referring to the matrix clause content.
262
from being added to the common ground, though, if A would otherwise have accepted
B’s assertion as truthful.
The responses in (426) show felicitous direct assent/dissent to not-at-issue content,
without a change in topic or other indication of a shift in QUD (and thus what is at-issue).
Together with (422) and (425), we have evidence of licit anaphoric reference to not-at-issue
propositions. This shows us, first, that at-issueness is not necessary for a proposition to
be available for anaphoric reference, and second, that being targeted by a propositional
anaphor, even in direct dissent, is not evidence for a proposition’s at-issueness, contra the
assumption of Syrett & Koev 2015.
5.4.2 At-issueness is not sufficient for anaphora
In this section, I’ll present data on at-issue contents which systematically fail to be
available for anaphoric reference. This illustrates that given only knowledge about the
at-issue status of a proposition, we can’t predict whether it will be available for anaphora.
In other words, at-issue status is not sufficient for anaphoric availability, either for direct
dissent or for anaphora broadly. This calls into question not only the tight linking of at-
issueness and anaphoric potential in the literature, but also feature (406I) from Tonhauser
2012.
Roberts et al. 2009: 5 tells us that “at-issue content may include non-conventional con-
tent as well, e.g. conversational implicatures which arise as a result of the utterance in
context”, as exemplified by the conversational implicature in (427), the example origi-
nally from Kadmon 2001.
(427) A: I have to pay this bill.
B: The customer accounts office isnt open today. (Roberts et al. 2009: (9))
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“[S]peaker B intends to convey (ii) that A will not be able to pay her bill (or at least not in
the standard way). The second implication, a Relevance implicature, is what is directly
at-issue in the utterance: it is what is intended by the speaker to help resolve the implicit
question raised by A’s utterance.” (Roberts et al. 2009: 5).
The same is true of presuppositions, as “a presupposition. . . can have main point sta-
tus” (Simons 2005: 340), exemplified in (428).
(428) Ann: The new guy is very attractive.
Bud: Yes, and his wife is lovely too. (Simons 2005: (10))
Simons 2005: 340 tell us that “the main point of Buds utterance is to inform Ann that the
new guy has a wife”. It of course also conveys that his wife is lovely, but “another of
the communicated propositions, namely that the new guy has a wife, is more relevant for
Ann than the fact that the wife is lovely” (p. 341) and Ann recognizes Bud’s intention for
her to pick this up, as reflected in the Simons et al. 2010 definition of at-issueness in (405).
In this section, I’ll show that these sorts of at-issue propositions systematically fail
to be available for anaphoric reference. Just like in the previous section, I’ll use a ques-
tion/answer test to clarify the at-issue status of the various propositions floating around
in each example. First, let’s look at a presupposition.
(429) Q: Does Vicky have any siblings?
A: Her brother is a chef, just like me. Her mom told me that.
Xthat he’s a chef
# that he exists
In (429), the explicit QUD is about whether Vicky has any siblings. This QUD is addressed
via the existence presupposition triggered by the DP her brother: Vicky’s brother exists,
therefore she has at least one sibling. That he is a chef, the main clause content, does not
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address the QUD; it is only the existence presupposition that is at-issue. The anaphor that,
however, can’t be interpreted as referring to the at-issue proposition that Vicky’s brother
exists. It can only be understood as referring to the proposition that he’s a chef. If Vicky’s
mom had in fact only told A about his existence, and not his profession, (429) would
not be a felicitous way to report that. The at-issue status of the existence presupposition
is not enough to make it available for anaphoric reference. This is in keeping with our
observation in §3.2.3 that possessives don’t introduce propositional discourse referents.
This existence proposition’s being at-issue does not change that behavior.
We can see the same with a non-presuppositional entailment, as in (430).
(430) [Kim and Jessie are high school students. Kim’s mom asks Jessie’s:]
Q: Where was Kim last night? Was she at the party?
A: The whole class was there! Jessie told me that.
Xthat the whole class was at the party
# that Kim was at the party
The explicit QUD in (430) is about whether Kim was at the party, but the response given
is about the whole class. The QUD is only addressed by an entailment of the answer: if
the whole class was there, then Kim must have been there. This entailed proposition is
what addresses the QUD and so is at-issue. The anaphor that can’t be taken to refer to the
proposition about Kim, however. The only possible reading of (430) is for Jessie to have
told her mom that the entire class was at the party. The proposition that Kim was at the
party, even though it is at-issue, is not an available antecedent for anaphoric reference.
We can see the same pattern with a conversational implicature, as in (431).
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(431) Q: Will Gretchen be able to make the meeting?
A: There’s a pile-up on I-287. Alexa told me that.
Xthat there is a pile-up on I-287
# that Gretchen won’t make the meeting
The explicit QUD in (431) is about Gretchen, but the response given is about a traffic
accident. The QUD is only addressed via conversational implicature, in particular a Rel-
evance implicature: the only way we can take A’s response as relevant is if the traffic
will affect Gretchen’s attendance at the meeting. Given world knowledge and some other
assumptions, we take it that the traffic does bear on this question: presumably Gretchen
would normally take I-287 to get to the meeting, and so now will be unable to attend or
will be delayed. In other words, A’s response conveys, via conversational implicature, the
proposition that Gretchen won’t make the meeting. It’s this proposition which addresses
the QUD, and so it’s this proposition which is at-issue in the context of (431).
Despite being at-issue, the proposition that Gretchen won’t make the meeting (on
time) is not an available antecedent for the anaphor that. The only available interpreta-
tion of (431) has Alexa reporting on the traffic accident, whether or not she knows about
Gretchen or the meeting. If Alexa had told A only about Gretchen’s attendance without
knowing the cause of the delay, (431) is not a felicitous way to report that. So here, too,
we have an at-issue proposition which is unavailable for anaphoric reference.
A version of (431) which involves direct dissent shows us the same unavailability:
(432) Q: Will Gretchen be able to make the meeting?
A: There’s a pile-up on I-287.
B: #No, that’s not true! She’ll be there, she took the subway today!
Xthat there is a pile-up on I-287
# that Gretchen won’t make the meeting
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This variant (432) has the same QUD, the same response, and the same Relevance impli-
cature as (431). Here B attempts to directly reject the at-issue proposition that Gretchen
won’t make the meeting, offering in a follow-up a reason to reject the Relevance impli-
cature: she took the subway, so road traffic won’t affect her travel. Nonetheless, the
anaphors no and that here obligatorily target the proposition that there’s a pile-up; they
cannot refer to the at-issue proposition that Gretchen won’t make the meeting. According
to Tonhauser 2012, at-issue content can be directly dissented with, but (432) shows us that
this is not the case for (at least some) at-issue conversational implicatures.
Parallel examples to (429) and (430) that include direct rejections of entailed content
are hard to construct in a way that makes them demonstrative.
(433) [Kim and Jessie are high school students. Kim’s mom asks Jessie’s:]
Q: Where was Kim last night? Was she at the party?
A: The whole class was there!
B: #That’s not true! Kim was the library all night!
B’s direct dissent in (433) denies the claim that Kim was at the party, but it’s difficult to
determine whether this dissent targets that at-issue proposition, or whether it in fact still
targets the asserted proposition about the whole class. After all, knowing that Kim was
at the library is a reason to deny the claim that the whole class was at the party. My
intuition is that indeed this direct dissent can only target the content that the entire class
was there, bearing on the at-issue content only indirectly, but this is hard to demonstrate
conclusively.
Nevertheless, the data in (429)–(431) are evidence that not all at-issue content can be
targeted by propositional anaphors. And at least in the case of conversational implicature,
(432) shows us an example where at-issue content cannot be directly dissented with. It is
not the case, then, that all content which is at-issue on the Simons et al. 2010 definition is
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available for direct dissent specifically (contra Tonhauser 2012), or for anaphoric reference
more broadly.
5.5 Discussion
Despite the tight linking between at-issueness and anaphoric availability presumed
in the literature, the data presented here show that the two notions are independent of
one another, and must be distinguished. Of the diagnostics presented in Tonhauser 2012,
only the question/answer tests, which tap into what content establishes and addresses
the QUD, diagnose at-issueness as defined by Simons et al. 2010. The direct dissent tests,
which are moderated by the availability of anaphoric antecedents, do not diagnose at-
issueness at all, but rather anaphoric availability.
If we’re interested in the question of what diagnoses at-issueness, then the data pre-
sented here demonstrate that a proposition’s being anaphorically available is neither nec-
essary nor sufficient to determine its at-issue status. The data in §5.4.2 show that felicitous
anaphora is not necessary for determining a proposition as being at-issue, as we can see
the systematic infelicity of anaphoric reference to content which is nevertheless at-issue.
The data in §5.4.1 show us that anaphoric availability is not sufficient, either, as we have
felicitous anaphoric reference to a proposition, where that proposition is nonetheless not
at-issue.
Alternatively, if we’re interested in the question of what determines the anaphoric
potential of a proposition, then the data presented here demonstrate that a proposition’s
being at-issue is neither necessary nor sufficient to determine its anaphoric potential. The
data in §5.4.1 show us that at-issueness is not necessary, as we have felicitous anaphora
(including direct dissent) to not-at-issue propositions. The data in §5.4.2 show us that
at-issueness is not sufficient, as we have at-issue propositions which are systematically
unavailable for anaphoric reference, direct dissent or otherwise. The availability of a
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proposition discourse referent is not sensitive to its at-issue status.
With this insight in hand, there are different directions we could go with our theory
of at-issueness. If we want to pursue a Simons et al. 2010 notion of at-issueness, then we
must decouple it from anaphoric potential. This means that we cannot rely on the direct
assent/dissent tests as a diagnostic for at-issue status, as they behave differently from the
QUD-based diagnostics.
Alternatively, this observation might lead one to move away from the Simons et al.
2010 definition entirely. If we want to model at-issueness using a discourse update system
as in Murray 2010, 2014 or AnderBois et al. 2013, then we need to be careful to ensure that
the mechanisms distinguishing at-issue and not-at-issue content are distinct from those
that determine the availability of propositional anaphora. These systems are compatible
with such changes; as Murray 2014: 8 puts it, the information conveyed by a not-at-issue
proposition “is still present [and] recoverable”. The Murray 2010, 2014 model applied to
English, then, would simply introduce propositional discourse referents for both at-issue
and not-at-issue content, but retain the different update procedure of each. Similarly,
AnderBois et al. 2013 could be easily modified to associate a propositional variable with
not-at-issue content, even while the update procedures are distinct.
Or, we might prefer a system like that of Hunter & Asher 2016, which proposes a
discourse based definition of at-issueness using SDRT (Asher 1993; Asher & Lascarides
2003). On this account, at-issueness and anaphoric potential are indeed closely linked,
but in a way that isn’t at odds with the data discussed here, because they use an entirely
different notion of at-issueness. As defined in Hunter & Asher 2016: 1036, “content is
at-issue at a certain point of the discourse just in case it is on the [Right Frontier (RF)]
of the discourse at that time. Content that is AI becomes NAI when knocked off the RF;
content that is NAI can become AI if targeted through discourse subordination” (and
thus returned to the Right Frontier). And, because discourse referents (propositional and
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otherwise) are only accessible for anaphora resolution in SDRT if they are on the Right
Frontier, propositional content which is available for anaphoric reference is necessarily at-
issue on this account.89 Thus, we can retain the tight association in the literature between
at-issueness and anaphoric potential, but only by reformulating what it means to be at-
issue.
However one chooses to define or model at-issueness, it is important to recognize the
difference between the at-issue status of a proposition and its anaphoric potential. The
two are at least conceptually distinct: at-issueness is about what the main point of an
utterance is, while anaphoric potential is about what propositions are available for sub-
sequent anaphoric reference. On some accounts, they coincide, but on others they come
apart. Crucially, there is a disparity in the diagnostics frequently used in the literature:
some diagnose the at-issue status of a proposition, while others diagnose its anaphoric po-
tential, and these diagnostics don’t always agree. How we define and model at-issueness
must be sensitive to the issue of availability for propositional anaphora.
89This definition also does away with an assumption of Simons et al. 2010, that only one proposition
expressed by a clause is at-issue at any given point in a discourse, which results from the Roberts 2009
description of the QUD system. For Hunter & Asher 2016, both a matrix and embedded/appositive clause
can be at-issue simultaneously, given the right discourse relation that holds between them. If that discourse
relation is subordinating, then both propositions will be on the Right Frontier, and thus both will be at-issue
(and potentially available for subsequent anaphoric reference).
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
Anaphoric reference to propositions underlies a great deal of day-to-day communi-
cation. We might notice it when we explicitly negotiate about the intended referent of a
propositional anaphor like that, though the same process is at play even when no such ne-
gotation is required, every time we identify the antecedent of a that or a so or a which. And
on a deeper representational level, I have argued that embedding verbs, sentential nega-
tion, and indeed the declarative mood all make use of a process which is anaphoric on
propositions. In this sense, propositional anaphora is core to natural language discourse.
In this dissertation, I have taken a closer look at propositional anaphora, in the hopes
of shining a light on a phenomenon which is often overlooked, despite being so fun-
damental and so prevalent. In Chapter 2, I introduced the concepts of anaphora and
propositions, and reviewed the words of English which can be used to make anaphoric
reference to propositions. I then argued that propositional anaphora fits firmly within
the world of anaphora, as it exhibits most if not all of the same features which have been
observed in the nominal, temporal, and modal domains. Propositional anaphora allows
for both referential and bound antecedents, allows for linguistic and non-linguistic an-
tecedents, and can be found in ‘donkey’ contexts. I also discussed examples that show
a strict/sloppy identity ambiguity, though more work remains to be done to determine
whether a propositional anaphor can be the sloppy variable in such a context without the
facilitation of an additional anaphor (e.g., in the examples discussed, a pronoun).
In Chapter 3, I presented a comprehensive investigation into which constructions in-
troduce propositional discourse referents, with the goal of doing for propositions what
Karttunen 1969 did for individuals. I showed that most subclausal constructions do not—
even those like possessive phrases and intersective adjectives which convey propositional
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content (via presupposition and and assertion, respectively)—but that some subclausal
constructions do, such as epistemic small clauses. I showed that sentential negation in-
troduces a propositional discourse referent for its prejacent while constituent negation
does not, and that epistemic modals do but root modals do not. I also showed that,
while matrix declarative and polar interrogative clauses make a proposition available for
anaphoric reference, embedded polar interrogatives, (both matrix and embedded) wh-
and alternative interrogatives, and imperatives, do not. I argued that the generalization of
which constructions introduce propositional discourse referents cannot be a syntactic one
(like that of Krifka 2013), as some but not all object raising and subject control construc-
tions make a proposition available for anaphoric reference. Ultimately, the generalization
must be sensitive to the semantics of a construction, in particular the semantic type of
the argument taken by an operator. I then discussed how this generalization might be
understood, and how it differentiates propositional anaphora from individual anaphora,
as well as how the two are similar, e.g., with respect to formal representation.
This chapter presented some surprising results, and as a consequence raises some in-
teresting questions, many of which remain open for future investigation. For one, the
pattern of epistemics—small clause embedding verbs, DP- and VP-adverbs, and auxil-
iary verbs—is surprising, and raises some questions about how this behavior should be
understood. Are these all the result of some post-surface (LF) movement, raising these
epistemic morphemes to the same high syntactic position? Or, alternatively, is there a
full Cinque 1999 hierarchy at work even in an adverbial modification? And is the same
necessary for small clause embedding verbs, or, as discussed earlier, should one take the
anaphoric behavior of epistemic small clause constructions as evidence that these small
clauses are in fact covert infinitives? These data have consequences not just for how we
analyze small clauses or modal auxiliaries—both of which seem less homogeneous than
we might otherwise have thought—but also for more general theories of syntax and the
syntax-semantics interface.
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Chapter 3 also unconvered some surprising behavior among the interrogatives. First,
that among the types of interrogatives, only polar interrogatives introduce propositional
discourse referents; not even sentential alternative interrogatives, which seem to plainly
invoke a disjunction of full tensed clauses, allow for anaphoric reference to one of the
alternatives—even while disjunction in declaratives does. But perhaps even more sur-
prising is the disparate behavior of matrix and embedded polar interrogatives: where
matrix polar interrogatives introduce a discourse referent for the partitioning proposition,
embedded polar interrogatives do not. This demands an explanation—one I have not pro-
vided here—and whatever the analysis, will have consequences for how we think about
sentence mood, especially in relation to theories of “embedded mood”. More broadly, the
anaphoric behavior of interrogatives has consequences for how we analyze and model
questions in discourse: even absent the “polarity” of response particles, it is not sufficient
to model the propositions which make up possible answers to a question as having the
same status. And, similarly, we should not model the possible responses to polar ques-
tions the same way we model the possible responses to alternative or wh- questions, as
we have seen them to have different anaphoric behavior.
In Chapter 4, I reviewed a number of formal systems which might be used to model
anaphoric reference to propositions. For each system, I discussed what might need to
be adapted in order to account for the data presented and the generalization developed
in Chapter 3. These included systems which were built to handle anaphora—in particu-
lar, individual anaphora—, as well as systems whose logical language already includes
propositional variables. I then presented a novel formal system, incorporating insights
from many of these existing formalisms, to model the data which is are interest here.
Ultimately, the system presented here is compositional at the sentence level; I leave it for
future work to present a system which is compositional at the level of the morpheme, and
which models anaphoric reference to propositions in parallel with reference to individu-
als, events, and other domains. Such a system would also ideally represent the different
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statuses a proposition can have in relation to a discourse, such as were discussed at the
end of Chapter 4, and which were the focus of Chapter 5.
Chapter 5 explored the relationship between a proposition’s availability for anaphoric
reference and its status in the discourse, i.e., its at-issue status. There has been a tight
linking between these two properties presumed in the literature, but I argued that this
is not the case. Focusing on the Simons et al. 2010 definition of at-issueness, I dis-
cussed the diagnostics presented in Tonhauser 2012 and argued that one of these classes
of diagnostics—the direct dissent tests—in fact diagnoses the anaphoric availability of
a proposition, not its at-issue status. Using the other two classes of diagnostics, which
are QUD-based and thus closer to the QUD-based definition of at-issueness from Simons
et al. 2010, I presented novel data to argue that the at-issue status of a proposition and its
availability for anaphoric reference are in fact independent. I showed that there are not-
at-issue propositions which are nevertheless available for anaphoric reference, indicating
that at-issueness is not necessary for anaphoric availability. I also showed examples of at-
issue propositions which systematically fail to be available for anaphoric reference, which
indicates that at-issue status is also not a sufficient condition for a proposition to be avail-
able for anaphora. I then discussed what these data might mean for our conception of
at-issueness, including for approaches other than that of Simons et al. 2010.
Ultimately, the data and discussions in Chapters 3 and 5 raise even more questions
about the nature of propositional anaphora, in particular about its relation to other types
of anaphora. While Chapter 2 argued that propositional anaphora is a kind of anaphora,
it also seems different in some crucial ways from other kinds of anaphora. As we saw
in Chapter 3, propositional anaphora is not sensitive to truth in the way that individ-
ual anaphora is, and in Chapter 5 we saw this insensitivity extended to discourse status
more broadly, at least in terms of Simons et al. 2010 at-issueness. (It remains to be seen
whether, or to what extent, this gap is closed under an alternative notion of at-issueness,
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such as that of Hunter & Asher 2016.) And, while the discourse referents for individ-
ual, tense, and modal anaphora seem to be introduced by the antecedent phrases or
morphemes which describe individuals, times, and worlds (respectively), propositional
anaphora seems to rely not on proposition-denoting clauses but on the operators which
take those propositions as arguments. Why this disparity should be, and what other con-
sequences it has for propositional anaphora versus other kinds of anaphora, still remain
open questions.
This dissertation represents an advance in what we know about anaphoric reference
to propositions, but there is yet more work to be done. In addition to the lingering ques-
tions mentioned above, this work invites a rich cross-linguistics examination of the range
of variation of this phenomenon. I have only discussed anaphoric reference to proposi-
tions in English, here. There are parts of this analysis which might well be true across
languages—e.g., I would expect the semantic type generalization of Chapter 3 is not
just a fact about English—but work must be done to confirm (or deny) those parts. In
addition, there are questions about propositional anaphora which simply cannot be an-
swered by looking only at English: What happens in languages with gender, animacy,
and other noun class marking on anaphoric pro-forms? What about in languages with
richer demonstrative systems (like Korean)? Are there other parts of speech which can
serve as propositional anaphors beyond those used by English? There are also questions
to be answered about the way propositional anaphora interacts with topicalization (e.g.,
in cleft constructions) and other discourse structural processes. I hope that this work will
spur research into these questions and other related areas.
More broadly, this dissertation represents a case study for how the careful examination
of what might be considered a discourse-level phenomenon can provide insight not only
into discourse-pragmatic processes, but also into syntactic structure and semantic compo-
sition. Paying attention to both the prior discourse context of an utterance—including but
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not limited to the current Question under Discussion—as well as the utterance’s effects
on subsequent discourse—e.g., which types of anaphors are licensed—can tell us more
about an utterance than a sentence in isolation can. While there remain open questions
about propositional anaphora and the structures which license it, this dissertation pro-
vides an argument for why linguistic phenomena should not be studied only in isolation,
but should also be considered in a rich discourse context.
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APPENDIX A
FORMAL FRAGMENTS
VOCABULARY
• n-place predicates
• individual constants
• individual variables
• negation ¬
• conjunction ∧
• disjunction ∨
• implication→
• existential ∃
• universal ∀
• identity =
SYNTAX
1. If t1, . . . , tn are individual constants or variables, R is an n-place predicate, then Rt1 . . . tn is
a formula.
2. If t1 and t2 are individual constants or variables, then t1 = t2 is a formula.
3. If φ is a formula, then ¬φ is a formula.
4. If φ and ψ are formulas, then [φ ∧ ψ] is a formula.
5. If φ and ψ are formulas, then [φ ∨ ψ] is a formula.
6. If φ and ψ are formulas, then [φ→ ψ] is a formula.
7. If φ is a formula, and x is a variable, then ∃xφ is a formula.
8. If φ is a formula, and x is a variable, then ∀xφ is a formula.
9. Nothing is a formula except on the basis of 1–8.
SEMANTICS
A model M is a pair 〈D,F 〉, where D is a non-empty set of individuals, F an interpretation func-
tion, having as its domain the individual constants and predicates. If α is an individual constant,
then F (α) ∈ D; if α is an n-place predicate, then F (α) ⊆ Dn. An assignment g is a function as-
signing an individual to each variable: g(x) ∈ D. G is the set of all assignment functions. Next,
we define JtKg = g(t) if t is a variable, and JtKg = F (t) if t is an individual constant.
1. JRt1 . . . tnK = {〈g, h〉|h = g & 〈Jt1Kh . . . JtnKh〉 ∈ F (R)}.
2. Jt1 = t2K = {〈g, h〉|h = g & Jt1Kh = Jt2Kh}.
3. J¬φK = {〈g, h〉|h = g & ¬∃k : 〈h, k〉 ∈ JφK}.
4. Jφ ∧ ψK = {〈g, h〉|∃k : 〈g, k〉 ∈ JφK & 〈k, h〉 ∈ JψK}.
5. Jφ ∨ ψK = {〈g, h〉|h = g & ∃k : 〈h, k〉 ∈ JφK ∨ 〈h, k〉 ∈ JψK}.
6. Jφ→ ψK = {〈g, h〉|h = g & ∀k : 〈h, k〉 ∈ JφK =⇒ ∃j : 〈k, j〉 ∈ JψK}.
7. J∃xφK = {〈g, h〉|∃k : k[x]g & 〈k, h〉 ∈ JφK}.
8. J∀xφK = {〈g, h〉|h = g & ∀k : k[x]h =⇒ ∃j : 〈k, j〉 ∈ JφK}.
φ is true with respect to g in M iff ∃h : 〈g, h〉 ∈ JφKM .
φ is valid iff ∀M∀g : φ is true with respect to g in M .
φ is a contradiction if ∀M∀g : φ is false with respect to g in M .
Figure 2: Fragment of Dynamic Predicate Logic (Groenendijk & Stokhof 1991)
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Figure 3: Fragment of Discourse Representation Theory (Asher 1993)
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VOCABULARY
Object language symbols:
x, y, x1, . . . individual, eventuality, or plural discourse referent variables
e, e1, . . . eventuality discourse referent variables
P, Q, P1, Q1, . . . predicative DRS variables
u, x, y, z, x1, . . . discourse referents (individual type)
loves( , ), boy( ), etc. DRT predicates
⇒,¬,∨ DRS operators
Metalinguistic symbols:
x, y, z, x1, . . . variables over individual, eventuality, or plural discourse referents
e, e1, . . . variables over eventuality discourse referents
t1, e2, . . . variables over temporal discourse referents
x,y, . . . variables over discourse referent variables
e, e1, . . . variables over eventuality discourse referent variables
K, K′, K1, . . . variables over DRSs
P, Q, Q1, . . . variables over predicative DRS variables
ϕ,ψ, ζ variables over DRT predicates
Φ,Ψ,Φ1, . . . variables over DRT conditions and sets of DRTS conditions
Given the above:
(i) If ψ is n-ary, then ψ(x1, . . . , xn) is an atomic condition.
(ii) x1 = x2, e1 < e2, e1 < t are conditions.
(iii) If ψ is a quantifier relation symbol, then the following are conditions: ¬K, K1⇒ K2, e-K, and
K1
ψ
x K2.
(iv) If x is a discourse referent in UK, then X = ΣxK is a condition.
(v) X = x1 + . . .+ xn is a condition.
(vi) A DRS is a pair 〈U,Con〉, where U is a set of discourse referents, and Con a set of conditions.
Conditions that contains subDRSs are complex conditions; those without constituent conditions
are simple or atomic conditions. An atomic DRS contains only atomic conditions; otherwise it is
complex.
Subordination: If K is a constituent of a complex condition of K′, then K is subordinate to K′. If Kn is
a constituent of a complex condition of Kn−1 and Kn−1 is subordinate to K, then Kn is subordinate
to K.
Accessibility: Let K = K0 or K be subordinate to K0. Then:
(i) If x, y ∈ UK, then y is accessible to x in K0;
(ii) if K′ is subordinate to K and x ∈ UK′ and y ∈ UK, then y is accessible to x in K0;
(iii) if y ∈ UK′ , x ∈ UK′′ and K′ ⇒ K′′ is a complex condition of K, then y is accessible to x in K0;
(iv) otherwise, y is not accessible to x in K0.
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Figure 3, continued
SEMANTICS
An intentional DRS model M is a quintuple 〈W, T, D, E, J K〉.
(i) W and T are non-empty sets (of worlds and times respectively).
(ii) D is a function from W × T into a non-empty, atomic lattice (D〈w,t〉 is the “domain of indi-
viduals and sums of individuals in w at t”).
(iii) E is a function from W × T into a set of objects (eventualities) partially well ordered by
inclusion such that:
(a) if φ is an E-path description, ∀e1 ∈ E〈w,t1〉∀e2 ∈ E〈w,t2〉 . . . ∀en ∈ E〈w,tn〉(ϕ(e1, . . . en) →
∃e′ ∈ E〈w,tn〉(e1 ⊂ e& . . .&en ⊂ e′) and
(b) if ψ is an eventuality description,
then ∃e′ ∈ E〈w,t〉∀e ∈ E〈w,t〉∀x1, . . . , xnψ(e, x1, . . . , xn)→ e ⊂ e′)
E〈w,t〉 is the “domain of eventualities in w at t”. Dom(〈w, t〉) = D〈w,t〉 ∪ E〈w,t〉.
(iv) J K is an interpretation function that assigns to DRS predicates functions δ such that for
〈w, t〉 ∈W× Tδ(〈w, t〉) ∈ P(∪n∈ω(Dom(〈w, t〉))n).
To quantifier relation symbols, J K assigned functions γ such that for 〈w, t〉 ∈ W × T into
γ(〈w, t〉) ∈ PP(∪n∈ω(Dom(〈w, t〉)n)), where Dom(〈w, t〉) = D〈w,t〉 ∪ E〈w,t〉.
e1 ⊕ e2 = min⊂{e′ : e1 ⊂ e′&e2 ⊂ e′} if there is such an e′; = 0 otherwise
Define a proper embedding of a DRS K in a model M with respect to a function from discourse refer-
ents into objects in DM〈w,t〉. Call any such function from discourse referents into DM an embedding
function.
Define an embedding function g to extend an embedding function f relative to K in M at 〈w, t〉 (writ-
ten g ⊇K f) just in case Dom(g) = Dom(f)∪UK,g ⊇ f.
Define an external anchor for K in M to be a partial function from UK into (∪〈w,t〉∈W×T(Dom(〈w, t〉))∪
T, such that if n ∈ UK then A(n) = the utterance time of the discourse, and if i ∈ UKA(i) = the
speaker of the discourse.
Define a proper embedding f of K in M at 〈w, t〉 (written [f,K]Mw,t) with respect to a possibly empty ex-
ternal anchor A for K in M and satisfaction for a condition in M relative to an embedding function
f for the DRS in which the conditions occur at 〈w, t〉 (written (M, w, t)|=f).
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Figure 3, continued
SATISFACTION
(i) If ψ is an atomic condition of the form φ(x1, . . . , xn), then (M, w, t)|=f ψ iff 〈f(x1), . . . , f(x)n〉 ∈JφKMw,t.
(ii) If ψ is an atomic condition of the form x1 = x2, then M(M, w, t)|=f ψ iff f(x1) = f(x2).
(ii) If ψ is a condition of the form X = x1 +. . .+xn, then (M, w, t)|=f ψ iff f(X) = f(x1)⊕. . .⊕f(xn).
(iii) If ψ is a condition of the form X = ΣxK1 , then (M, w, t)|=f ψ iff f(X) = ⊕{b ∈ D〈w, t〉 :
∃g ⊇K1 f(g(x) = b & [g,K1]Mw,t,f)}.
(iv) If ψ is of the form e-K1, then (M, w, t)|=f ψ iff ∃g ⊇K1 f[g,K1]Mw,t,f).
(v) If ψ is a condition of the form K1 ⇒ K2, then (M, w, t)|=f ψ iff ∀g ⊇K1 f([g,K1]Mw,t,f → ∃h ⊇K2
g[h,K2]Mw,t,g).
(vi) If ψ is a condition of the form K1
ψ
x K2, then (M, w, t)|=f ψ iff 〈{b : ∃g ⊇K1
f[g,K1]Mw,t,f & g(x) = b}, {b : ∃g ⊇K1 f[g,K1]Mw,t,f & ∃h ⊇K2 g[h,K2]Mw,t,gh(x) = b}〉 ∈ JφKMw,t.
(vii) If ψ is a condition of the form ¬K1, then (M, w, t)|=f ψ iff ¬∃g ⊇K1 f[g,K1]Mw,t,f.
(viii) If A is an external anchor for K in M, then [f,K]Mw,t,g iff
(i) f ⊇K g; (ii) A ⊆ f; (iii) ∀θ ∈ ConK(M, w, t)|=f θ.
(ix) [f,K]Mw,t iff [f,K]
M
w,t,∅.
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VOCABULARY
• set of information states Sn about n subjects Sn = P(Dn) , where S = ⋃n∈N Sn
• relation constants Rn of arity n • individual anaphors A = {pi | i ∈ N}
• individual constants C
• individual variables V
• set of terms T = {C, V,A}
• negation ¬
• conjunction ∧
• existential ∃
For a state s ∈ Sn and 0 < j ≤ n, and for any case e = 〈d1, . . . , dn〉 ∈ s, dj is a possible value of the
j-th subject of s, and this value will also be indicated as ej .
If e ∈ Dn and e′ ∈ Dm, then e · e′ = 〈e1, . . . , en, e′1, . . . , e′m〉 ∈ Dn+m
Extension: e ≤ e′ iff ∃e′′ : e′ = e · e′′
For s ∈ Sn (i ∈ Dn), Ns (= Ni) = n, the number of subjects of s (i)
Update: s ≤ s′ iff Ns ≤ Ns′ and ∀e′ ∈ s′∃e ∈ s : e ≤ e′
SYNTAX
The set L of PLA formulas is the smallest set such that:
1. if t1, . . . , tn ∈ T and R ∈ Rn, then Rt1 . . . tn ∈ L
2. if t1, t2 ∈ T , then t1 = t2 ∈ L
3. if φ ∈ L, then ¬φ ∈ L
4. if φ ∈ L and x ∈ V , then ∃xφ ∈ L
5. if φ, ψ ∈ L, then (φ ∧ ψ) ∈ L
∀xφ abbreviates ¬∃x¬φ φ→ ψ abbreviates ¬(φ ∧ ¬ψ)
s JφKM,g is the interpretation of φ in info state s with respect to modelM and assignment g.JφKM,g is a (partial) update function on info states.
SEMANTICS
A PLA modelM = 〈D,F 〉 consists of a non-empty domainD of individuals, and an interpretation
function F which assigns individuals in D to individual constants and sets of n-tuples of individ-
uals to n-place relation expressions. Constants and variables are evaluated in the usual way with
respect to a model and an assignment function. Pronouns are evaluated relative to an information
state s and a case e ∈ s.
• [c]M,s,e,g = F (c) for all constants c
• [x]M,s,e,g = g(x) for all variables x
• [pi]M,s,e,g = eNs−i for all pronouns pi and e and s such that e ∈ s and Ns > i
If X is a set of terms, then Ix is the smallest number ≥ the index of every pronoun in X .
1. s JRt1 . . . tnKM,g = {e ∈ s | 〈[t1]M,s,e,g, . . . , [tn]M,s,e,g〉 ∈ F (R)} (if Ns > I{t1,...,tn})
2. s Jt1 = t2KM,g = {e ∈ s | [t1]M,s,e,g = [t2]M,s,e,g} (if Ns > I{t1,t2})
3. s J¬φKM,g = {e ∈ s | ¬∃e′ : e ≤ e′ & e′ ∈ s JφKM,g}
4. s J∃xφKM,g = {e′ · d | d ∈ D & e′ ∈ s JφKM,g[x/d]}
5. s Jφ ∧ ψKM,g = s JφKM,g JψKM,g
Support: s |=M,g φ iff ∀e ∈ s : ∃e′ : e ≤ e′ & e′ ∈ s JφKM,g
Entailment: φ1, . . . , φn |= ψ iff ∀M, g∀s ∈ S : s Jφ1KM,g . . . s JφnKM,g |=M,g ψ (if defined)
Figure 4: Fragment of Predicate Logic with Anaphora (Dekker 1994)
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VOCABULARY & SYNTAX
The vocabulary and syntax of DMPL are like those of DPL, but with a construction for epistemic
‘might’ added:
DMPL pi ..= Rt · · · t | t = t | v ..=? | pi;pi | ¬pi | ♦pi.
SEMANTICS
A DMPL modelM is a pair 〈M,W 〉whereW is a set of first order interpretations over the universe
M . Variable assignments forM are elements of MV . Index sets forM are subsets of W .JpiKsu(I) = J means that given input assignment s and output assignment u (forM), pi maps index
set I to index set J .
1. JRt1 · · · tnKsu(I) = {i ∈ I | s = u and M, i |=s Rt1 · · · tn}
2. Jt1 = t2Ksu(I) = {i ∈ I | s = u and M, i |=s t1 = t2}
3. Jpi1;pi2Ksu(I) = {i ∈ I | there is an r with i ∈ Jpi2Kru(Jpi1Ksr(I))}
4. J¬piKsu(I) = {i ∈ I | s = u and there is no r with i ∈ JpiKsr(I)}
5. Jv ..=?Ksu(I) = {i ∈ I | u = s(x|d) for some d ∈M} (reduces to either I or ∅)
6. J♦piKsu(I) = {i ∈ I | u = s and there is an r with JpiKsr(I) 6= ∅} (reduces to either I or ∅)J♦pi1 ⇒ pi2Ksu(I) = {i ∈ I | s = u and ∀r with i ∈ Jpi1Ksr(I) ∃p with i ∈ Jpi2Ksp(Jpi1Ksr(I))}
A program pi is acceptable (inM) for inputs I and s if there is an u for which JpiKsu(I) 6= 1.
A program pi is accepted by I , given s, if there is an u for which JpiKsu(I) = 1.
A program pi is valid if for all modelsM, for all I, s forM, pi is accepted by I , given s.
Figure 5: Fragment from van Eijck & Cepparello 1994
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DEFINITION OF TERMS
A referent system is a function r, which has as its domain a finite set of variables v, and as its range
a number of pegs. If the number of pegs in a referent system is n, then the numbers m < n are its
pegs. The quantifier ∃x adds the variable x to the domain, introduces the next peg, and associates
x with that peg.
r[x/n] is the referent system r′ which is like r, except that its domain is v ∪ {x}, and its range is
n + 1, and r′(x) = n. If x is already present in r, it is associated with the new peg; the peg that x
had been connected with before remains, but is no longer associated with a variable.
Extension: Let r and r′ be two referent systems with domains v and v′, ranges n and n′, respectively.
r′ is an extension of r, r ≤ r′, iff v ⊆ v′;n ≤ n′; if x ∈ v then r(x) = r′(x) or n ≤ r′(x); if x /∈ v and
x ∈ v′ then n ≤ r′(x).
Possibilities: Let D, the domain of discourse, and W , the set of possible worlds, be two disjoint non-
empty sets. The possibilities based onD andW is the set of I of triples 〈r, g, w〉, where r is a referent
system; g is a function from the range of r into D; w ∈W .
Let α be a basic expression, i = 〈r, g, w〉 ∈ I , with v the domain of r, and I based upon W and D.
The denotation of α in i is defined as:
i. If α is an individual constant, then i(α) = w(α) ∈ D.
ii. If α is an n-place predicate, then i(α) = w(α) ⊆ Dn.
iii. If α is a variable such that α ∈ v, then i(α) = g(r(α)) ∈ D, else i(α) is not defined.
Information states: Let I be the set of possibilities based on D and W . The set of information states
based on I is the set S s.t. s ∈ S iff s ⊆ I , and ∀i, i′ ∈ s : i and i′ have the same referent system.
Information growth: Let i = 〈r, g, w〉 ∈ I ; n the range of r; d ∈ D, s ∈ S.
i. i[x/d] = 〈r[x/n], g[n/d], w〉 ii. s[x/d] = {o[x/d] | i ∈ s}
Extension: Let i, i′ ∈ I , i = 〈r, g, w〉 and i′ = 〈r′, g′, w′〉, and s, s′ ∈ S.
i. i′ is an extension of i, i ≤ i′ iff r ≤ r′, g ⊆ g′, and w = w′.
ii. s′ is an extension of s, s ≤ s′ iff ∀i′ ∈ s′ : ∃i ∈ s : i ≤ i′.
Let s, s′ ∈ S, s ≤ s′, i ∈ s, i′ ∈ s′.
i. i′ is a descendant of i in s′ iff i ≤ i′.
ii. i subsists in s′ iff i has one or more descendants in s′.
iii. s subsists in s′ iff all i ∈ s subsist in s′.
SEMANTICS
A formula φ of this language is interpreted as a (partial) function, [φ], from information states to
information states. Postfix notation is used: s[φ] is the result of updates s with φ.
Let s ∈ S be an information state, and φ a formula of the language. The update of s with φ is
recursively defined as follows:
i. s[Rt1 . . . tn] = {i ∈ s | 〈i(t1), . . . , i(tn)〉 ∈ i(R)}
ii. s[t1 = t2] = {i ∈ s | i(t1) = i(t2)}
iii. s[¬φ] = {i ∈ s | i does not subsist in s[φ]}
iv. s[φ ∧ ψ] = s[φ][ψ]
v. s[∃xφ] = ∪d∈D(s[x/d][φ])
vi. s[♦φ] = {i ∈ s | s[φ] 6= ∅}
Figure 6: Fragment from Groenendijk et al. 1995b, 1996
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Figure 7: Fragment of Update with Centering (Bittner 2009)
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VOCABULARY
• 〈D〉n,m = Dn ×Dm is the set of >⊥-lists of n topical objects and m background objects
• For any >⊥-list i = 〈i1, i2〉 ∈ 〈D〉n,m, >i = i1 and ⊥i = i2. Thus, i = 〈>i,⊥i〉.
• An n,m-infotention state is any subset of 〈D〉n,m. The null set, ∅, is the absurd state.
Discourse deferents for propositions (type ωt), worlds (ω), individuals, (δ), events (ε), states (σ),
times (τ ). These compose (Θ|5). A >⊥-list is an object of type s.
The set of UC types Θ is the smallest set such that
(i) {t, ω, δ, ε, σ, τ} ⊆ Θ, (ii) (ab) ∈ Θ, and (iii) s ∈ Θ.
• common ground p0
• speech event e0
• run time ϑ
• place pi
• temporal precedence <
• consequent state CON
• beginning BEG
• experiencer DAT
• end END
• center CTR
SYNTAX
Define for each type a ∈ Θ the set of a-terms as follows:
1. Cona ∪ Vara ⊆ Terma
2. λua(B) ∈ Termab, if ua ∈ Vara and B ∈ Termb
3. BA ∈ Termb, if B ∈ Termab and A ∈ Terma
4. ¬A, (A→ B), (A ∧B), (A ∨B) ∈ Termt, if A,B ∈ Termt
5. ∀uaB, ∃uaB ∈ Termt, if ua ∈ Vara and B ∈ Termt
6. (A = B) ∈ Termt, if A,B ∈ Terma
7. (ua>⊕B), (ua⊥⊕B) ∈ Terms, if a ∈ (Θ|5), ua ∈ Vara, and B ∈ Terms
8. >a,⊥a ∈ Termsa, if a ∈ (Θ|5)
9. A{B} ∈ Termat, if a ∈ (Θ|5), A ∈ Termsa, and B ∈ Termst
10. (A ; B), (A >; B), (A ⊥; B) ∈ Term(st)st, if A,B ∈ Term(st)st
11. (A ⊂ B), (A < B) ∈ Termt, if A,B ∈ Termt
12. CON A ∈ Termσ, if A ∈ Termε
BEG A, END A ∈ Termε, if A ∈ Termσ
CTR A, DAT A ∈ Termδ, if A ∈ Termε ∪ Termσ
13. ϑ(W,A) ∈ Termτ , if W ∈ Termω and A ∈ Termε ∪ Termσ
pi(W,A) ∈ Termδ, if W ∈ Termω and A ∈ Termε ∪ Termσ
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Figure 7, continued
FRAMES
A UC frame is a set {Da|a ∈ Θ} of non-empty pairwise disjoint sets where:
(i) Dt = {1, 0}, Dτ is the set of non-empty convex sets of integers;
(ii) Da, b = {f |∅ ⊂ Domf ⊆ Da ∧ Ranf ⊆ Db}; and
(iii) Ds ∪n,m≥0 〈D〉n,m, with D = ∪a∈(Θ|5)Da.
{}f is the set characterized by function f XA is the characteristic function of set A
MODELS
A UC-model is a structure M = 〈{Da|a ∈ Θ}, <t,p0,e0, J·K〉, where:
(i) {Da|a ∈ Θ} is a UC frame;
(ii) for all t, t′ ∈ Dτ , t <τ t′ iff ∀n ∈ t∀n′ ∈ t′ : n < n′;
(iii) p0 ∈ Dωt\{∅} and e0 ∈ Dε; and
(iv) J·K assigns to each A ∈ Cona a value JAK ∈ Da and
to each B ∈ {CON, BEG, END, CTR, DAT, ϑ, pi} a value JBK such that:
(a) JCONK ∈ Dεσ, JBEGK, JENDK ∈ Dσε, JCTRK, JDATK ∈ {fε ∪ fσ|fε ∈ Dεδ ∧ fσ ∈ Dσδ},JϑK ∈ {fε ∪ fσ|fε ∈ Dωετ ∧ fσ ∈ Dωστ}, JpiK ∈ {fε ∪ fσ|fε ∈ Dωεδ ∧ fσ ∈ Dωσδ}
(b) ∀w ∈ Dω,a ∈ Dδ,e ∈ Dε, s ∈ Dσ,ev ∈ Dε ∪Dσ, t ∈ Dτ :JϑK(w,e) = t→ ∃n : t = {n} ∧ JϑK(w, JBEGK(JCONK(e))) = {(n+ 1)}JϑK(w,s) = t→ {min< t} = JϑK(w, JBEGK(s)) <τ JϑK(w, JENDK(s)) = {max< t}
(c) JCTRK(ev) = a→ JCTRK(JBK(ev)) = a for B ∈ {CON, BEG, END}
〈ev,a, . . .〉 ∈ {}JAK(w)→ JCTRK(ev) = a forA ∈ Conωεδ...t ∪ Conωσδ...t
(d) ∃t∀w ∈ {}p0 : t = JϑK(w,e0) ∧ 〈e0, JCTRK(e0)〉 ∈ {}JspkK(w)
The pair 〈p0,e0〉 is the utterance context of M .
The default infotention state ∗〈p0,e0〉 ..= X{〈〈t,w,p0,e0〉, 〈 〉〉 | w ∈ {}p0 ∧ t = JϑK(w,e0)}
ABBREVIATIONS
i. (x)n = the nth coordinate, xn for x ∈ Dn+m, n ≥ 1
(x)a = the subsequence consisting of xi ∈ Da for x ∈ Dn, a ∈ Θ
ii. (d⊕ x) = 〈d, x1, . . . , xn〉 for d ∈ D, x ∈ Dn
y > x iff y = (y1 ⊕ . . . (yn ⊕ x)) for x ∈ Dn, y ∈ Dn+m
y ≥ x iff y > x ∨ y = x for x ∈ Dn, y ∈ Dm
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Figure 7, continued
SEMANTICS
X
.
= Y reads as ‘X is Y if Y is defined, else X is undefined’
i. JAKg = JAK for any A ∈ ConaJuKg = g(u) for any u ∈ Vara
ii. Jλua(B)Kg(d) .= JBKg[u/d] for any d ∈ Da
iii. JBAKg .= JBKg(JAKg)
iv. J¬AKg .= 1\JAKgJ(A→ B)Kg .= 1\(JAKg\JBKg)J(A ∧B)Kg .= JAKg ∩ JBKgJ(A ∨B)Kg .= JAKg ∪ JAKg
v. J∀uaAKg .= ⋂d∈DaJAKg[u/d]J∃uaAKg .= ⋃d∈DaJAKg[u/d]
vi. JAa = BaKg .= |{〈d,d′〉 ∈ Da2| d = JAKg ∧ d′ = JBKg ∧ d = d′}|
vii. Jua>⊕BKg .= 〈(g(ua)⊕>JBKg),⊥JBKg〉Jua⊥⊕BKg .= 〈>JBKg, (g(ua)⊕⊥JBKg)〉
viii. J>aKg(i) .= ((>i)a)1 for any i ∈ DsJ⊥aKg(i) .= ((⊥i)a)1 for any i ∈ Ds
ix. JA{B}Kg .= X{JAKg(i)| i ∈ {}JBKg}
x. cJA;BKg .= cJAKgJBKg for any c ∈ Dst
cJA >; BKg .= {l ∈ cJA;BKg | ∃a∀k ∈ cJA;BKg ∃j ∈ cJA;BKg ∃i ∈ c ∃d ∈ Da :
>k ≥ >j > >i ∧ (>j)1 = d ∧ JBKg 6= JB[>a/⊥a]Kg ∧ J>aKg(k) = d}
cJA ⊥; BKg .= {l ∈ cJA;BKg | ∃a∀k ∈ cJA;BKg ∃j ∈ cJA;BKg ∃i ∈ c ∃d ∈ Da :
⊥k ≥ ⊥j > ⊥i ∧ (⊥j)1 = d ∧ JBKg 6= JB[⊥a/>a]Kg ∧ J⊥aKg(k) = d}
xi. JA ⊂ BKg .= |{〈t, t′〉 ∈ Dτ 2| t = JAKg ∧ t′ = JBKg ∧ t ⊂ t′}|JA < BKg .= |{〈t, t′〉 ∈ Dτ 2| t = JAKg ∧ t′ = JBKg ∧ t <τ t′}|
xii. JBAKg .= JBKg(JAKg)
xiii. JB(W,A)Kg .= JBKg(JW Kg, JAKg)
Given a state c, an (st)st termK adds the primary topics>cK = {(>j)1 | ∀g : j ∈ {}(cJKKg)∧j /∈ {}c}.
K is true in c at w iff ∃p ∈ DΩ : >cK = {p} ∧ w ∈ {}p;
K is false in c at w iff ∃p ∈ DΩ : >cK = {p} ∧ w /∈ {}p; else K does not have a truth value.
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VOCABULARY
• countable set of propositional variables V = {p1,p2, . . .}
• disjunction ∨
• negation ∼
• necessarily 
• universal quantifier (p)
• brackets ( and )
SEMANTICS
A structureA is an ordered triple (W,P, v), whereW (worlds) is a non-empty set, P (propositions)
is a non-empty set of subsets of W , and v (valuation) is a map from V into P .
For a structure A = (W,P, v), a world x in W , formulas B and C, and i = 1, 2, . . .:
(i) x
A
pi iff x ∈ v(pi);
(ii) x
A ∼ B iff not x
A
B ;
(iii) x
A
B ∨C iff x
A
B or x
A
C;
(iv) x
A B iff y
A
B for all y in W ;
(v) x
A
(pi)B iff x
A′
B for all structures A′ = (W,P, v′) such that v′(pi) = v(pj) for all i 6= j.
A formula A is valid in A, A , if y
A
for all y in W .
Figure 8: Fragment from Fine 1970
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VOCABULARY
For the language LA0 :
• finite set of atomic sentences A
• sentential variables
• negation ¬
• conjunction ∧
• disjunction ∨
• parentheses ( )
The language LA1 also has the unary operator might. L
A
2 adds normally and presumably.
SYNTAX
An update system is a triple, 〈L,Σ, [], where L is a language, Σ a set of relevant information states,
and [ ] a function that assigns to every sentence φ an operation [φ].
σ[φ] is a state σ updated with φ. Let W be the powerset of the set A of atomic sentences:
(i) σ is an information state iff σ ⊆W ;
(ii) 0, the minimal state, is the information state given by W ;
1, the absurd state, is the information state given by ∅;
(iii) for every two states σ and τ , σ + τ = σ ∩ τ .
For every sentence φ of LA1 and state σ, σ[φ] is determined as follows:
atoms: σ[p] = σ ∩ {w ∈W |p ∈ w}
¬: σ[¬φ] = σ ∼ σ[φ]
∧: σ[φ ∧ ψ] = σ[φ] ∩ σ[ψ]
∨: σ[φ ∨ ψ] = σ[φ] ∪ σ[ψ]
might: σ[might φ] = σ if σ[φ] 6= 1
σ[might φ] = 1 if σ[φ] = 1
If σ[φ] 6= 1, φ is acceptable in σ. If σ[φ] = 1, φ is not acceptable in σ. If σ[φ] = σ, φ is accepted in σ.
A sequence of sentences φ1, . . . , φn is consistent iff there is an information state σ such that
σ[φ1] · · · [φn] 6= 1.
SEMANTICS
For a sentence φ of LA0 , 0[φ] is the proposition expressed by φ, abbreviated JφK.JpK = {w ∈W | p ∈ w}J¬φK = W ∼ JφKJφ ∧ ψK = JφK ∩ JψKJφ ∨ ψK = JφK ∪ JψK
For LA2 , take a state σ to be a pair 〈ε, s〉, where s ∈ W and ε is an (expectation) pattern on W : a
reflexive and transitive relation on W .
If ε and ε′ are patterns on W , and e ⊆W :
(i) ε′ is a refinement of ε iff ε′ ⊆ ε;
(ii) ε ◦ e = {〈v, w〉 ∈ ε | if w ∈ e, then v ∈ e}; ε ◦ e is the refinement of ε with the proposition e.
For every sentence φ of LA2 , σ[φ] is determined as follows:
if φ is a sentence of LA0 , then
• if s ∩ JφK = ∅, then σ[φ] = 1;
• otherwise, σ[φ] = 〈ε, s ∩ JφK
if φ = normally φ, then
• if nε ∩ JφK = ∅, then σ[φ] = 1;
• otherwise, σ[φ] = 〈ε ◦ JφK, s〉
if φ = presumably φ, then
• if mσ ∩ JφK = mσ, σ[φ] = σ;
• otherwise, σ[φ] = 1
Figure 9: Fragment from Veltman 1996
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Figure 10: Fragment from Geurts 1998
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VOCABULARY
Terms
a. T = RMi ∪ RMp ∪ Tp (terms)
b. RMi = {u, v, w, . . . ,u′,u′′, . . .} (individual reference markers)
c. RMp = {p, q, r, . . . ,p′,p′′, . . .} (propositional reference markers)
d. Tp = {p+ ϕ | p ∈ RMp and ϕ is a DRS} (complex propositional terms)
DRSs and DRS-conditions
a. A DRS ϕ is a pair 〈U(ϕ),Con(ϕ)〉, where U(ϕ) ∈ RMi ∪ RMp, and Con(ϕ) is a set of DRS-
conditions.
b. If P is an n-place predicate, and α1, . . . , αn ∈ T, then Pα1, . . . , αn is a DRS-condition.
c. If α ∈ RMi ∪ RMp and β ∈ T, then α = β is a DRS-condition.
d. If ϕ and ψ are DRSs, then ¬ϕ,ϕ⇒ ψ, and ϕ ∨ ψ are DRS-conditions.
ACCESIBILITY
Extension: For any ϕ, >ϕ is the smallest preorder on propositional terms for which the following
hold, for all ψ 6 ϕ, and p, q ∈ RMp ∪ Tp:
a. If p = q + χ ∈ Con(ψ), then q 6ϕ p
b. If p = q ∈ Con(ψ), then p 6ϕ q and q 6ϕ p
Strict accessibility: 6 is the smallest preorder for which the following hold:
a. If ¬ψ ∈ Con(ϕ), then ϕ 6 ψ
b. If ψ ∨ χ ∈ Con(ϕ), then ϕ 6 ψ and ϕ 6 χ
c. If ψ ⇒ χ ∈ Con(ϕ), then ϕ 6 ψ 6 χ
d. If p+ ψ 6ϕ q + χ, then ψ 6 χ
Accessible domains: The accessible domain of a DRS ϕ is the set of references markers that are visible
from ϕ: Acc(ϕ) =
⋃
ψ>ϕ U(ψ)
292
Figure 10, continued
SEMANTICS
Embedding functions: Let M be a model with a set of worlds W and a domain of individuals Dw for
each w ∈W. Then:
1. F0M = {f | ∃X ⊆ RMi, f : X→
⋃
w∈W Dw}
2. FnM = {f ∪ g | f ∈ F0M & ∃X ⊆ RMp, g : X→ Pow(W× Fn−1M )}, for all n > 0
Let M = 〈W,D,dox, I〉 be a model, where W is a set of worlds, D is a function that assigns a
domain of individuals Dw to each w ∈W, dox a partial function from W×D to Pow(W) and I an
interpretation function. Let s = 〈w, f〉 be an indexed world, where w ∈ W and f ∈ FnM, for some
n > 0. Then:
a. ‖α‖s = f(α), if α ∈ RMi ∪ RMp; undefined otherwise
b. ‖p+ ϕ‖s = {s′ | ∃s′ ∈ ‖p‖s : s′ ∈ ‖ϕ‖s′}
c. ‖ϕ‖s = {〈w, g〉 | f ⊆ g & dom(g) = Acc(ϕ) & ∀ψ ∈ Con(ϕ), ‖ψ‖〈w,g〉 = 1}
d. ‖Pα1 . . . αn‖s = 1 iff 〈‖α1‖s, . . . , ‖αn‖s〉 ∈ Iw(P)
e. ‖α = β‖s = 1 iff ‖α‖s = ‖β‖s
f. ‖¬ϕ‖s = 1 iff ‖ϕ‖s = ∅
g. ‖ϕ ∨ ψ‖s = 1 iff ‖ϕ‖s ∪ ‖ψ‖s 6= ∅
h. ‖ϕ⇒ ψ‖s = 1 iff ∀s′ ∈ ‖ϕ‖s : ‖ψ‖s′ 6= ∅
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VOCABULARY
Types: e (individuals), τ (times), ε (eventualities), w (worlds), s (states of a discourse model)
Discourse markers: functions from stores to objects (of any type, including here e, τ , ε, and (wt))
Existence predicate, e in w, says that event or entity e exists in world w.
Marker predicate mk is true of discourse markers.
A ternary relation on worlds, closer(w,w′, w′′), says that w′ is more like w than w′′ is.
SEMANTICS
if(ω1, ω2,K) λij.∃k(i[ω1 : ω2]k ∧Kkj) ∧ ∀hk(i[ω1 : ω2]k ∧Kkh) ⊃
∀ww1(w1 ∈ ω1iw ⊃ (ω2hw1 ⊆ ω2jw1∨
∃w2w3(w2 ∈ ω2jw1 ∧ w3 ∈ ω2hw1 ∧ closer(w1, w2, w3))))
not(ω1, ω2) λi.∀ww1(w1 ∈ ω1iw ⊃ ¬(w1 ∈ ω2iw1))
may(ω1, ω2) λi.∀ww1(w1 ∈ ω1iw ∧ w1 ∈ ω2iw1)
ifω,i λKλJ λtλω.if(ω, ωi,Ktωi) ; Jωi
notω,i λKλtλω.if(ω, ωi,Ktωi) ; [ | not(ω, ωi)]
Figure 11: Fragment from Stone & Hardt 1999
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SEMANTICS
A model M is a quintuple (W,R,P,D, I), where W is a non-empty set of worlds, R is an
accessibility relation, P is a non-empty set of subsets of W (i.e. of propositions) satisfying a
number of properties, D is a non-empty domain of individuals, and I is an interpretation function
for the non-logical part of the language. An assignment function g maps individuals variables x
to elements of D, and propositional variables p to elements of P .
A satisfaction relation |=g may hold between a model M , a world w and a sequence of witnesses
s from P , on the one hand, and a formula φ on the other.
n(φ) is the number of active existential propositional quantifiers in φ.
n(Rx1 . . . xn) = 0 n(φ ∧ ψ) = n(φ) + n(ψ) n(¬φ) = 0
n(∃xφ) = n(φ) n(♦φ) = 0 n(p) = 0
n(φ = ψ) = 0 n(∃pφ) = 1 + n(φ)
M,w, s |=g Rx1 . . . xn iff 〈g(x1), . . . , g(xn)〉 ∈ I(R)(w)
M,w, s |=g ¬φ iff M,w, cs |=g φ, for no c ∈ Pn(φ)
M,w, cs |=g φ ∧ ψ iff M,w, s |=g φ & M,w, cs |=g ψ, for c ∈ Pn(ψ)
M,w, s |=g ∃xφ iff M,w, s |=g[x/d] φ, for d ∈ D
M,w, s |=g ♦φ iff ∃v : wRv & M, v, cs |=g φ, for c ∈ Pn(φ)
M,w, s |=g p iff w ∈ g(p)
M,w, s |=g φ = ψ iff ∀v : M,v, cs |=g φ iff M,v, ds |=g ψ, for c ∈ Pn(φ), d ∈ Pn(ψ)
M,w, qs |=g ∃pφ iff M,w, s |=g[p/q] φ, for q ∈ P
Disjunction ∨, implication→, universal quantification ∀, and necessity  are defined as standard
in terms of ¬,∧,∃, and ♦.
Truth: M,w |=g φ iff ∃s : M,w, s |=g φ
Entailment: φ |= ψ iff ∀M, ∀w,∀g : M,w |=g φ⇒M,w |=g ψ
Alternative sets: ALT(φ)M,g = {{w |M,w, s |=g φ} | s ∈ Pn(φ)}\∅JφKM,w,g and JφKM,w denote the extension (truth value) and intention (proposition) of φ in M with
respect to (w and) g, respectively.J∃xA(x)KM,w,g = 1 ⇔ ∃p ∈ {JA(x)KM,g[x/d] | d ∈ D} : w ∈ pJA ∨BKM,w,g = 1 ⇔ ∃p ∈ {JAKM,g, JBKM,g} : w ∈ p
Figure 12: Fragment from Aloni 2007
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VOCABULARY
• variables over partial individual concepts: x, y, . . .
• variables over worlds: w,w′, . . .
• variables over propositions/set of worlds: p, p′, pcs, . . .
• individual constants: JOHN, . . .
• properties: WOMAN, . . .
• binary relations: VISIT, . . .
SEMANTICS
Models: M = {D,W, I}, where the domain of individualsD and the domain of possible worldsW
are disjoint, and the basic interpretation function I assigns a subset of Dn to any n-ary relation R
relative to any worlds w : Iw(R) ⊆ Dn.
The interpretation function has the form J·KM,〈g,h〉, i.e., formulas denote binary relations between
an input assignment g and an output assignment h. SuperscriptM is usually omitted.
a. Jx = yK〈g,h〉 = T iff g = h and h(x) = h(y)
b. Jx = JOHNK〈g,h〉 = T iff g = h and Ran(h(x)) = {I(JOHN)}
c. Jp = p′K〈g,h〉 = T iff g = h and h(p) = h(p′)
d. Jp ⊆ p′K〈g,h〉 = T iff g = h and h(p) ⊆ h(p′)
e. JRp(x1, . . . , xn)K〈g,h〉 presupposes that for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, h(p) ⊆ Dom(h(xi));
If its presuppositions are satisfied, JRp(x1, . . . , xn)K〈g,h〉 = T iff g = h and for all worlds
w ∈ h(p), 〈h(x1)(w), . . . , h(xn)(w)〉 ∈ Iw(R)
f. J[w]K〈g,h〉 = T iff for any variable v (of any type) s.t. v 6= w, we have that g(v) = h(v)
g. J[p]K〈g,h〉 = T iff for any variable v (of any type) s.t. v 6= p, we have that g(v) = h(v)
h. J[xp]K〈g,h〉 = T iff for any variable v (of any type) s.t. v 6= x, we have that g(v) = h(v) and{
Dom(h(x)) = h(pcs) if p ⊆ pcs is the at-issue proposal
Dom(h(x)) = h(p) otherwise
i. Jϕ ∧ ψK〈g,h〉 = T iff there exists a k such that JϕK〈g,k〉 = T and JψK〈k,h〉 = T
j. Jmaxp(ϕ)K〈g,h〉 = T iff a. J[p] ∧ ϕK〈g,h〉 = T and
b. there is no h′ s.t. J[p] ∧ ϕK〈g,h′〉 = T and h(p) ( h′(p)
k. JNOTp′p (ϕ)K〈g,h〉 = T iff a. Jmaxp′(ϕ)K〈g,h〉 = T and
b. h(p) ∩ h(p′) = ∅
l. JMIGHTp′p (ϕ)K〈g,h〉 = T iff a. Jmaxp′(ϕ)K〈g,h〉 = T and
b. for all w ∈ h(p), MB(w) ∩ h(p′) 6= ∅
Figure 13: Fragment from AnderBois et al. 2013
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VOCABULARY
• Atomic expressions A,B,C
• Declarative mood 
• Interrogative mood ?
• Imperative mood !
• Variable for fixing imperative addressee x
• Negation ¬
• Conjunction ∧
• Disjunction ∨
SEMANTICS
Atomic and Connective Semantics: Given a space of possible worlds W , agents x ∈ D
1. Atomics JAK = {w | A is true in w} 2. Negation J¬φK = W − JφK
3. Conjunction Jφ ∧ ψK = JφK ∩ JψK 4. Dusjunction Jφ ∨ ψK = JφK ∪ JψK
Sentential Mood Semantics:
1. Declarative JφK = JφK
2. Interrogative J?φK = {JφK,W − JφK}
3. Imperative J!φ(x)Ks,c = {〈y, w〉 | y = addc & w ∈ Jφ(x)Ks[x/addc],c}
For a variable assignment s, context c, where addc is addressee of c, and s[x/addc] is the
assignment which differs at most from s in that it assigns x to addc
A preference state R is a binary relation on a set of alternative propositions. It represents the
preferences that are being taken for granted for the purposes of the interaction. R(a, a′) means
that a is preferred to a′. CR (issues at stake in R) is the set of (non-empty) alternatives related by
R. cR (information at stake in R) is the union of those non-empty alternatives. It is assumed that
the agents always prefer their information to absurdity, so ∀R : R(cR, ∅).
A preference state with attention is a preference state R, plus a list of propositions being attended
to: S = 〈R, 〈p0, . . . , pn〉〉. The meaning of a sentence φ is a function from one preference state with
attention S to another S′ : S[φ] = S′.
Figure 14: Fragment from Murray & Starr 2016
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VOCABULARY
Types: The set of types of Ty2 is the smallest set of strings such that:
i. e, s, and t are Ty2 types
ii. If α and β are Ty2 types, then (αβ) is a Ty2 type
• variables of type α ∈ T2
• constants of type α ∈ T2
• identity =
• lambda operator λ
• negation ¬
• universal quantifier ∀
Frames: A Ty2 frame is a set {Dα | α is a Ty2 type} such that
De 6= ∅; Ds 6= ∅; Dt = {0, 1}; Dαβ ⊆ {F | F : Dα → Dβ} for each type αβ.
A Ty2 frame is standard if Dαβ = {F | F : Dα → Dβ} for each type αβ.
SYNTAX
Define for each Ty2 type a the set of Ty2 terms of that type, as follows:
i. Every constant or variable of any type is a term of that type;
ii. If ϕ and ψ are tersm of type T (formulae) then ¬ϕ and (ϕ ∧ ψ) are formulae;
iii. If ϕ is a formula and x is a variable of any type, then ∀xϕ is a formula;
iv. If A is a term of type αβ and B is a term of type α, then (AB) is a term of type β;
v. If A is a term of type β and x is a variable of type α then λx(A) is a term of type αβ;
vi. If A and B are terms of the same type, then (A = B)is a formula.
SEMANTICS
An interpretation function I for a frame F = {Dα}α is a function having the set of all constants as
its domain such that I(cα) ∈ Dα for each constant cα of type α.
A standard model is a tuple 〈F, I〉 s.t. F is a standard frame & I is an interpretation function for F .
An assignment is a function a taking variables as its arguments s.t. a(xα) ∈ Dα for each variable xα
of type α. Write a[d/x] for the assignment a′ defined by a′(x) = d & a′(y) = a(y) if x 6= y.
The value |A|M,a of a term A on a standard model M = 〈F, I〉 under an assignment a is defined in
the following way:
i. |c| = I(c) if c is a constant;
|x| = a(x) if x is a variable;
ii. |¬ϕ| = 1− |ϕ|;
|ϕ ∧ ψ| = |ϕ| ∩ |ψ|;
iii. |∀xαϕ|M,a =
⋂
d∈Dα |ϕ|M,a[d/x];
iv. |AB| = |A|(|B|);
v. |λxβA|M,a = the function F with domain Dβ such that for all d ∈ Dβ , F (d) = |A|M,a[d/x];
vi. |A = B| = 1 if |A| = |B|,
= 0 if |A| 6= |B|.
Figure 15: Fragment of Gallin’s (1975) Ty2 as in Muskens 1995a
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